Validating a Web Service Security Abstraction by Typing

An XML web service is, to a first approximation, an RPC service in which requests and responses are encoded in XML as SOAP envelopes, and transported over HTTP. We consider the problem of authenticating requests and responses at the SOAP-level, rather than relying on transport-level security. We propose a security abstraction, inspired by earlier work on secure RPC, in which the methods exported by a web service are annotated with one of three security levels: none, authenticated, or both authenticated and encrypted. We model our abstraction as an object calculus with primitives for defining and calling web services. We describe the semantics of our object calculus by translating to a lower-level language with primitives for message passing and cryptography. To validate our semantics, we embed correspondence assertions that specify the correct authentication of requests and responses. By appeal to the type theory for cryptographic protocols of Gordon and Jeffrey's Cryptyc, we verify the correspondence assertions simply by typing. Finally, we describe an implementation of our semantics via custom SOAP headers.Comment: 44 pages. A preliminary version appears in the Proceedings of the Workshop on XML Security 2002, pp. 18-29, November 200

Refinement Types for Secure Implementations

We present the design and implementation of a typechecker for verifying security properties of the source code of cryptographic protocols and access control mechanisms. The underlying type theory is a λ-calculus equipped with refinement types for expressing pre- and post-conditions within first-order logic. We derive formal cryptographic primitives and represent active adversaries within the type theory. Well-typed programs enjoy assertion-based security properties, with respect to a realistic threat model including key compromise. The implementation amounts to an enhanced typechecker for the general purpose functional language F#; typechecking generates verification conditions that are passed to an SMT solver. We describe a series of checked examples. This is the first tool to verify authentication properties of cryptographic protocols by typechecking their source code. © 2008 IEEE

Everest: Towards a Verified, Drop-in Replacement of HTTPS

The HTTPS ecosystem is the foundation on which Internet security is built. At the heart of this ecosystem is the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, which in turn uses the X.509 public-key infrastructure and numerous cryptographic constructions and algorithms. Unfortunately, this ecosystem is extremely brittle, with headline-grabbing attacks and emergency patches many times a year. We describe our ongoing efforts in Everest (The Everest VERified End-to-end Secure Transport) a project that aims to build and deploy a verified version of TLS and other components of HTTPS, replacing the current infrastructure with proven, secure software. Aiming both at full verification and usability, we conduct high-level code-based, game-playing proofs of security on cryptographic implementations that yield efficient, deployable code, at the level of C and assembly. Concretely, we use F*, a dependently typed language for programming, meta-programming, and proving at a high level, while relying on low-level DSLs embedded within F* for programming low-level components when necessary for performance and, sometimes, side-channel resistance. To compose the pieces, we compile all our code to source-like C and assembly, suitable for deployment and integration with existing code bases, as well as audit by independent security experts. Our main results so far include (1) the design of Low*, a subset of F* designed for C-like imperative programming but with high-level verification support, and KreMLin, a compiler that extracts Low* programs to C; (2) an implementation of the TLS-1.3 record layer in Low*, together with a proof of its concrete cryptographic security; (3) Vale, a new DSL for verified assembly language, and several optimized cryptographic primitives proven functionally correct and side-channel resistant. In an early deployment, all our verified software is integrated and deployed within libcurl, a widely used library of networking protocols

ERINYES: A CONTINUOUS AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL

The need for user authentication in the digital domain is paramount as the number of digital interactions that involve sensitive data continues to increase. Advances in the fields of machine learning (ML) and biometric encryption have enabled the development of technologies that can provide fully remote continuous user authentication services. This thesis introduces the Erinyes protocol. The protocol leverages state of the art ML models, biometric encryption of asymmetric cryptographic keys, and a trusted third-party client-server architecture to continuously authenticate users through their behavioral biometrics. The goals in developing the protocol were to identify if biometric encryption using keystroke timing and mouse cursor movement sequences were feasible and to measure the performance of a continuous authentication system that utilizes biometric encryption. Our research found that with a combined keystroke and mouse cursor movement dataset, the biometric encryption system can perform with a 0.93% False Acceptance Rate (FAR), 0.00% False Reject Rate (FRR), and 99.07% accuracy. Using a similar dataset, the overall integrated system averaged 0% FAR, 2% FRR and 98% accuracy across multiple users. These metrics demonstrate that the Erinyes protocol can achieve continuous user authentication with minimal user intrusion.Lieutenant, United States NavyLieutenant, United States NavyApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

