8,105 research outputs found
Cores of Cooperative Games in Information Theory
Cores of cooperative games are ubiquitous in information theory, and arise
most frequently in the characterization of fundamental limits in various
scenarios involving multiple users. Examples include classical settings in
network information theory such as Slepian-Wolf source coding and multiple
access channels, classical settings in statistics such as robust hypothesis
testing, and new settings at the intersection of networking and statistics such
as distributed estimation problems for sensor networks. Cooperative game theory
allows one to understand aspects of all of these problems from a fresh and
unifying perspective that treats users as players in a game, sometimes leading
to new insights. At the heart of these analyses are fundamental dualities that
have been long studied in the context of cooperative games; for information
theoretic purposes, these are dualities between information inequalities on the
one hand and properties of rate, capacity or other resource allocation regions
on the other.Comment: 12 pages, published at
http://www.hindawi.com/GetArticle.aspx?doi=10.1155/2008/318704 in EURASIP
Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking, Special Issue on "Theory
and Applications in Multiuser/Multiterminal Communications", April 200
Mechanism Design with Public Goods: Committee Karate, Cooperative Games, and the Control of Social Decisions through Subcommittees
Axioms from social choice theory and the core of cooperative games in effectiveness form are used to design an organization that influences a voting group to choose the alternative preferred by a designer. The designer has information about individual preferences and can dictate organization but cannot dictate choice. The designer’s influence works through decision centers (subcommittees). Subcommittee memberships, subcommittee separation, the alternatives available to the subcommittees, the chairpersons and voting rules can be used to create games with appropriate configurations of cores that result in group decisions according to the designer's wishes. The institutions leave considerable flexibility to subcommittee decisions and appear to be fair. Manipulation is not detected. Core alternatives emerge as the group choice. Conflicting individual preferences enable organizational structures such that a wide range of alternative can be made the solution. Experiments demonstrate that the resulting model is a very accurate predictor of the group choice
Coalitional Games for Transmitter Cooperation in MIMO Multiple Access Channels
Cooperation between nodes sharing a wireless channel is becoming increasingly
necessary to achieve performance goals in a wireless network. The problem of
determining the feasibility and stability of cooperation between rational nodes
in a wireless network is of great importance in understanding cooperative
behavior. This paper addresses the stability of the grand coalition of
transmitters signaling over a multiple access channel using the framework of
cooperative game theory. The external interference experienced by each TX is
represented accurately by modeling the cooperation game between the TXs in
\emph{partition form}. Single user decoding and successive interference
cancelling strategies are examined at the receiver. In the absence of
coordination costs, the grand coalition is shown to be \emph{sum-rate optimal}
for both strategies. Transmitter cooperation is \emph{stable}, if and only if
the core of the game (the set of all divisions of grand coalition utility such
that no coalition deviates) is nonempty. Determining the stability of
cooperation is a co-NP-complete problem in general. For a single user decoding
receiver, transmitter cooperation is shown to be \emph{stable} at both high and
low SNRs, while for an interference cancelling receiver with a fixed decoding
order, cooperation is stable only at low SNRs and unstable at high SNR. When
time sharing is allowed between decoding orders, it is shown using an
approximate lower bound to the utility function that TX cooperation is also
stable at high SNRs. Thus, this paper demonstrates that ideal zero cost TX
cooperation over a MAC is stable and improves achievable rates for each
individual user.Comment: in review for publication in IEEE Transactions on Signal Processin
On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games
We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies
over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a
dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time
and thereby to give rise to a new environment. A coalition that considers a
deviation needs to take the consequences into account because from the
deviation point on, the game is no longer played with the original set of
players. The deviating coalition becomes the new grand coalition which, in
turn, induces a new dynamic game. The stage games of the new dynamical game
depend on all previous allocation including those that have materialized from
the deviating time on.
We define three types of core solutions: fair core, stable core and credible
core. We characterize the first two in case where the instantaneous game
depends on the last allocation (rather than on the whole history of
allocations) and the third in the general case. The analysis and the results
resembles to a great extent the theory of non-cooperative dynamic games.Comment: 25 page
Supply chain collaboration
In the past, research in operations management focused on single-firm analysis. Its goal was to provide managers in practice with suitable tools to improve the performance of their firm by calculating optimal inventory quantities, among others. Nowadays, business decisions are dominated by the globalization of markets and increased competition among firms. Further, more and more products reach the customer through supply chains that are composed of independent firms. Following these trends, research in operations management has shifted its focus from single-firm analysis to multi-firm analysis, in particular to improving the efficiency and performance of supply chains under decentralized control. The main characteristics of such chains are that the firms in the chain are independent actors who try to optimize their individual objectives, and that the decisions taken by a firm do also affect the performance of the other parties in the supply chain. These interactions among firms’ decisions ask for alignment and coordination of actions. Therefore, game theory, the study of situations of cooperation or conflict among heterogenous actors, is very well suited to deal with these interactions. This has been recognized by researchers in the field, since there are an ever increasing number of papers that applies tools, methods and models from game theory to supply chain problems
ADVANCES IN THE THEORY OF LARGE COOPERATIVE GAMES AND APPLICATIONS TO CLUB THEORY : THE SIDE PAYMENTS CASE
In a series of papers (Kovalenkov and Wooders 2001a, Games and Economic Behavior, 2001b,Mathematics of Operations Research, and 1997, Journal of Economic Theory to appear), the authors have developed the framework of parameterized collections of games and also that of parameterized collections of economies with clubs. These papers apply to collections of games with nontransferable utility and similarly to economies with clubs and general preferences. The game theoretic framework encompasses the earlier `pregame' framework (cf., Wooders 1994b Econometrica) and also earlier models of economies with clubs and with possibly multiple memberships in clubs (cf. Shubik and Wooders 1982). In this paper, we consider the special case of games with side payments and illustrate the application of our more general results in this special, and much simpler but still important, framework. The motivation for this line of research is developed and application to environmental problems is discussed.cooperative games ; clubs ; core ; approximate cores ; widespread externalities ; multiple memberships ; local public goods
Cost allocation in partition functionform games
A cooperative game in partition function form is proposed for a cost allocation problem. The game describes a real situation in which a payoff of any coalition does not only depend on the players in the coalition but also on the coalition structure of the other players. Solution concepts like the stable set and the core are analyzed. Relations of the concepts in the case of the game in partition function form and of an appropriately formulated game in characteristic function form are shown.partition function form game, core, stable set, cost allocation
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