352 research outputs found
Complexity of Manipulation, Bribery, and Campaign Management in Bucklin and Fallback Voting
A central theme in computational social choice is to study the extent to
which voting systems computationally resist manipulative attacks seeking to
influence the outcome of elections, such as manipulation (i.e., strategic
voting), control, and bribery. Bucklin and fallback voting are among the voting
systems with the broadest resistance (i.e., NP-hardness) to control attacks.
However, only little is known about their behavior regarding manipulation and
bribery attacks. We comprehensively investigate the computational resistance of
Bucklin and fallback voting for many of the common manipulation and bribery
scenarios; we also complement our discussion by considering several campaign
management problems for Bucklin and fallback.Comment: 28 page
Normalized Range Voting Broadly Resists Control
We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with
respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an
election chair to alter the structure of an election in order to change the
outcome. We show that a voting system resists a case of control by proving that
performing that case of control is computationally infeasible. Range Voting is
a natural extension of approval voting, and Normalized Range Voting is a simple
variant which alters each vote to maximize the potential impact of each voter.
We show that Normalized Range Voting has among the largest number of control
resistances among natural voting systems
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