Implementing broadcast channels with memory for electronic voting systems

To provide universal verifiability, cryptographic voting protocols often require a broadcast channel to spread the election data to the public. The basic requirements on such a broadcast channel are similar for most protocols, for example that the channel maintains a memory of all broadcast messages and that nothing can be deleted from the channel’s memory. In this paper, we provide a formal definition for such broadcast channels with memory and describe their properties. We also analyze the significance of a broadcast channel with memory in cryptographic voting protocols and propose that such a channel is provided in form of a service that we call bulletin board. Based on this service, we analyze some real-world problems that cryptographic voting protocols might have and provide possible solutions. For this we define a generic interface for the main board functionalities, which offers a flexible way of extending the basic properties of a bulletin board to comply with all sorts of additional requirements

Blockchain, consensus, and cryptography in electronic voting

Motivated by the recent trends to conduct electronic elections using blockchain technologies, we review the vast literature on cryptographic voting and assess the status of the field. We analyze the security requirements for voting systems and describe the major ideas behind the most influential cryptographic protocols for electronic voting. We focus on the great importance of consensus in the elimination of trusted third parties. Finally, we examine whether recent blockchain innovations can satisfy the strict requirements set for the security of electronic voting

Internet Voting Protocols: An Analysis of the Cryptographic Operations per Phase

Internet voting is a good option for Colombia thanks to the expansion of mobile technology throughout the country and the interest of the government to implement the e-voting. For this reason, we study the e-voting protocols to establish if any of them is suitable for Colombian elections. However some of them imply a great number of cryptographic operations and therefore a great computational cost for the devices, which sometimes exceed their capacity. In this paper, we determine the number of cryptographic operations per phase of four e-voting protocols: one based on blind signatures (Li, Hwang and Lai protocol), one based on mix nets (Meng protocol), one based on homomorphic encryption (EVIV protocol) and one used in real electoral processes (I-Voting for Estonian Elections). Then, we analyze the changes in the number of operations when the number of voters, number of votes, number of authorities and number of candidates increase for small, medium and large elections. Finally, we establish the protocol that imply a less number of cryptographic operations and is suitable for big electoral processes, such as congress elections in Colombia

Automated Cryptographic Analysis of the Pedersen Commitment Scheme

Aiming for strong security assurance, recently there has been an increasing interest in formal verification of cryptographic constructions. This paper presents a mechanised formal verification of the popular Pedersen commitment protocol, proving its security properties of correctness, perfect hiding, and computational binding. To formally verify the protocol, we extended the theory of EasyCrypt, a framework which allows for reasoning in the computational model, to support the discrete logarithm and an abstraction of commitment protocols. Commitments are building blocks of many cryptographic constructions, for example, verifiable secret sharing, zero-knowledge proofs, and e-voting. Our work paves the way for the verification of those more complex constructions.Comment: 12 pages, conference MMM-ACNS 201

Proving Coercion-Resistance of Scantegrity II

By now, many voting protocols have been proposed that, among others, are designed to achieve coercion-resistance, i.e., resistance to vote buying and voter coercion. Scantegrity II is among the most prominent and successful such protocols in that it has been used in several elections. However, almost none of the modern voting protocols used in practice, including Scantegrity II, has undergone a rigorous cryptographic analysis. In this paper, we prove that Scantegrity II enjoys an optimal level of coercion-resistance, i.e., the same level of coercion-resistance as an ideal voting protocol (which merely reveals the outcome of the election), except for so-called forced abstention attacks. This result is obtained under the (necessary) assumption that the workstation used in the protocol is honest. Our analysis is based on a rigorous cryptographic definition of coercion-resistance we recently proposed. We argue that this definition is in fact the only existing cryptographic definition of coercion-resistance suitable for analyzing Scantegrity II. Our case study should encourage and facilitate rigorous cryptographic analysis of coercion-resistance also for other voting protocols used in practice

Verifying privacy by little interaction and no process equivalence

While machine-assisted verification of classical security goals such as confidentiality and authentication is well-established, it is less mature for recent ones. Electronic voting protocols claim properties such as voter privacy. The most common modelling involves indistinguishability, and is specified via trace equivalence in cryptographic extensions of process calculi. However, it has shown restrictions. We describe a novel model, based on unlinkability between two pieces of information. Specifying it as an extension to the Inductive Method allows us to establish voter privacy without the need for approximation or session bounding. The two models and their latest specifications are contrasted

Return Codes from Lattice Assumptions

We present an approach for creating return codes for latticebased electronic voting. For a voting system with four control components and two rounds of communication our scheme results in a total of 2.3MB of communication per voter, taking less than 1 s of computation. Together with the shuffle and the decryption protocols by Aranha et al. [1,2], the return codes presented can be used to build a post-quantum secure cryptographic voting scheme

Public Evidence from Secret Ballots

Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. And they have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to be affordable and maintainable, and usable by voters, election officials, and pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts: convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this tightrope.Comment: To appear in E-Vote-Id '1