Privatisation and Franchising of British Train Operations: the decline and derailment of the Great North Eastern Railway

As a result of the 1993 Railways Act, the British railways industry was privatised which resulted in the separation of ownership and control of the railway infrastructure (track, signals and stations) from that of passenger train operations. The Great North Eastern Railway (GNER), a major train operator, was unable to meet its contractual obligations shortly after successfully re-tendering for its second franchise. Within the context of incomplete contract theory, this paper discusses the main problems inherent in the franchising process and which specifically contributed to the collapse of GNER. In particular, the paper argues that the fragmented structure of asset ownership, the lack of coordination and investment incentives and flaws in the franchise method itself explain the demise of GNER and have undermined the general objectives of railway privatisation

Regulation, competition, and liberalization

In many countries throughout the world, regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries. This essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process. While stressing the importance of case-specific analyses, this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are pro-competitive from corresponding anti-competitive liberalization policies

The Role of Residual Claims and Self-Enforcement in Franchise Contracting

Much of the economic literature on franchising has been concerned with incentive issues and how these are managed in franchised contracts. Two main types of incentive mechanisms have been identified: residual claims and self enforcement. In this paper we describe these incentive mechanisms, and their use in franchise contracts. We argue that although these two types of mechanisms are usually thought of as alternative ways to align franchisee and franchisor incentives, they are in fact complementary in franchise contracts because they address different incentive problems. We explore what these incentive problems are, and then describe specifically how franchise contract terms and practices support each type of incentive mechanism. Finally, we discuss briefly, via two examples, how our analysis also applies to non-franchised systems with common marks or other reputation concerns.

Regulation, Competition and Liberalization

In many countries throughout the world, regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries. This essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process. While stressing the importance of case-specific analyses, this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are pro-competitive from corresponding anti-competitive liberalization policiesCompetition, Regulation, Liberalization

Revenue-Based Auctions and Unbundling Infrastructure Franchises

This paper discusses privatization among investments in infrastructure. The goal of this paper is to present a new auction mechanism that solves many of the problems that have hindered the use of franchises. The first section of the paper discusses least present value of revenue (LPVR) auctions, where the regulator fixes user fees (according to some optimizing criterion) and asks for bids on the present value of revenue from user fees that franchise holders will accept in exchange for building, operating and maintaining the infrastructure. Section 2 of the paper classifies infrastructure projects according to their technological characteristics in order to establish conditions under which franchising is feasible and desirable. In Section 3, the authors discuss several conceptual issues that arise in franchising. Section 4 discusses the shortcomings of fixed-term mechanisms. Section 5 introduces and analyzes LPVR auctions. Section 6 discusses the unbundling of franchises. The authors' conclusions are presented in the final section.Infrastructure & Transport, Private Sector, least present value of revenue (LPVR) auctions, privatization, infrastructure sector

The restructuring and future of the British Rail system

The paper focuses mainly on reviewing and analysing the restructuring of Britain’s railways, including the re-cently published proposals for its future. The objective is to investigate the current market structure, the market behaviour and the overall performance of the British rail system over time. In order to learn what other people think about the problems of the industry and their solutions, interviews with key people associated with the in-dustry and several submissions of some key interest parties to the 2004 railway structure review are used in this paper. The results are that all major characteristics of the rail reform in Britain are seen as workable and empiri-cal data reveal that they have worked comparatively successfully, before Hatfield. Because of bad implementa-tion some of the features, and in particular the private infrastructure manager, have not worked well. Most of the problems have arisen because of indecision over refranchising and the disruption following Hatfield. Further-more the policy of the Government after Hatfield created an extremely risk averse culture within the industry, at a time when Railtrack had not enough insights about the state of the rail network. Although empirically unjustified, safety improvement became the main issue, costs escalated and reliability and productivity experienced a huge fall. The current White Paper “The Future of Rail” is seen as partially misleading and not at all detailed. At present it is only clear that the proposals will result in further increase of political interference. Much will depend on the precise implementation of the proposed measures and therefore the future of British rail remains unclear

Competition in Rail Transport: A New Opportunity for Railways?

Throughout Europe, and in many other parts of the world, railways are suffering from declining market share and deteriorating financial performance; consequently there is renewed interest in deregulation and the introduction of competition into rail transport as a way of improving performance. An EC Directive now provides for access to rail infrastructure for third parties to run their own international trains in some circumstances. After a long debate, the British Government in July 1992 published a White Paper (New Opportunities for the Railways) which aimed to go much further. It would both open access to the infrastructure for any licensed operator and franchise out existing passenger services via a competitive bidding process; all freight services would be privatised outright. Draft legislation to implement these proposals, as well as a string of consultation documents on details have also been published, and an Interim Report from the Select Committee of Members of Parliament examining the proposals has appeared. This paper review the debate that is currently raging over the British government proposals. It considers the potential for innovation and cost savings which they offer, as well as the problems of increased transactions costs, lack of competitive bidding and other potential inefficiencies of the new system. The key issue of the charging regime for access to the infrastructure is also addressed. It is concluded that competition in the provision of freight services is desirable, but that passenger services present many more problems, and that the proposals need modification if they are to meet their objectives

An Economic Analysis of Team Movements in Professional Sports

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Issues and Options for Restructuring Electricity Supply Industries

The electricity supply industry is highly capital-intensive, whose success depends critically upon the management of its investment. In most developing countries investment is poorly managed, poorly maintained, and often inadequate. Inadequate regulation or political control lead to low prices that undermine the finance of investment and give poor incentives for management and operation. The paper argues that regulation must be carefully designed to provide efficient incentives and adequate guarantees to sustain investment and operations and only then will privatisation improve performance and benefit consumers. The paper discusses the evidence for these claims, the circumstances required for full unbundling and liberalisation to be successful, and those where the Single Buyer Model or continued, ideally reformed, state ownership, may be preferable, at least until conditions improve

Dynamic Co-Existence of Company-Owned and Franchised Outlets Within a Company: A Framework of the Franchisor\u27s Perspective

Why and how do company-owned and franchised outlets simultaneously exist within the same organization? The purpose of this article is to integrate a variety of theories on this interesting retail phenomenon into a broader theoretical framework based on the political-economy paradigm. This paper attempts to integrate the perspectives of several theories that previously have been considered competing models of a single reality--the access-to-capital viewpoint, transaction cost analysis, the population ecology perspective, and power-dependence-conflict arguments--into a broader perspective that utilizes intra-firmfactors and the internal and external economies and polities of the political-economy paradigm. A model depicting this integration is set forth and nineteen research propositions stemming from this model are proposed