Disruptions in large value payment systems: an experimental approach

This experimental study investigates the behaviour of banks in a large value payment system. More specifically,we look at 1) the reactions of banks to disruptions in the payment system, 2) the way in which the history of disruptions affects the behaviour of banks (path dependency) and 3) the effect of more concentration in the payment system (heterogeneous market versus a homogeneous market). The game used in this experiment is a stylized version of a model of Bech and Garrett (2006) in which each bank can choose between paying in the morning (efficient) or in the afternoon (inefficient). The results show that there is significant path dependency in terms of disruption history. Also the chance of disruption influences the behaviour of the participants. Once the system is moving towards the inefficient equilibrium, it does not easily move back to the efficient one. Furthermore, there is a clear leadership effect in the heterogeneous market

Social Data Offloading in D2D-Enhanced Cellular Networks by Network Formation Games

Recently, cellular networks are severely overloaded by social-based services, such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, in which thousands of clients subscribe a common content provider (e.g., a popular singer) and download his/her content updates all the time. Offloading such traffic through complementary networks, such as a delay tolerant network formed by device-to-device (D2D) communications between mobile subscribers, is a promising solution to reduce the cellular burdens. In the existing solutions, mobile users are assumed to be volunteers who selfishlessly deliver the content to every other user in proximity while moving. However, practical users are selfish and they will evaluate their individual payoffs in the D2D sharing process, which may highly influence the network performance compared to the case of selfishless users. In this paper, we take user selfishness into consideration and propose a network formation game to capture the dynamic characteristics of selfish behaviors. In the proposed game, we provide the utility function of each user and specify the conditions under which the subscribers are guaranteed to converge to a stable network. Then, we propose a practical network formation algorithm in which the users can decide their D2D sharing strategies based on their historical records. Simulation results show that user selfishness can highly degrade the efficiency of data offloading, compared with ideal volunteer users. Also, the decrease caused by user selfishness can be highly affected by the cost ratio between the cellular transmission and D2D transmission, the access delays, and mobility patterns

Delay Tolerant Networking over the Metropolitan Public Transportation

We discuss MDTN: a delay tolerant application platform built on top of the Public Transportation System (PTS) and able to provide service access while exploiting opportunistic connectivity. Our solution adopts a carrier-based approach where buses act as data collectors for user requests requiring Internet access. Simulations based on real maps and PTS routes with state-of-the-art routing protocols demonstrate that MDTN represents a viable solution for elastic nonreal-time service delivery. Nevertheless, performance indexes of the considered routing policies show that there is no golden rule for optimal performance and a tailored routing strategy is required for each specific case

Strategic Network Disruption and Defense

Networks are one of the essential building blocks of society. Not only do firms cooperate in R&D networks, but firms themselves may be seen as networks of information-exchanging workers. Social movements increasingly make use of networks to exchange information, just as on the negative side criminal and terrorist networks use them. However, the literature on networks has mainly focused on the cooperative side of networks and has so far neglected the competition side of networks. Networks themselves may face competition from actors with opposing interests to theirs. Several R&D networks may compete with one another. The firm as a network of employees obviously faces competition. In particular, given the importance of connectivity for networks, competing networks may try to disrupt each other, by trying to convince key players in competing networks to defect, or to stop sponsoring key links (strategic network disruption). In response, networks that face competition will adapt their structure, and will avoid vulnerable network structures. Such network competition is what our paper is concerned with.Strategic Network Disruption, Strategic Network Design, Noncooperative Network Games

Bounds on the Cost of Stabilizing a Cooperative Game

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the AI Access Foundation via the DOI in this record.A key issue in cooperative game theory is coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the core—the set of outcomes that are resistant to group deviations. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. We investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using subsidies. We consider scenarios where an external party that is interested in having the players work together offers a supplemental payment to the grand coalition, or, more generally, a particular coalition structure. This payment is conditional on players not deviating from this coalition structure, and may be divided among the players in any way they wish. We define the cost of stability as the minimum external payment that stabilizes the game. We provide tight bounds on the cost of stability, both for games where the coalitional values are nonnegative (profit-sharing games) and for games where the coalitional values are nonpositive (cost-sharing games), under natural assumptions on the characteristic function, such as superadditivity, anonymity, or both. We also investigate the relationship between the cost of stability and several variants of the least core. Finally, we study the computational complexity of problems related to the cost of stability, with a focus on weighted voting games.DFGEuropean Science FoundationNRF (Singapore)European Research CouncilHorizon 2020 European Research Infrastructure projectIsrael Science FoundationIsrael Ministry of Science and TechnologyGoogle Inter-University Center for Electronic Markets and AuctionsEuropean Social Fund (European Commission)Calabria Regio

QoS routing in ad-hoc networks using GA and multi-objective optimization

Much work has been done on routing in Ad-hoc networks, but the proposed routing solutions only deal with the best effort data traffic. Connections with Quality of Service (QoS) requirements, such as voice channels with delay and bandwidth constraints, are not supported. The QoS routing has been receiving increasingly intensive attention, but searching for the shortest path with many metrics is an NP-complete problem. For this reason, approximated solutions and heuristic algorithms should be developed for multi-path constraints QoS routing. Also, the routing methods should be adaptive, flexible, and intelligent. In this paper, we use Genetic Algorithms (GAs) and multi-objective optimization for QoS routing in Ad-hoc Networks. In order to reduce the search space of GA, we implemented a search space reduction algorithm, which reduces the search space for GAMAN (GA-based routing algorithm for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks) to find a new route. We evaluate the performance of GAMAN by computer simulations and show that GAMAN has better behaviour than GLBR (Genetic Load Balancing Routing).Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

A Dose Relationship Between Brain Functional Connectivity and Cumulative Head Impact Exposure in Collegiate Water Polo Players.

A growing body of evidence suggests that chronic, sport-related head impact exposure can impair brain functional integration and brain structure and function. Evidence of a robust inverse relationship between the frequency and magnitude of repeated head impacts and disturbed brain network function is needed to strengthen an argument for causality. In pursuing such a relationship, we used cap-worn inertial sensors to measure the frequency and magnitude of head impacts sustained by eighteen intercollegiate water polo athletes monitored over a single season of play. Participants were evaluated before and after the season using computerized cognitive tests of inhibitory control and resting electroencephalography. Greater head impact exposure was associated with increased phase synchrony [r (16) > 0.626, p < 0.03 corrected], global efficiency [r (16) > 0.601, p < 0.04 corrected], and mean clustering coefficient [r (16) > 0.625, p < 0.03 corrected] in the functional networks formed by slow-wave (delta, theta) oscillations. Head impact exposure was not associated with changes in performance on the inhibitory control tasks. However, those with the greatest impact exposure showed an association between changes in resting-state connectivity and a dissociation between performance on the tasks after the season [r (16) = 0.481, p = 0.043] that could also be attributed to increased slow-wave synchrony [F (4, 135) = 113.546, p < 0.001]. Collectively, our results suggest that athletes sustaining the greatest head impact exposure exhibited changes in whole-brain functional connectivity that were associated with altered information processing and inhibitory control