GridEmail: A Case for Economically Regulated Internet-based Interpersonal Communications

Email has emerged as a dominant form of electronic communication between people. Spam is a major problem for email users, with estimates of up to 56% of email falling into that category. Control of Spam is being attempted with technical and legislative methods. In this paper we look at email and spam from a supply-demand perspective. We propose Gridemail, an email system based on an economy of communicating parties, where participants? motivations are represented as pricing policies and profiles. This system is expected to help people regulate their personal communications to suit their conditions, and help in removing unwanted messages.Comment: 15 pages, 10 figures, A Technical Report from Grid Computing and Distributed Systems Laboratory, University of Melbourne, Australi

CommitCoin: Carbon Dating Commitments with Bitcoin

Abstract. In the standard definition of a commitment scheme, the sender commits to a message and immediately sends the commitment to the recipient interested in it. However the sender may not always know at the time of commitment who will become interested in verifying it. Further, when the interested party does emerge, it could be critical to establish when the commitment was made. Employing a proof of work protocol at commitment time will later allow anyone to “carbon date ” when the commitment was made, approximately, without trusting any external parties. We present CommitCoin, an instantiation of this approach that harnesses the existing processing power of the Bitcoin peer-to-peer network; a network used to mint and trade digital cash. 1 Introductory Remarks Consider the scenario where Alice makes an important discovery. It is important to her that she receives recognition for her breakthrough, however she would also like to keep it a secret until she can establish a suitable infrastructure for monetizing it. By forgoing publication of her discovery, she risks Bob independently making the same discovery and publicizing it as his own. Folklore suggests that Alice might mail herself a copy of her discovery and leave the letter sealed, with the postal service’s timestamp intact, for a later resolution time. If Bob later claims the same discovery, th

Protection Against Spam Using Pre-Challenges

Abstract: Spam turns out to be an increasingly serious problem to email users. A number of anti-spam schemes have been proposed and deployed, but the problem has yet been well addressed. One of those schemes is challenge-response, in which a challenge is imposed on an email sender. However, such a scheme introduces new problems for the users, e.g., delay of service and denial of service attacks. In this paper, we introduce a pre-challenge scheme that avoids those problems. It assumes each user has a challenge that is defined by the user himself/herself and associated with his/her email address, in such a way that an email sender can simultaneously retrieve a new receiver's email address and challenge before sending an email in the first contact. Some new mechanisms are employed to reach a good balance between security against spam and convenience to email users

How to Protect Against a Militant Spammer

We consider how to avoid unsolicited e-mail -- so called spam -- in a stronger adversarial model than has previously been considered. Our primary concern is the proposal of an architecture and of protocols preventing against successful spamming attacks launched by a strong attacker. This attacker is assumed to control the communication media and to be capable of corrupting large numbers of protocol participants. Additionally, the same architecture can be used as a basis to support message integrity and privacy, though this is not a primary goal of our work. This results in a simple and efficient solution that is largely backwards-compatible, and which addresses many of the concerns surrounding e-mail communication

Pioneers, Submariners, or Thicket-builders: Which Firms Use Continuations in Patenting?

The continuations procedure within the U.S. patent system has been criticized for enabling firms to manipulate the patent review process for strategic purposes. Changes during the 1990s in patent procedures affected the incentives of applicants to exploit the continuations process, and additional reforms in continuations currently are being considered. Nonetheless, little is known about applicants' use of the three major types of continuations -- the Continuation Application (CAP), the Continuations-In-Part (CIP), and Divisions -- to alter the term and scope of patents. This paper analyzes patents issued from the three types of continuations to U.S. firms during 1981 - 2004 (with priority years 1981 - 2000), and links their frequency to the characteristics of patents, assignees and industries. We find that CIPs are disproportionately filed by R&D-intensive, small firms that patent heavily, and are more common in chemical and biological technologies. Patents resulting from CIP filings contain more claims and backward citations per patent on average, and cover relatively "valuable" inventions. In contrast, CAPs cover less valuable patents from large, capital-intensive firms that patent intensively, particularly in computer and semiconductor patents. We also analyze the effects of the 1995 change in patent term on continuation applications and find that the Act reduced the use of continuations overall, while shifting the output of CAPs toward "less important" patents.

Incentive-Centered Design for Information Security

Humans are "smart components" in a system, but cannot be directly programmed to perform; rather, their autonomy must be respected as a design constraint and incentives provided to induce desired behavior. Sometimes these incentives are properly aligned, and the humans don't represent a vulnerability. But often, a misalignment of incentives causes a weakness in the system that can be exploited by clever attackers. Incentive-centered design tools help us understand these problems, and provide design principles to alleviate them. We describe incentive-centered design and some tools it provides. We provide a number of examples of security problems for which incentive- centered design might be helpful. We elaborate with a general screening model that offers strong design principles for a class of security problems.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/49505/1/icd-security-position.pd