Cost sharing and catch sharing

The model developed in this paper attempts to provide an explanation of the fact that Icelandic vessel owners and Icelandic skippers do not share costs of operation of a vessel. In the model a skipper is contracted to take a fishing vessel to the fishing ground. The skipper is remunerated with a share of the catch, subject to an agreed minimum. Skippers and vessel owners are modelled as if risk neutral. Skippers develop a fishing strategy which is more costly, the higher the value of the potential catch associated with that strategy. Costs that accrue are partly pecuniary (and shareable) and partly skipper-specific (and non- shareable). The conclusions of the paper demonstrate that given the assumptions of our model, a vessel owner should prefer a remuneration contract with a positive revenue share and zero cost share.Cost sharing, remuneration systems, fishing

Ordinal proportional cost sharing

We consider cost sharing problems with variable demands of heterogeneous goods. We study the compatibility of two axioms imposed on cost sharing methods: ordinality and average cost pricing for homogeneous (ACPH) goods. We generalize the ordinal proportional method (OPM) for the two-agent case, Sprumont [Journal of Economic Theory 81 (1998) 126162] to arbitrary number of agents