26,827 research outputs found

    Information theory and the role of intermediaries in corporate governance

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    We investigate the connection between corporate governance system configurations and the role of intermediaries in the respective systems from a informational perspective. Building on the economics of information we show that it is meaningful to distinguish between internalisation and externalisation as two fundamentally different ways of dealing with information in corporate governance systems. This lays the groundwork for a description of two types of corporate governance systems, i.e. insider control system and outsider control system, in which we focus on the distinctive role of intermediaries in the production and use of information. It will be argued that internalisation is the prevailing mode of information processing in insider control system while externalisation dominates in outsider control system. We also discuss shortly the interrelations between the prevailing corporate governance system and types of activities or industry structures supported

    Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and Regulatory Choices

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    This survey paper examines various information insufficiencies in biodiversity conservation and their impact of regulatory choices. We surveyed the literature in the field and identified four major types of informational insufficiencies in making efficient biodiversity conservation decisions: 1) biological uncertainty 2) natural uncertainty 3) individual information, and 4) monitoring problem. The consequences of these four types of information insufficiencies on the choice of regulatory tools are explored. We discuss in this context three types of regulatory tools: land takings, environmental fees/charges, and contracts. The efficiency of each type of regulatory tools is shown dependent on the specific informational constraints that the regulatory faces.Biodiversity conservation, Information, Regulatory tools

    Governance: Who Controls Matters

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    In this paper, we provide an outlook for further research on the topic of governance. We review four different approaches on the theory of the firm and discuss implications for governance, namely; nexus of contracts / agency theory, property rights / incomplete contracts, adaptation, and nexus of specific investments.governance, property rights, adaptation, nexus of contracts

    Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Law\u27s Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems

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    Revisiting section 3.4.2 of Clark\u27s Corporate Law (\u27Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems ) reminds us, however, that the internal controls story actually goes back many decades, and that many of the strategic issues that are at the heart of section 404 have long been contentious. My Article will briefly update Clark\u27s account through the late 1980s and 1990s before returning to Sarbanes-Oxley and rulemaking thereunder by the SEC and the newly created Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ( PCAOB ). My main point builds on one of Clark\u27s but digs deeper. Internal controls requirements, whether federal or state, are incoherent unless and until one articulates clearly for whose benefit they exist, and to what end. There are, in fact, a number of competing articulations. The failure to identify a single and coherent rationale creates significant uncertainty, which has been exploited by players in the legal, accounting, consulting, and information technology fields. Companies are probably spending more time and resources on 404 compliance than a reasonable reading of the legislation and the rules necessarily requires, heavily influenced by those who gain from issuer over-compliance. This rent-seeking compromises the political viability and substantive quality of what is at the heart a beneficial statutory reform

    Bank lending networks, experience, reputation, and borrowing costs.

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    We investigate the network structure of syndicated lending markets and evaluate the impact of lenders’ network centrality, considered as measures of their experience and reputation, on borrowing costs. We show that the market for syndicated loans is a “small world” characterized by large local density and short social distances between lenders. Such a network structure allows for better information and resources flows between banks thus enhancing their social capital. We then show that lenders’ experience and reputation play a significant role in reducing loan spreads and thus increasing borrower’s wealth.agency costs, bank syndicate, experience, loan syndication, reputation, small world, social network analysis.

    KNOWLEDGE AND MODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

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    The issue of corporate governance has been largely debated in the literature. Conventionally, corporate governance is viewed either from a stakeholder or a shareholder perspective. This paper discusses the informational aspects of the two models of corporate governance. The role information plays in corporate governance cannot be overstated. Agents involved in corporate governance acquire, create, use and transmit information. Therefore, how the notion of knowledge is conceived is important for the analysis of alternative systems of corporate governance. Basically, there are two types of information processing: internalization and externalization. The internalization-based information processing system corresponds to the stakeholder model of corporate governance. A shareholder model of corporate governance relies on information externalization. Externalization of information is made via the market price system.knowledge, economics of information, information processing, corporate governance, market-based corporate governance

    Networking in the food sector of regional economy

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    Purpose: The article aims to study the features and the directions of development of network interaction of subjects of the food sector in different regions of the economy. Design/Methodology/Approach: The use of different methodological approaches allowed us to formulate a holistic management concept for the development of a network of competences in the food sector of the regional economy. Findings: The study identified the subjects of such interaction, as well as features that allow them to unite into groups that form networks of competencies. Considering the food sector of the region's economy as a socio-economic system, noted its extreme structural complexity, which necessitates the development of special approaches to its management, or rather the need for structural management is presented. The format of such interaction is a network of competencies, representing a spatially localized socio-economic structure formed on the initiative of active subjects of the regional economy. Practical Implications: The results obtained can be used as a basis for designing a network form of development of the food sector of the region's economy, taking into account the nature of placement and interaction of participants, as well as allowing for effective use of their resource capabilities, experience and knowledge. Originality/Value: In order to overcome the problems associated with the formation of network identity, network management competence is proposed to use a structured approach allowing them to make targeted decisions based on objective conditions and institutional nature.peer-reviewe

    What’s Common to Relationship Banking and Relationship Investing? Reflections within the Contractual Theory of the Firm

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    The financial systems in continental Europe are subject to profound changes in the institutions of market exchange. Banks traditionally holding close relationships with firms are substituted by non-bank institutional investors. The present paper examines whether this implies a substitution of relationship finance by arm’s length finance or of firm-like organization by market exchange. Within the contractual theory of the firm, we seek common features of relationship banking and relationship investing. Extending the governance structure approach, we show that both are hybrid organizations, whose comparative advantages depend on two kinds of asset specificity. They are complements to finance and control firms with different redeployability and information opaqueness of assets.banks, institutional investors, financial systems, corporate governance, markets vs. hierachies, theory of the firm

    What’s Common to Relationship Banking and Relationship Investing? Reflections within the Contractual Theory of the Firm

    Get PDF
    The financial systems in continental Europe are subject to profound changes in the institutions of market exchange. Banks traditionally holding close relationships with firms are substituted by non-bank institutional investors. The present paper examines whether this implies a substitution of relationship finance by arm’s length finance or of firm-like organization by market exchange. Within the contractual theory of the firm, we seek common features of relationship banking and relationship investing. Extending the governance structure approach, we show that both are hybrid organizations, whose comparative advantages depend on two kinds of asset specificity. They are complements to finance and control firms with different redeployability and information opaqueness of assets.banks, institutional investors, financial systems, corporate governance, markets vs. hierachies, theory of the firm
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