Proving Cryptographic C Programs Secure with General-Purpose Verification Tools

Security protocols, such as TLS or Kerberos, and security devices such as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) or PKCS#11 tokens, are central to many computer interactions. Yet, such security critical components are still often found vulnerable to attack after their deployment, either because the specification is insecure, or because of implementation errors. Techniques exist to construct machine-checked proofs of security properties for abstract specifications. However, this may leave the final executable code, often written in lower level languages such as C, vulnerable both to logical errors, and low-level flaws. Recent work on verifying security properties of C code is often based on soundly extracting, from C programs, protocol models on which security properties can be proved. However, in such methods, any change in the C code, however trivial, may require one to perform a new and complex security proof. Our goal is therefore to develop or identify a framework in which security properties of cryptographic systems can be formally proved, and that can also be used to soundly verify, using existing general-purpose tools, that a C program shares the same security properties. We argue that the current state of general-purpose verification tools for the C language, as well as for functional languages, is sufficient to achieve this goal, and illustrate our argument by developing two verification frameworks around the VCC verifier. In the symbolic model, we illustrate our method by proving authentication and weak secrecy for implementations of several network security protocols. In the computational model, we illustrate our method by proving authentication and strong secrecy properties for an exemplary key management API, inspired by the TPM

CALIPER: Continuous Authentication Layered with Integrated PKI Encoding Recognition

Architectures relying on continuous authentication require a secure way to challenge the user's identity without trusting that the Continuous Authentication Subsystem (CAS) has not been compromised, i.e., that the response to the layer which manages service/application access is not fake. In this paper, we introduce the CALIPER protocol, in which a separate Continuous Access Verification Entity (CAVE) directly challenges the user's identity in a continuous authentication regime. Instead of simply returning authentication probabilities or confidence scores, CALIPER's CAS uses live hard and soft biometric samples from the user to extract a cryptographic private key embedded in a challenge posed by the CAVE. The CAS then uses this key to sign a response to the CAVE. CALIPER supports multiple modalities, key lengths, and security levels and can be applied in two scenarios: One where the CAS must authenticate its user to a CAVE running on a remote server (device-server) for access to remote application data, and another where the CAS must authenticate its user to a locally running trusted computing module (TCM) for access to local application data (device-TCM). We further demonstrate that CALIPER can leverage device hardware resources to enable privacy and security even when the device's kernel is compromised, and we show how this authentication protocol can even be expanded to obfuscate direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM) malwares.Comment: Accepted to CVPR 2016 Biometrics Worksho

Modular code-based cryptographic verification

International audienceType systems are effective tools for verifying the security of cryptographic programs. They provide automation, modularity and scalability, and have been applied to large security protocols. However, they traditionally rely on abstract assumptions on the underlying cryptographic primitives, expressed in symbolic models. Cryptographers usually reason on security assumptions using lower level, computational models that precisely account for the complexity and success probability of attacks. These models are more realistic, but they are harder to formalize and automate. We present the first modular automated program verification method based on standard cryptographic assumptions. We show how to verify ideal functionalities and protocols written in ML by typing them against new cryptographic interfaces using F7, a refinement type checker coupled with an SMT-solver. We develop a probabilistic core calculus for F7 and formalize its type safety in Coq. We build typed module and interfaces for MACs, signatures, and encryptions, and establish their authenticity and secrecy properties. We relate their ideal functionalities and concrete implementations, using game-based program transformations behind typed interfaces. We illustrate our method on a series of protocol implementations

A Bio-Crypto Protocol for Password Protection Using ECC

In  information  security the  following security parameters like, integrity , non repudiation and confidentiality , authentication   must be satisfied.  To avoid thievery of organization resources  it needs be secured in more efficient way  and there is always demand  for different levels of security attacks include virus , brute force and Eveadroper  in business that  organizations make use of voice biometrics an attractive low-cost. Voice biometrics is the  cheapest  among the  other biometrics and used all levels for management to buy readily available metric and it is the way of  identifying individuals remotely  with high level of accuracy . In this work, we have been designed a  new  password- authentication approach  that provides security  using voice biometrics for authentication and uses the device  itself into an authenticator which uses  voice itself as its passwords and we are primarily interested in keys that can be temporally reproduced on the same device from the same user’s voice. Public and private keys are generated  randomly from the user's voice  and stored in the voice file(.wav).This Method uses voice recognition , include the operation of  register( recording feature ) or voice prints  and  storing of one or more voice passwords into the  database. It uses ECDSA to perform the authentication process that matching the  voice sample  with the database. The recognition, entity makes the database  to decide that  the sample is matched to perform an operation or not. Our proposed approach  generates cryptographic keys from voice input itself and this algorithm developed an adhoc basis. It can effectively defend  attacks specially brute force attack in system networks