On Conceiving the Inconsistent

This work has been developed within the 2013–15 ahrc project The Metaphysical Basis of Logic: The Law of Non-Contradiction as Basic Knowledge (grant ref. ah/k001698/1). A version of the paper was presented in September 2013 at the Modal Metaphysics Workshop in Bratislava. I am grateful to the audiences there and at the Aristotelian Society meeting for many helpful comments and remarks.Peer reviewedPostprin

Essentialist Blindness would not preclude counterfactual knowledge

This paper does two things. First, it defends, against a potential threat to it, the claim that a capacity for essentialist knowledge should not be placed among the core capacities for counterfactual knowledge. Second, it assesses a consequence of that claim—or better: of the discussion by means of which I defend it—in relation to Kment's and Williamson's views on the relation between modality and counterfactuals

Moderate Modal Skepticism

This paper examines "moderate modal skepticism", a form of skepticism about metaphysical modality defended by Peter van Inwagen in order to blunt the force of certain modal arguments in the philosophy of religion. Van Inwagen’s argument for moderate modal skepticism assumes Yablo's (1993) influential world-based epistemology of possibility. We raise two problems for this epistemology of possibility, which undermine van Inwagen's argument. We then consider how one might motivate moderate modal skepticism by relying on a different epistemology of possibility, which does not face these problems: Williamson’s (2007: ch. 5) counterfactual-based epistemology. Two ways of motivating moderate modal skepticism within that framework are found unpromising. Nevertheless, we also find a way of vindicating an epistemological thesis that, while weaker than moderate modal skepticism, is strong enough to support the methodological moral van Inwagen wishes to draw

The problem of conditionals

This paper is devoted to the logical problem of conditionals. This is interpreted as the problem of formulating, in terms of simple non-modal logical notions, the general conditions for the truth of statements of the 'if...then---' form. It is argued in the first part of the paper that the compass of this analysis properly includes not only those conditionals expressed counter- factually with verbs in the subjunctive, but also those containing the verbs of the indicative. This view is defended through a series of arguments condensing in the conclusion that the appropriate mood for the verbs in a conditional is not determined by the kind of implication the writer or speaker claims between antecedent and consequent, but rather by opinion as to the probable truth or falsity of the antecedent. The second part of the paper is then given over to the search for a general definition for the truth of conditionals. An elaborate set of rules is finally formulated and claimed to provide an adequate analysis of the conditional. Difficulties shared by the problem of conditionals and that of explanation are mentioned, and it is suggested that counterexamples to earlier versions of the criterion for conditionals can be imitated to establish counterexamples to deductive-nomological models, and further that the necessary adjustments can be discovered in the strategies used to correct the conditional criterion.Philosophy, Department o

Modal Knowledge and Counterfactual Knowledge

The paper compares the suitability of two different epistemologies of counterfactuals—(EC) and (W)—to elucidate modal knowledge. I argue that, while both of them explain the data on our knowledge of counterfactuals, neither can subsume modal knowledge. (EC) would be available only to extreme haecceitists. Only (W)—Williamson’s epistemology—is compatible with all counterpossibles being true; something on which Williamson’s account relies. A first problem is that, in the absence of further data for (W) and against (EC), Williamson’s choice of (W) is objectionably biased. A second, deeper problem is that (W) cannot satisfactorily elucidate modal knowledge. Third, from a naturalistic perspective, the nature of this second problem favours (EC) against (W)