Virtus et disciplina : an interdisciplinary study of the roman martial values of courage and discipline

This thesis discusses Roman martial values, principally virtus and disciplina, and their literary characterization. This is an interdisciplinary study that employs data and methodologies from anthropology, evolutionary biology, moral philosophy, military history, and analytical psychology to supplement scholarship from classical studies. My aim is to analyze and interpret, as deeply and profoundly as possible, the values that the Romans regarded as essential to their military success. I argue that Greek and Roman authors depict nuanced but relatively consistent representations of Roman martial values, which both derive from actual Roman military practice and project an important component of Roman cultural identity. Virtus was a virtue that primarily denoted martial courage, an ethical quality, while disciplina functioned as a means to virtus, but it was not necessarily a virtue itself. The premises of my argument are as follows: 1) military doctrine reflects culture, which manifests in the projection of Roman values through military narratives; 2) there is significant agreement among classical authors discussing Roman warfare in the abstract; 3) historiography distorts to some extent but is not deliberately mendacious, which derives from the relatively meritocratic hierarchies cultivated by the Roman army; 4) an appreciation of archetypal imagery has utility in interpreting Roman values, given that the primary evidence for these qualities derive from stories imbued with moral instruction.Includes bibliographical reference

Protecting the most vulnerable? The management of a disaster and the making/unmaking of victims after xenophobic violence in 2008 in South Africa

In 2008, South Africa witnessed a bout of xenophobic violence, requiring the state to declare a disaster to manage a massive displacement of migrants and foreigners. How did the South African state come to care for these populations, whereas it had previously sought to avoid providing protection to foreigners, and was seen as responsible for fostering xenophobia, if not violence? Analyzing the management of the disaster at the local level (in Cape Town), and the various discourses and mobilizations involved in it, this article shows how widespread violence and displacement rendered migrant vulnerabilities visible in the urban space and forced the state to temporarily recognize and protect those who became seen as “victims.” It also questions the idea that xenophobia and failure to comply with international norms were responsible for the lack of protection of migrants and foreigners. Rather, it is the kind of protection displayed, restricted to the “most vulnerable,” that failed to address the root causes of the violence and envision broader social integration issues. The article provides further theorization on what it means to treat violence as disaster and points out to the need to envisage critically humanitarian and social assistance by including them in broader welfare patterns

Strategy, Uncertainty, and the China Challenge

Despite China’s increasing aggressiveness, its intentions are indeterminate, even aligning with U.S. interests in some arenas. Furthermore, China simply may fail in achieving even its foremost national and foreign-policy goals. Given this uncertainty, the United States should not base its policy and strategy on any specific prediction about Chinese intentions or abilities

Remembering and forgetting the last war: discursive memory of the Sino-Vietnamese war in China and Vietnam

The year 2019 marked the 40th anniversary of the outbreak of the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979. Making use of published and unpublished Chinese, Vietnamese, and English sources, this article traces the tensions between official and popular memories of the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 in China and Vietnam, respectively. We argue that these tensions existed because the development of the official Chinese and Vietnamese memories of the war largely mirrored each other. Between 1991 and roughly 2006, when bilateral relations between the countries improved, both Beijing and Hanoi claimed victory for their side while simultaneously downplaying the bloodshed, tragedy, and loss experienced during the war. However, they have reacted to the rise of popular memories since the early 2000s in very different ways. While Beijing walks a thin line between accommodating appeals for greater recognition of the sacrifices made by ordinary soldiers without provoking social discontent with the political system, Hanoi has been more successful in mobilising Vietnamese popular memory of the war to strike a measured nationalistic response to China. How China and Vietnam remember and downplay the Sino-Vietnamese War points to the bigger picture of the sensitivity of bilateral relations to historical memory in Asia. In particular, historical memory shapes how a country perceives external threats and opportunities, while historical memory is created, suppressed, and re-created as international relations evolve

