Environmental analysis for application layer networks

Die zunehmende Vernetzung von Rechnern über das Internet lies die Vision von Application Layer Netzwerken aufkommen. Sie umfassen Overlay Netzwerke wie beispielsweise Peer-to-Peer Netzwerke und Grid Infrastrukturen unter Verwendung des TCP/IP Protokolls. Ihre gemeinsame Eigenschaft ist die redundante, verteilte Bereitstellung und der Zugang zu Daten-, Rechen- und Anwendungsdiensten, während sie die Heterogenität der Infrastruktur vor dem Nutzer verbergen. In dieser Arbeit werden die Anforderungen, die diese Netzwerke an ökonomische Allokationsmechanismen stellen, untersucht. Die Analyse erfolgt anhand eines Marktanalyseprozesses für einen zentralen Auktionsmechanismus und einen katallaktischen Markt. --Grid Computing

Allocating Air Traffic Flow Management Slots

In Europe, when an imbalance between demand and capacity is detected for air traffic network resources, Air Traffic Flow Management slots are allocated to flights on the basis of a First Planned First Served principle. We propose a market mechanism to allocate such slots in the case of a single constrained en-route sector or airport. We show that our mechanism provides a slot allocation which is economically preferable to the current one as it enables airlines to pay for delay reduction or receive compensations for delay increases. We also discuss the implementation of our mechanism through two alternative distributed approaches that spare airlines the disclosure of private information. Both these approaches have the additional advantage that they directly involve airlines in the decision making process. Two computational examples relying on real data illustrate our findings.Air Transportation, Market Mechanism Design, Air Traffic Flow Management slots, Collaborative Decision Making, SESAR.

Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity OF Ronald Coase.

In the Federal Communications Commission, Ronald Coase (1959) exposed deep foundations via normative argument buttressed by astute historical observation. The government controlled scarce frequencies, issuing sharply limited use rights. Spillovers were said to be otherwise endemic. Coase saw that Government limited conflicts by restricting uses; property owners perform an analogous function via the "price system." The government solution was inefficient unless the net benefits of the alternative property regime were lower. Coase augured that the price system would outperform the administrative allocation system. His spectrum auction proposal was mocked by communications policy experts, opposed by industry interests, and ridiculed by policy makers. Hence, it took until July 25, 1994 for FCC license sales to commence. Today, some 73 U.S. auctions have been held, 27,484 licenses sold, and $52.6 billion paid. The reform is a textbook example of economic policy success. We examine Coase‘s seminal 1959 paper on two levels. First, we note the importance of its analytical symmetry, comparing administrative to market mechanisms under the assumption of positive transaction costs. This fundamental insight has had enormous influence within the economics profession, yet is often lost in current analyses. This analytical insight had its beginning in his acclaimed early article on the firm (Coase 1937), and continued into his subsequent treatment of social cost (Coase 1960). Second, we investigate why spectrum policies have stopped well short of the property rights regime that Coase advocated, considering rent-seeking dynamics and the emergence of new theories challenging Coase‘s property framework. One conclusion is easily rendered: competitive bidding is now the default tool in wireless license awards. By rule of thumb, about$17 billion in U.S. welfare losses have been averted. Not bad for the first 50 years of this, or any, Article appearing in Volume II of the Journal of Law & Economics.

Truckload Shipment Planning and Procurement

This dissertation presents three issues encountered by a shipper in the context of truckload transportation. In all of the studies, we utilize optimization techniques to model and solve the problems. Each study is inspired from the real world and much of the data used in the experiments is real data or representative of real data. The first topic is about the freight consolidation in truckload transportation. We integrate it with a purchase incentive program to increase truckload utilization and maximize profit. The second topic is about supporting decision making collaboration among departments of a manufacturer. It is a bi-objective optimization model. The third topic is about procurement in an adverse market. We study a modification of the existing procurement process to consider the market stochastic into marking decisions. In all three studies, our target is to develop effectively methodologies to seek optimal answers within a reasonable amount of time

Simulation and optimization of a multi-agent system on physical internet enabled interconnected urban logistics.

