Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with locational prices

CWPE0619 (EPRG0602) Xinmin Hu and Daniel Ralph (Feb 2006) Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with locational prices We study a bilevel noncooperative game-theoretic model of electricity markets with locational marginal prices. Each player faces a bilevel optimization problem that we remodel as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, MPEC. This gives an EPEC, equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. We establish sufficient conditions for existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria for this class of bilevel games and give some applications. We show by examples the effect of network transmission limits, i.e. congestion, on existence of equilibria. Then we study, for more general EPECs, the weaker pure strategy concepts of local Nash and Nash stationary equilibria. We model the latter via complementarity problems, CPs. Finally, we present numerical examples of methods that attempt to find local Nash or Nash stationary equilibria of randomly generated electricity market games. The CP solver PATH is found to be rather effective in this context

On SOCP-based disjunctive cuts for solving a class of integer bilevel nonlinear programs

We study a class of integer bilevel programs with second-order cone constraints at the upper-level and a convex-quadratic objective function and linear constraints at the lower-level. We develop disjunctive cuts (DCs) to separate bilevel-infeasible solutions using a second-order-cone-based cut-generating procedure. We propose DC separation strategies and consider several approaches for removing redundant disjunctions and normalization. Using these DCs, we propose a branch-and-cut algorithm for the problem class we study, and a cutting-plane method for the problem variant with only binary variables. We present an extensive computational study on a diverse set of instances, including instances with binary and with integer variables, and instances with a single and with multiple linking constraints. Our computational study demonstrates that the proposed enhancements of our solution approaches are effective for improving the performance. Moreover, both of our approaches outperform a state-of-the-art generic solver for mixed-integer bilevel linear programs that is able to solve a linearized version of our binary instances.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:2111.0682

Public evaluation of large projects : variational inequialities, bilevel programming and complementarity. A survey

Large projects evaluation rises well known difficulties because -by definition- they modify the current price system; their public evaluation presents additional difficulties because they modify too existing shadow prices without the project. This paper analyzes -first- the basic methodologies applied until late 80s., based on the integration of projects in optimization models or, alternatively, based on iterative procedures with information exchange between two organizational levels. New methodologies applied afterwards are based on variational inequalities, bilevel programming and linear or nonlinear complementarity. Their foundations and different applications related with project evaluation are explored. As a matter of fact, these new tools are closely related among them and can treat more complex cases involving -for example- the reaction of agents to policies or the existence of multiple agents in an environment characterized by common functions representing demands or constraints on polluting emissions