Processing the Lessons of War: Organizational Change and the U.S. Military

Failing to understand the lessons of war can cause militaries to repeat past failures, leading to increased costs in terms of resources and causalities in future conflicts. Modern Western militaries faced a range of difficulties on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan that they struggled to address, and they need to learn and institutionalize the lessons of their experiences if they are to succeed in future conflicts. This dissertation addresses this by asking: to what extent has the battlefield experience of the U.S. military influenced post-war organizational change? The various service branches of the U.S. military have needed to adapt at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. However, what remains to be understood is if, and more importantly how, such battlefield adaptations and the lessons of military operations were actually learned and thus influenced the overall organizational changes of the U.S. military. This dissertation examines whether battlefield adaptations of the U.S. Army, Air Force (then the Army Air Force), Navy and Marine Corps during the Second World War influenced the process of post-war organizational change within the military in the aftermath of that conflict. In particular, this dissertation explores the role of junior and midlevel officers in the change process, which is an area of focus that has been largely undervalued by much of the existing literature on military change. Building on archival research, this dissertation develops a framework to explain the process of how the lessons of combat become institutionalized in a post-war period

South Africa Case Study: The Double Crisis – Mass Migration From Zimbabwe And Xenophobic Violence in South Africa

The protracted economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe led directly to a major increase in mixed migration flows to South Africa. Migrants were drawn from every sector of society, all education and skill levels, equal numbers of both sexes, and all ages (including unaccompanied child migration). Many migrants claimed asylum in South Africa which gave them the right to work while they waited for a refugee hearing. Many others were arrested and deported back to Zimbabwe. Migrants who were unable to find employment in the formal economy turned to employment and self-employment in the informal economy. These migrant entrepreneurs used personal savings to establish small and micro enterprises in many urban areas. The businesses focused on retail trading, manufacturing and services and contributed to the South African economy in various ways, including providing employment for South Africans. Nationwide xenophobic violence in 2008 targeted all migrants, irrespective of origin and legal status. From 2008 onwards, violent attacks on migrant-owned informal businesses began to escalate. This culminated in a second round of nationwide xenophobic violence in early 2015 when migrant-owned businesses were targeted by mobs. Migrants send essential remittances to family in Zimbabwe and return migration is not a viable or long-term response until Zimbabwe’s economic crisis is resolved. As a result, informal migrant entrepreneurs have adapted to hostile business conditions by adopting a range of strategies to avoid and protect themselves and their businesses from xenophobia. Against this backdrop, this report first discusses the nature of the crisis in Zimbabwe and its connections with large-scale out-migration, particularly to South Africa. The South African response to crisis-driven migration is reviewed showing how the government shifted from a predominantly coercive and control-oriented policy towards a more realistic assessment of the need to accommodate migrants through an immigration amnesty and the right to work in the formal and informal sector. One of the major challenges facing migrants and all stakeholders in South Africa is xenophobic violence. Nationwide attacks on migrants and refugees in 2008 and 2015 have been interspersed with ongoing lower-level episodes of violence. These attacks have increasingly targeted migrants and refugees, including many Zimbabweans, seeking to make a living in the country’s urban informal economy. The research for this report focused on the business activities and responses to xenophobic violence of Zimbabweans in the informal economy. Amongst the key findings were the following: • Between 20-30% of Zimbabwean migrants in South African cities are involved in the informal economy and the importance of informal sector employment to Zimbabweans has increased over time. • Zimbabweans operating enterprises in the informal economy are predominantly young (50- 75% under the age of 35) and male (60-70%). • Nearly two-thirds of the migrant entrepreneurs arrived in South Africa in the peak years of the Zimbabwean crisis between 2000 and 2010 (42%). Another 32% migrated after 2010. Less than 2% migrated to South Africa before the end of apartheid. • Economic hardship, unemployment and political persecution are the main push drivers of migration to South Africa. Pull drivers include the assistance of relatives already in South Africa and the prospect of employment. • The majority of the Zimbabwean migrant enterprises are in the retail, trade and wholesale sector, followed by services and manufacturing. Around three-quarters of the migrants relied on their personal savings to start their businesses and many worked in the formal economy first. • Business expansion has occurred despite the prime obligation of the entrepreneurs to support family still in Zimbabwe. Instead of reinvesting all of the business profits into further expansion, a portion is therefore diverted into remittance channels. Over one-third remit funds at least once per month and only 12% never send remittances. • A significant number of the entrepreneurs had been victims of or knew other who had been victims of crime such as looting and robbery, xenophobic abuse and police misconduct abuse. The report then presents the results of in-depth interviews with Zimbabwean business-owners who had experienced xenophobic violence in 2008 and 2015 or at other times. The narratives of the migrants provide insights into the unpredictable nature of the violence, their vulnerability to attack, the loss of business goods and property during mob violence and the need to restart from scratch, and the various strategies that they adopt to reduce risk. These strategies include operating in safer areas (not feasible for all), avoiding areas where corrupt police tend to operate, paying for protection and flight when xenophobic violence erupts. Return to Zimbabwe is not considered a viable option because of the economic conditions there. The interviews also provide insights into the migrants’ perceptions of government and stakeholder responses to the xenophobic violence. Almost without exception, the migrants felt that neither government (the Zimbabwean or South African) had done anything to protect or assist them during and after the violence. This perception of inaction also extended to international and non-governmental organisations. The migrants were particularly harsh in their comments about the police who were widely seen as either conniving in the violence or uninterested in protecting migrants. The perceptions of the migrants that nothing is done may simply be a function of who was interviewed and does not necessarily reflect the actual reality. The report therefore evaluates the response of the South African government to the ongoing crisis of xenophobia and concludes that some actions – such as sending in the army – are taken during episodes of nationwide violence but that ongoing daily and weekly attacks are generally ignored. There is a strong official line that these attacks are not motivated by xenophobia and. Indeed, that xenophobia does not even exist. This is clearly contradicted by the migrants who view the attacks as motivated by xenophobia. A second element of the official response is that the migrants are partially to blame for what happens to them as their business success builds resentment amongst South Africans. Government has yet to acknowledge that migrant-owned informal enterprises make a valuable contribution to the economy of the country, including through job creation for South Africans. The primary response to the violence of 2015 was the launching of a military-style Operation Fiela which was justified as a crime-fighting initiative but appears to have targeted migrant enterprises. The final sections of the report examine the responses and programmes of various non-governmental and international organisations to the crisis of xenophobia. During large-scale xenophobic violence there is considerable mobilisation of anti-xenophobia civil society organisations to offer protection and protest. Their effectiveness and impact tends to dissipate when the violence is more scattered and random. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) has played a major role in the past in holding government to account and articulating extensive recommendations for remedial action, most of which have not been taken up and many of which are still highly relevant. International organisations have tended to target integration and education programming at the community level but there has only been one systematic evaluation (of the UNHCR’s response) which was highly critical of the organisation. These organisations and other governments are considerably hamstrung by xenophobia denialism at the highest level because it means that government will avoid the kinds of partnership that are urgently needed to address this endemic crisis

