Query DAGs: A Practical Paradigm for Implementing Belief-Network Inference

We describe a new paradigm for implementing inference in belief networks, which consists of two steps: (1) compiling a belief network into an arithmetic expression called a Query DAG (Q-DAG); and (2) answering queries using a simple evaluation algorithm. Each node of a Q-DAG represents a numeric operation, a number, or a symbol for evidence. Each leaf node of a Q-DAG represents the answer to a network query, that is, the probability of some event of interest. It appears that Q-DAGs can be generated using any of the standard algorithms for exact inference in belief networks (we show how they can be generated using clustering and conditioning algorithms). The time and space complexity of a Q-DAG generation algorithm is no worse than the time complexity of the inference algorithm on which it is based. The complexity of a Q-DAG evaluation algorithm is linear in the size of the Q-DAG, and such inference amounts to a standard evaluation of the arithmetic expression it represents. The intended value of Q-DAGs is in reducing the software and hardware resources required to utilize belief networks in on-line, real-world applications. The proposed framework also facilitates the development of on-line inference on different software and hardware platforms due to the simplicity of the Q-DAG evaluation algorithm. Interestingly enough, Q-DAGs were found to serve other purposes: simple techniques for reducing Q-DAGs tend to subsume relatively complex optimization techniques for belief-network inference, such as network-pruning and computation-caching.Comment: See http://www.jair.org/ for any accompanying file

The Origins of Computational Mechanics: A Brief Intellectual History and Several Clarifications

The principle goal of computational mechanics is to define pattern and structure so that the organization of complex systems can be detected and quantified. Computational mechanics developed from efforts in the 1970s and early 1980s to identify strange attractors as the mechanism driving weak fluid turbulence via the method of reconstructing attractor geometry from measurement time series and in the mid-1980s to estimate equations of motion directly from complex time series. In providing a mathematical and operational definition of structure it addressed weaknesses of these early approaches to discovering patterns in natural systems. Since then, computational mechanics has led to a range of results from theoretical physics and nonlinear mathematics to diverse applications---from closed-form analysis of Markov and non-Markov stochastic processes that are ergodic or nonergodic and their measures of information and intrinsic computation to complex materials and deterministic chaos and intelligence in Maxwellian demons to quantum compression of classical processes and the evolution of computation and language. This brief review clarifies several misunderstandings and addresses concerns recently raised regarding early works in the field (1980s). We show that misguided evaluations of the contributions of computational mechanics are groundless and stem from a lack of familiarity with its basic goals and from a failure to consider its historical context. For all practical purposes, its modern methods and results largely supersede the early works. This not only renders recent criticism moot and shows the solid ground on which computational mechanics stands but, most importantly, shows the significant progress achieved over three decades and points to the many intriguing and outstanding challenges in understanding the computational nature of complex dynamic systems.Comment: 11 pages, 123 citations; http://csc.ucdavis.edu/~cmg/compmech/pubs/cmr.ht

Apperceptive patterning: Artefaction, extensional beliefs and cognitive scaffolding

In “Psychopower and Ordinary Madness” my ambition, as it relates to Bernard Stiegler’s recent literature, was twofold: 1) critiquing Stiegler’s work on exosomatization and artefactual posthumanism—or, more specifically, nonhumanism—to problematize approaches to media archaeology that rely upon technical exteriorization; 2) challenging how Stiegler engages with Giuseppe Longo and Francis Bailly’s conception of negative entropy. These efforts were directed by a prevalent techno-cultural qualifier: the rise of Synthetic Intelligence (including neural nets, deep learning, predictive processing and Bayesian models of cognition). This paper continues this project but first directs a critical analytic lens at the Derridean practice of the ontologization of grammatization from which Stiegler emerges while also distinguishing how metalanguages operate in relation to object-oriented environmental interaction by way of inferentialism. Stalking continental (Kapp, Simondon, Leroi-Gourhan, etc.) and analytic traditions (e.g., Carnap, Chalmers, Clark, Sutton, Novaes, etc.), we move from artefacts to AI and Predictive Processing so as to link theories related to technicity with philosophy of mind. Simultaneously drawing forth Robert Brandom’s conceptualization of the roles that commitments play in retrospectively reconstructing the social experiences that lead to our endorsement(s) of norms, we compliment this account with Reza Negarestani’s deprivatized account of intelligence while analyzing the equipollent role between language and media (both digital and analog)