Modal logic NL for common language

Despite initial appearance, paradoxes in classical logic, when comprehension is unrestricted, do not go away even if the law of excluded middle is dropped, unless the law of noncontradiction is eliminated as well, which makes logic much less powerful. Is there an alternative way to preserve unrestricted comprehension of common language, while retaining power of classical logic? The answer is yes, when provability modal logic is utilized. Modal logic NL is constructed for this purpose. Unless a paradox is provable, usual rules of classical logic follow. The main point for modal logic NL is to tune the law of excluded middle so that we allow for a sentence and its negation to be both false in case a paradox provably arises. Curry's paradox is resolved differently from other paradoxes but is also resolved in modal logic NL. The changes allow for unrestricted comprehension and naive set theory, and allow us to justify use of common language in formal sense

A Recipe for Paradox

In this paper, we provide a recipe that not only captures the common structure of semantic paradoxes but also captures our intuitions regarding the relations between these paradoxes. Before we unveil our recipe, we first talk about a well-known schema introduced by Graham Priest, namely, the Inclosure Schema. Without rehashing previous arguments against the Inclosure Schema, we contribute different arguments for the same concern that the Inclosure Schema bundles together the wrong paradoxes. That is, we will provide further arguments on why the Inclosure Schema is both too narrow and too broad. We then spell out our recipe. The recipe shows that all of the following paradoxes share the same structure: The Liar, Curry's paradox, Validity Curry, Provability Liar, Provability Curry, Knower's paradox, Knower's Curry, Grelling-Nelson's paradox, Russell's paradox in terms of extensions, alternative Liar and alternative Curry, and hitherto unexplored paradoxes. We conclude the paper by stating the lessons that we can learn from the recipe, and what kind of solutions the recipe suggests if we want to adhere to the Principle of Uniform Solution

Modal logic NL for common language

Despite initial appearance, paradoxes in classical logic, when comprehension is unrestricted, do not go away even if the law of excluded middle is dropped, unless the law of noncontradiction is eliminated as well, which makes logic much less powerful. Is there an alternative way to preserve unrestricted comprehension of common language, while retaining power of classical logic? The answer is yes, when provability modal logic is utilized. Modal logic NL is constructed for this purpose. Unless a paradox is provable, usual rules of classical logic follow. The main point for modal logic NL is to tune the law of excluded middle so that we allow for a sentence and its negation to be both false in case a paradox provably arises. Curry's paradox is resolved differently from other paradoxes but is also resolved in modal logic NL. The changes allow for unrestricted comprehension and naive set theory, and allow us to justify use of common language in formal sense

Reply to MacFarlane, Scharp, Shapiro, and Wright

Philosoph

Gapping as Constituent Coordination

A number of coordinate constructions in natural languages conjoin sequences which do not appear to correspond to syntactic constituents in the traditional sense. One striking instance of the phenomenon is afforded by the gapping construction of English, of which the following sentence is a simple example: (1) Harry eats beans, and Fred, potatoes Since all theories agree that coordination must in fact be an operation upon constituents, most of them have dealt with the apparent paradox presented by such constructions by supposing that such sequences as the right conjunct in the above example, Fred, potatoes, should be treated in the grammar as traditional constituents, of type S, but with pieces missing or deleted

Indicative conditionals, restricted quantification, and naive truth

This paper extends Kripke’s theory of truth to a language with a variably strict conditional operator, of the kind that Stalnaker and others have used to represent ordinary indicative conditionals of English. It then shows how to combine this with a different and independently motivated conditional operator, to get a substantial logic of restricted quantification within naive truth theory