Game saturation of intersecting families

We consider the following combinatorial game: two players, Fast and Slow, claim $k$-element subsets of $[n]=\{1,2,...,n\}$ alternately, one at each turn, such that both players are allowed to pick sets that intersect all previously claimed subsets. The game ends when there does not exist any unclaimed $k$-subset that meets all already claimed sets. The score of the game is the number of sets claimed by the two players, the aim of Fast is to keep the score as low as possible, while the aim of Slow is to postpone the game's end as long as possible. The game saturation number is the score of the game when both players play according to an optimal strategy. To be precise we have to distinguish two cases depending on which player takes the first move. Let $gsat_F(\mathbb{I}_{n,k})$ and $gsat_S(\mathbb{I}_{n,k})$ denote the score of the saturation game when both players play according to an optimal strategy and the game starts with Fast's or Slow's move, respectively. We prove that $\Omega_k(n^{k/3-5}) \le gsat_F(\mathbb{I}_{n,k}),gsat_S(\mathbb{I}_{n,k}) \le O_k(n^{k-\sqrt{k}/2})$ holds

Sequential legislative lobbying

In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies, Lobby 0 and Lobby 1, compete by bidding for legislators’ votes. In this model, the lobbyist moving first suffers from a second mover advantage and will make an offer to a panel of legislators only if it deters any credible counter-reaction from his opponent, i.e., if he anticipates to win the battle. This paper departs from the existing literature in assuming that legislators care about the consequence of their votes rather than their votes per se. Our main focus is on the calculation of the smallest budget that he needs to win the game and on the distribution of this budget across the legislators. We study the impact of the key parameters of the game on these two variables and show the connection of this problem with the combinatorics of sets and notions from cooperative game theory.Lobbying; cooperative games; noncooperative games