Securing the Participation of Safety-Critical SCADA Systems in the Industrial Internet of Things

In the past, industrial control systems were ‘air gapped’ and isolated from more conventional networks. They used specialist protocols, such as Modbus, that are very different from TCP/IP. Individual devices used proprietary operating systems rather than the more familiar Linux or Windows. However, things are changing. There is a move for greater connectivity – for instance so that higher-level enterprise management systems can exchange information that helps optimise production processes. At the same time, industrial systems have been influenced by concepts from the Internet of Things; where the information derived from sensors and actuators in domestic and industrial components can be addressed through network interfaces. This paper identifies a range of cyber security and safety concerns that arise from these developments. The closing sections introduce potential solutions and identify areas for future research

Towards a Layered Architectural View for Security Analysis in SCADA Systems

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems support and control the operation of many critical infrastructures that our society depend on, such as power grids. Since SCADA systems become a target for cyber attacks and the potential impact of a successful attack could lead to disastrous consequences in the physical world, ensuring the security of these systems is of vital importance. A fundamental prerequisite to securing a SCADA system is a clear understanding and a consistent view of its architecture. However, because of the complexity and scale of SCADA systems, this is challenging to acquire. In this paper, we propose a layered architectural view for SCADA systems, which aims at building a common ground among stakeholders and supporting the implementation of security analysis. In order to manage the complexity and scale, we define four interrelated architectural layers, and uses the concept of viewpoints to focus on a subset of the system. We indicate the applicability of our approach in the context of SCADA system security analysis.Comment: 7 pages, 4 figure

Forensic Attacks Analysis and the Cyber Security of Safety-Critical Industrial Control Systems

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) applications monitor and control a wide range of safety-related functions. These include energy generation where failures could have significant, irreversible consequences. They also include the control systems that are used in the manufacture of safety-related products. In this case bugs in an ICS/SCADA system could introduce flaws in the production of components that remain undetected before being incorporated into safety-related applications. Industrial Control Systems, typically, use devices and networks that are very different from conventional IP-based infrastructures. These differences prevent the re-use of existing cyber-security products in ICS/SCADA environments; the architectures, file formats and process structures are very different. This paper supports the forensic analysis of industrial control systems in safety-related applications. In particular, we describe how forensic attack analysis is used to identify weaknesses in devices so that we can both protect components but also determine the information that must be analyzed during the aftermath of a cyber-incident. Simulated attacks detect vulnerabilities; a risk-based approach can then be used to assess the likelihood and impact of any breach. These risk assessments are then used to justify both immediate and longer-term countermeasures