The Weirdest People in the World?

Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world’s top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers—often implicitly—assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these “standard subjects” are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species—frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, selfconcepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior—hence, there are no obvious a priori grounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions of human nature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges.external validity, population variability, experiments, cross-cultural research, culture, human universals, generalizability, evolutionary psychology, cultural psychology, behavioral economics

Evidence and Formal Models in the Linguistic Sciences

This dissertation contains a collection of essays centered on the relationship between theoretical model-building and empirical evidence-gathering in linguistics and related language sciences. The first chapter sets the stage by demonstrating that the subject matter of linguistics is manifold, and contending that discussion of relationships between linguistic models, evidence, and language itself depends on the subject matter at hand. The second chapter defends a restrictive account of scientific evidence. I make use of this account in the third chapter, in which I argue that if my account of scientific evidence is correct, then linguistic intuitions do not generally qualify as scientific evidence. Drawing on both extant and original empirical work on linguistic intuitions, I explore the consequences of this conclusion for scientific practice. In the fourth and fifth chapters I examine two distinct ways in which theoretical models relate to the evidence. Chapter four looks at the way in which empirical evidence can support computer simulations in evolutionary linguistics by informing and constraining them. Chapter five, on the other hand, probes the limits of how models are constrained by the data, taking as a case study empirically-suspect but theoretically-useful intentionalist models of meaning

The nature of intuition : what theories of intuition ought to be

Immediate striking feelings without any conscious inference are viewed as one of the sources of truth by many philosophers. It is often claimed that there is a long tradition in philosophy of viewing intuitive propositions as true without need for further justification, since the intuitiveness, for traditional philosophy, suggests that the proposition is self-evident. In philosophical discussions, it was extremely common for philosophers to argue for the intuitiveness of their theories. Contemporary philosophers have put increasing attention and effort into the study of this methodology in philosophy. They explicitly use the term ‘intuition’ and ‘appealing to intuition’ to refer to such common practice in philosophy. Recently there are numerous papers discussing the topic of intuition, its reliability, evidential status, and what philosophy ought to be. These disputes have lasted for several decades and it seems the disputes may even continue for several more decades. Despite the excessive usage of the term ‘intuition’, there are still polarized attitudes towards intuition: not only on the question of whether we should appeal to intuition in doing philosophy, but also on what ‘intuition’ means. The latter problem, the divergence of understanding on ‘intuition’, seems to be the main factor causing endless disputes of this topic and it should be the problem primarily solved. There are philosophers who notice the problem that there is no general agreement on the accounts of intuition. However, surprisingly, most of them have not attempted to solve the problem, but just simply give their own accounts of intuition, or claim that it is improbable to have general agreement on the definition of ‘intuition’ instead. In fact, it is possible to have a general acceptable theory of intuition. The main aims of the thesis are to provide the method of seeking the good candidates for a general acceptable theory of intuition and to use the method in seeking one of the good theories. In order to achieve the goals, the thesis will (1) provide the ground for the discussion, by specifying several features of intuition as the desiderata of a good theory; and (2) examine several theories of intuition that have been offered in recent literature as example. We will find that, unfortunately, among the theories selected in philosophy, there still seems to be no satisfactory account of intuition. Nevertheless, there seems a promising account of intuition offered in psychology. The thesis will argue the psychological account is one of the good candidates of general acceptable theory of intuition. If not, we at least have a method of seeking the good theories of intuition