An urban logistics system is composed of multiple agents, e.g., shippers, carriers, and distribution centers, etc., and multi-modal networks. The structure of Physical Internet (PI) transportation network is different from current logistics practices, and simulation can effectively model a series of PI-approach scenarios. In addition to the baseline model, three more scenarios are enacted based on different characteristics: shared trucks, shared hubs, and shared flows with other less-than-truckload shipments passing through the urban area. Five performance measures, i.e., truck distance per container, mean truck time per container, lead time, CO2 emissions, and transport mean fill rate, are included in the proposed procedures using real data in an urban logistics case. The results show that PI enables a significant improvement of urban transportation efficiency and sustainability. Specifically, truck time per container reduces 26 percent from that of the Private Direct scenario. A 42 percent reduction of CO2 emissions is made from the current logistics practice. The fill rate of truckload is increased by almost 33 percent, whereas the relevant longer distance per container and the lead time has been increased by an acceptable range. Next, the dissertation applies an auction mechanism in the PI network. Within the auction-based transportation planning approach, a model is developed to match the requests and the transport services in transport marketplaces and maximize the carriers’ revenue. In such transportation planning under the protocol of PI, it is a critical system design problem for decision makers to understand how various parameters through interactions affect this multi-agent system. This study provides a comprehensive three-layer structure model, i.e. agent-based simulation, auction mechanism, and optimization via simulation. In term of simulation, a multi-agent model simulates a complex PI transportation network in the context of sharing economy. Then, an auction mechanism structure is developed to demonstrate a transport selection scheme. With regard of an optimization via simulation approach and sensitivity analysis, it has been provided with insights on effects of combination of decision variables (i.e. truck number and truck capacity) and parameters settings, where results can be drawn by using a case study in an urban freight transportation network. In the end, conclusions and discussions of the studies have been summarized. Additionally, some relevant areas are required for further elaborate research, e.g., operational research on airport gate assignment problems and the simulation modelling of air cargo transportation networks. Due to the complexity of integration with models, I relegate those for future independent research

A theoretical and computational basis for CATNETS

The main content of this report is the identification and definition of market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. These build the theoretical foundation for the work within the following two years of the CATNETS project. --Grid Computing

Transportation service procurement using combinatorial auctions

Thesis (M. Eng. in Logistics)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, 2003.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 39-40).Auction is a mechanism of selling distinct assets that can be both physical objects and virtual objects. Examples of virtual objects are the rights to use assets like airport time slots and FCC spectrum, or to service truckload delivery routes in a transportation network. Under some situations bidding on combinations of objects can render lower total price compare with bidding the objects one at a time, and the auction that allows bidders to bid on combinations of different assets are called combinatorial auctions. With shipper being the auctioneer and carriers being the bidders, combinatorial auction has become increasingly important in the transportation service procurement domain, due to its mechanism to align shipper s procurement interest with carrier transportation service cost structure, which in turn lowers shippers total procurement cost. The thesis provides a comprehensive review of the use of conditional bidding within a transportation combinatorial auction framework. The thesis first describes the general forms of the transportation services available, and discusses the economics of motor carriers that provide LTL and TL services. It then illustrates the basic optimization technique of conditional bidding for TL service procurement and discusses the information technologies that enable the optimization-based procurement and the actual application of the method in the real world.by XiaoPing Chen.M.Eng.in Logistic

Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks - Annual Report Year 1

This paper identifies and defines suitable market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. --Grid Computing

Spectrum auctions: designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy

Access to the radio spectrum is vital for modern digital communication. It is an essential component for smartphone capabilities, the Cloud, the Internet of Things, autonomous vehicles, and multiple other new technologies. Governments use spectrum auctions to decide which companies should use what parts of the radio spectrum. Successful auctions can fuel rapid innovation in products and services, unlock substantial economic benefits, build comparative advantage across all regions, and create billions of dollars of government revenues. Poor auction strategies can leave bandwidth unsold and delay innovation, sell national assets to firms too cheaply, or create uncompetitive markets with high mobile prices and patchy coverage that stifles economic growth. Corporate bidders regularly complain that auctions raise their costs, while government critics argue that insufficient revenues are raised. The cross-national record shows many examples of both highly successful auctions and miserable failures. Drawing on experience from the UK and other countries, senior regulator Geoffrey Myers explains how to optimise the regulatory design of auctions, from initial planning to final implementation. Spectrum Auctions offers unrivalled expertise for regulators and economists engaged in practical auction design or company executives planning bidding strategies. For applied economists, teachers, and advanced students this book provides unrivalled insights in market design and public management. Providing clear analytical frameworks, case studies of auctions, and stage-by-stage advice, it is essential reading for anyone interested in designing public-interested and successful spectrum auctions

Strategic development in the petrochemical industry

Imperial Users onl