A Covert Channel Using Named Resources

A network covert channel is created that uses resource names such as addresses to convey information, and that approximates typical user behavior in order to blend in with its environment. The channel correlates available resource names with a user defined code-space, and transmits its covert message by selectively accessing resources associated with the message codes. In this paper we focus on an implementation of the channel using the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) with Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) as the message names, though the system can be used in conjunction with a variety of protocols. The covert channel does not modify expected protocol structure as might be detected by simple inspection, and our HTTP implementation emulates transaction level web user behavior in order to avoid detection by statistical or behavioral analysis.Comment: 9 page

Covert Bits Through Queues

We consider covert communication using a queuing timing channel in the presence of a warden. The covert message is encoded using the inter-arrival times of the packets, and the legitimate receiver and the warden observe the inter-departure times of the packets from their respective queues. The transmitter and the legitimate receiver also share a secret key to facilitate covert communication. We propose achievable schemes that obtain non-zero covert rate for both exponential and general queues when a sufficiently high rate secret key is available. This is in contrast to other channel models such as the Gaussian channel or the discrete memoryless channel where only $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{n})$ covert bits can be sent over $n$ channel uses, yielding a zero covert rate.Comment: To appear at IEEE CNS, October 201

BitWhisper: Covert Signaling Channel between Air-Gapped Computers using Thermal Manipulations

It has been assumed that the physical separation (air-gap) of computers provides a reliable level of security, such that should two adjacent computers become compromised, the covert exchange of data between them would be impossible. In this paper, we demonstrate BitWhisper, a method of bridging the air-gap between adjacent compromised computers by using their heat emissions and built-in thermal sensors to create a covert communication channel. Our method is unique in two respects: it supports bidirectional communication, and it requires no additional dedicated peripheral hardware. We provide experimental results based on implementation of BitWhisper prototype, and examine the channel properties and limitations. Our experiments included different layouts, with computers positioned at varying distances from one another, and several sensor types and CPU configurations (e.g., Virtual Machines). We also discuss signal modulation and communication protocols, showing how BitWhisper can be used for the exchange of data between two computers in a close proximity (at distance of 0-40cm) at an effective rate of 1-8 bits per hour, a rate which makes it possible to infiltrate brief commands and exfiltrate small amount of data (e.g., passwords) over the covert channel