Sins sans suffering: children's moralization of victimless actions

Many traditional accounts of moral development posit that children actively construct moral beliefs by reasoning about the distress they directly perceive in the aftermath of harmful or unjust actions. However, these accounts cannot straightforwardly explain the development of moral beliefs about harmless but tabooed actions. For cases such as these, when no negative behavioral consequences are apparent, top-down socialization processes (e.g., verbal instruction or "testimony" from adults) may instead influence moral development, as well as emotional reactions such as disgust. The present research consists of four studies that empirically examine the mechanisms leading to the formation of moral values involving victimless actions. Seven-year-old children were recruited as participants in this research. They were shown pictures of anthropomorphic aliens engaged in novel body-focused or environment-focused actions, all of which were harmless. After being exposed to one of various experimental manipulations, children were asked to judge whether the depicted actions were "wrong" or "OK". It was hypothesized that participants would readily acquire new moral beliefs upon being exposed to each of the experimental manipulations that were employed, even though none invoked suffering or harm. Study 1 (N = 64) found that information about unnaturalness and the invocation of disgust each elevated moralization, and that their independent effects were compounded when these manipulations were presented jointly. Study 2 (N = 90) demonstrated that verbally presented testimony about disgust, but not the induced emotional experience of disgust, was an effective mechanism for moralization, particularly for children who were more disgust sensitive. Study 3 (N = 30) found that children responded to testimony about anger with similar patterns of moralization as when given testimony about disgust, but that anger-based testimony was especially effective for children who were more highly prone to anger. Study 4 (N = 28) found that children's moral beliefs were retained after a prolonged time delay. In sum, across four studies, children were found to rapidly form new moral beliefs about victimless actions, particularly upon exposure to emotionally laden testimony. Overall, this research demonstrates that children are susceptible to swiftly acquiring moral beliefs even in the absence of obvious adverse outcomes

Religion, Science, and the Conscious Self: Bio-Psychological Explanation and the Debate Between Dualism and Naturalism

This dissertation approaches metaphysical and metaethical questions concerning the nature of the human person, the existence and nature of God, and the nature of moral judgment through contemporary neuroscience, cognitive science, scientific moral psychology, and analytic philosophy of mind. Contrary to proposals that seek a harmonious integration of religion and science this dissertation argues that contemporary bio-psychological sciences give one ample reason to be skeptical of many of the metaphysical and metaethical claims embedded in religious traditions like Christianity and Buddhism. The first three chapters of the dissertation focus on the metaphysical issue of mind-body dualism while the fourth chapter addresses closely related metaethical issues regarding the nature and origin of moral judgment. Chapter One calls into question the truth of dualism and defends a version of psychoneural identity theory as the most adequate solution to the mind-body problem. If dualism is not true, why is it so ubiquitous across cultures? Drawing on research in both neuroscience and cognitive science, Chapter Two offers a naturalistic, bio-psychological explanation of dualism. Chapter Three applies the conclusions of the first two chapters to religious and theological concerns. The link between mind-body dualism and theism is highlighted, and it is argued that the collapse of mind-body dualism renders many versions of theism problematic. Philip Clayton\u27s attempt to integrate an emergentist doctrine of the human person with a dualist doctrine of God is critiqued, as is B. Alan Wallace\u27s more experiential defense of religious dualism from a Buddhist perspective. Along with a commitment to dualism, many religious traditions understand moral judgment as something objectively grounded in divine commands and/or reason. Chapter Four argues that research in scientific moral psychology implicating the emotions in moral judgment raises significant questions for theological and reason based accounts of moral judgment

Religion and morality

The relationship between religion and morality has long been hotly debated. Does religion make us more moral? Is it necessary for morality? Do moral inclinations emerge independently of religious intuitions? These debates, which nowadays rumble on in scientific journals as well as in public life, have frequently been marred by a series of conceptual confusions and limitations. Many scientific investigations have failed to decompose “religion” and “morality” into theoretically grounded elements; have adopted parochial conceptions of key concepts—in particular, sanitized conceptions of “prosocial” behavior; and have neglected to consider the complex interplay between cognition and culture. We argue that to make progress, the categories “religion” and “morality” must be fractionated into a set of biologically and psychologically cogent traits, revealing the cognitive foundations that shape and constrain relevant cultural variants. We adopt this fractionating strategy, setting out an encompassing evolutionary framework within which to situate and evaluate relevant evidence. Our goals are twofold: to produce a detailed picture of the current state of the field, and to provide a road map for future research on the relationship between religion and morality

