New bounds for truthful scheduling on two unrelated selfish machines

We consider the minimum makespan problem for $n$ tasks and two unrelated parallel selfish machines. Let $R_n$ be the best approximation ratio of randomized monotone scale-free algorithms. This class contains the most efficient algorithms known for truthful scheduling on two machines. We propose a new $Min-Max$ formulation for $R_n$, as well as upper and lower bounds on $R_n$ based on this formulation. For the lower bound, we exploit pointwise approximations of cumulative distribution functions (CDFs). For the upper bound, we construct randomized algorithms using distributions with piecewise rational CDFs. Our method improves upon the existing bounds on $R_n$ for small $n$. In particular, we obtain almost tight bounds for $n=2$ showing that $|R_2-1.505996|<10^{-6}$.Comment: 28 pages, 3 tables, 1 figure. Theory Comput Syst (2019

Truthful Allocation in Graphs and Hypergraphs

We study truthful mechanisms for allocation problems in graphs, both for the minimization (i.e., scheduling) and maximization (i.e., auctions) setting. The minimization problem is a special case of the well-studied unrelated machines scheduling problem, in which every given task can be executed only by two pre-specified machines in the case of graphs or a given subset of machines in the case of hypergraphs. This corresponds to a multigraph whose nodes are the machines and its hyperedges are the tasks. This class of problems belongs to multidimensional mechanism design, for which there are no known general mechanisms other than the VCG and its generalization to affine minimizers. We propose a new class of mechanisms that are truthful and have significantly better performance than affine minimizers in many settings. Specifically, we provide upper and lower bounds for truthful mechanisms for general multigraphs, as well as special classes of graphs such as stars, trees, planar graphs, k-degenerate graphs, and graphs of a given treewidth. We also consider the objective of minimizing or maximizing the L^p-norm of the values of the players, a generalization of the makespan minimization that corresponds to p = ?, and extend the results to any p > 0

Truthful allocation in graphs and hypergraphs

We study truthful mechanisms for allocation problems in graphs, both for the minimization (i.e., scheduling) and maximization (i.e., auctions) setting. The minimization problem is a special case of the well-studied unrelated machines scheduling problem, in which every given task can be executed only by two pre-specified machines in the case of graphs or a given subset of machines in the case of hypergraphs. This corresponds to a multigraph whose nodes are the machines and its hyperedges are the tasks. This class of problems belongs to multidimensional mechanism design, for which there are no known general mechanisms other than the VCG and its generalization to affine minimizers. We propose a new class of mechanisms that are truthful and have significantly better performance than affine minimizers in many settings. Specifically, we provide upper and lower bounds for truthful mechanisms for general multigraphs, as well as special classes of graphs such as stars, trees, planar graphs, k-degenerate graphs, and graphs of a given treewidth. We also consider the objective of minimizing or maximizing the Lp-norm of the values of the players, a generalization of the makespan minimization that corresponds to p = ∞, and extend the results to any p > 0

Fuelling the zero-emissions road freight of the future: routing of mobile fuellers

The future of zero-emissions road freight is closely tied to the sufficient availability of new and clean fuel options such as electricity and Hydrogen. In goods distribution using Electric Commercial Vehicles (ECVs) and Hydrogen Fuel Cell Vehicles (HFCVs) a major challenge in the transition period would pertain to their limited autonomy and scarce and unevenly distributed refuelling stations. One viable solution to facilitate and speed up the adoption of ECVs/HFCVs by logistics, however, is to get the fuel to the point where it is needed (instead of diverting the route of delivery vehicles to refuelling stations) using "Mobile Fuellers (MFs)". These are mobile battery swapping/recharging vans or mobile Hydrogen fuellers that can travel to a running ECV/HFCV to provide the fuel they require to complete their delivery routes at a rendezvous time and space. In this presentation, new vehicle routing models will be presented for a third party company that provides MF services. In the proposed problem variant, the MF provider company receives routing plans of multiple customer companies and has to design routes for a fleet of capacitated MFs that have to synchronise their routes with the running vehicles to deliver the required amount of fuel on-the-fly. This presentation will discuss and compare several mathematical models based on different business models and collaborative logistics scenarios