Braving Shame: The Rhetoric of Bravery in Contemporary Women\u27s Memoir

This dissertation interrogates the rhetoric of bravery as a culturally-infused way of hearing certain kinds of personal narratives. As a cultural rhetoric, “bravery” has deep roots in masculine militaristic ideology in which cowardice, courage, and shame are conceptually linked to a sense of duty. The memoir industry represents one environment that archives what is valued as brave writing. As rhetoric precariously at work in the memoir industry, this dissertation investigates the cultural assumptions that drive literary bravery as it is used to assess contemporary memoirs, particularly memoirs written by women. Braving Shame invokes a new brand of bravery—one that de-emphasizes a masculine perception of bravery (as performance) and emphasizes a feminine ethic of care

Civil Religion and Ontological Threat

Dyadic conflict research within international relations is largely reliant on the analysis of differences in regime or leadership characteristics as a catalyst for conflict. This dissertation challenges traditional scholarship through the introduction of a unique approach that examines more fundamental differences between states. These fundamental historical and cultural differences, which are enshrined in a states\u27 civil religion, offer insights into the behavior of states during crisis. The three primary questions of this dissertation are the following: What role does societal norms and cultural values have in threat perception? Why do states practice restraint in some crises and escalation of belligerence in others? Why do some conflicts result in brutal wars and others in limited wars? The theoretical expectation is that greater cultural and historical differences between states reduces the bargaining range for states to resolve crises, resulting in the escalation of tensions. In order to demonstrate empirical support for these claims, a mixed-methods approach is utilized. The quantitative analysis will be conducted to determine the generalizability and applicability of differences in civil religion on hostilities and escalation of crisis between dyads. The qualitative analysis will expound on the historical narratives of three pairs of dyads, which include the same state involved in two crises. These case studies will demonstrate how crises between certain dyads are escalated because of ontological threat perception. Furthermore, these case studies also demonstrate how the severity and brutality of war can vary dramatically between different dyads