Incapacitating Errors: Sentencing and the Science of Change

Despite widespread support for shifting sentencing policy from “tough on crime” to “smart on crime,” reflected in legislation like the federal First Step Act, the scope of criminal justice reform has been limited. We continue to engage in practices that permanently incapacitate people while carving out only limited niches of sentencing reform for special groups like first-time nonviolent offenders and adolescents. We cannot, however, be “smart on crime” without a theory of punishment that supports second chances for the broadest range of people convicted of crimes.This Article posits that the cultural belief that adults do not change poses a major impediment to “smart on crime” policies. Current sentencing policies focus on long-term incapacitation of adults with criminal records because of our folk belief that adult personality traits are immutable. Whereas adolescents are expected to mature over time, and thus can rarely be determined to require permanent incapacitation, adults lack the benefit of the presumption of change.Standing in contrast to our folk belief that adults do not change is a growing body of neuroscientific and psychological literature that this Article refers to as, “the science of adult change,” which demonstrates that adult brains change in response to environmental prompts and experience.The science of adult change has powerful implications for punishment theory and practice. In its broadest sense, the science of adult change supports an empirically grounded, normative claim that sentencing should not attempt to identify the true criminal to permanently exclude. Rather, sentencing policy should engage in only modest predictions about future behavior. The presumption of reintegration as a full member of society should be the norm. Moreover, because adult change occurs in response to environmental stimuli, the science of adult change supports both public accountability for the conditions of confinement and, ultimately, a challenge to incarceration as our primary means of responding to social harm

Implicit Cultures: Towards a Psychosocial Theory of ‘Intuitive Religious Beliefs’

This thesis defines and resolves some persistent criticisms of Justin Barrett and Jessie Bering’s shared contention that religious beliefs are compelled by ‘default’ cognitive systems. I contend that the source of these criticisms is correctly the ‘naturalness of religious belief’ metathesis. This metathesis justifies the methodological reductions that both use to account for ‘intuitive religious beliefs.’ Through a review of the critical literature sourced from various methodologies including anthropology, hermeneutics, and social neuroscience, I uncover a recurrent set of criticisms that I contend theories of ‘intuitive religion’ need to confront in order to strengthen the theoretical, and by inference, empirical validity of their theories. Yet I also discuss why it is that Bering and Barrett fail to incorporate insights relative to persistent criticisms of their research, emphasising that it is because they fail to see the experimental plausibility of alternative methodologies and theories. Somewhat proactively, I argue that Mathew Day’s proposal for a psychosocial theory of religion offers a step in the right direction. Day’s psychosocial theory rejects the ‘naturalness of religion’ metathesis. My own revision and application of psychosocial theory allows for the reinterpretation of Bering and Barrett’s findings from the vantage point of cultural psychology. I close by offering a developmental theory of ‘intuitive religious beliefs’ that includes the numerous theoretical perspectives addressed throughout this thesis and, crucially, is empirically grounded in research from cultural psychology. I propose a tentative empirical test to trial my claims

The social brain in human and religious evolution: Elucidating the role of theory of mind in (non)religious belief

Contemporary theorists of religion have argued that religious beliefs are “natural” because they arise from normally functioning social cognitive capacities, especially Theory of Mind (ToM). Hence, attempts to explain atheism have relied heavily on the assumption that nonbelievers may have a malfunctioning ToM and other traits associated with the autism spectrum continuum (ASC). However, few studies currently address this topic and the evidence either way remains ambiguous. The current research narrows this empirical gap, addressing these claims with a two-fold approach. First, a near comprehensive review of ToM is provided. Second, this study is exploratory, employing a unique methodology and previously untapped empirical measures to test for differences in ToM components and ASC traits between atheists (N = 2423) and theists (N = 103)