Deletion of content in large cloud storage systems

This thesis discusses the practical implications and challenges of providing secure deletion of data in cloud storage systems. Secure deletion is a desirable functionality to some users, but a requirement to others. The term secure deletion describes the practice of deleting data in such a way, that it can not be reconstructed later, even by forensic means. This work discuss the practice of secure deletion as well as existing methods that are used today. When moving from traditional on-site data storage to cloud services, these existing methods are not applicable anymore. For this reason, it presents the concept of cryptographic deletion and points out the challenge behind implementing it in a practical way. A discussion of related work in the areas of data encryption and cryptographic deletion shows that a research gap exists in applying cryptographic deletion in an efficient, practical way to cloud storage systems. The main contribution of this thesis, the Key-Cascade method, solves this issue by providing an efficient data structure for managing large numbers of encryption keys. Secure deletion is practiced today by individuals and organizations, who need to protect the confidentiality of data, after it has been deleted. It is mostly achieved by means of physical destruction or overwriting in local hard disks or large storage systems. However, these traditional methods ofoverwriting data or destroying media are not suited to large, distributed, and shared cloud storage systems. The known concept of cryptographic deletion describes storing encrypted data in an untrusted storage system, while keeping the key in a trusted location. Given that the encryption is effective, secure deletion of the data can now be achieved by securely deleting the key. Whether encryption is an acceptable protection mechanism, must be decided either by legislature or the customers themselves. This depends on whether cryptographic deletion is done to satisfy legal requirements or customer requirements. The main challenge in implementing cryptographic deletion lies in the granularity of the delete operation. Storage encryption providers today either require deleting the master key, which deletes all stored data, or require expensive copy and re-encryption operations. In the literature, a few constructions can be found that provide an optimized key management. The contributions of this thesis, found in the Key-Cascade method, expand on those findings and describe data structures and operations for implementing efficient cryptographic deletion in a cloud object store. This thesis discusses the conceptual aspects of the Key-Cascade method as well as its mathematical properties. In order to enable production use of a Key-Cascade implementation, it presents multiple extensions to the concept. These extensions improve the performance and usability and also enable frictionless integration into existing applications. With SDOS, the Secure Delete Object Store, a working implementation of the concepts and extensions is given. Its design as an API proxy is unique among the existing cryptographic deletion systems and allows integration into existing applications, without the need to modify them. The results of performance evaluations, conducted with SDOS, show that cryptographic deletion is feasible in practice. With MCM, the Micro Content Management system, this thesis also presents a larger demonstrator system for SDOS. MCM provides insight into how SDOS can be integrated into and deployed as part of a cloud data management application