855,028 research outputs found
Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004This paper explores predictability of behavior in coordination games with multiple equilibria. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects' certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Attitudes towards strategic uncertainty in coordination games are related to risk aversion, experience seeking, gender and age. From the distribution of certainty equivalents among participating students we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of coordination games. For many games success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response of a risk neutral player is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Data indicate that subjects have probabilistic beliefs about success or failure of coordination rather than beliefs about individual behavior of other players
Coordination cycles
Players repeatedly face a coordination problem in a dynamic global game. By choosing a risky action (invest) instead of waiting, players risk instantaneous losses as well as a loss of payoffs from future stages, in which they cannot participate if they go bankrupt. Thus, the total strategic risk associated with investment in a particular stage depends on the expected continuation payoff. High continuation payoff makes investment today more risky and therefore harder to coordinate on, which decreases today’s payoff. Thus, expectation of successful coordination tomorrow undermines successful coordination today, which leads to fluctuations of equilibrium behavior even if the underlying economic fundamentals happen to be the same across the rounds. The dynamic game inherits the equilibrium uniqueness of the underlying static global game
Images of coordination : how implementing organizations perceive coordination arrangements
A crucial challenge for the coordination of horizontal policy programs those designed to tackle crosscutting issues is how to motivate government organizations to contribute to such programs. Hence, it is crucial to study how practitioners in implementing organizations view and appreciate the coordination of such programs. Assisted by Q-methodology, this inductive study reveals three significantly different "images" centralframe setting, networking via boundary spanners, and coordination beyond window dressing Most surprisingly, different images show up among respondents within the same organizations and horizontal programs. The authors find that the images reflect elements of the literature: the resistance to hierarchical central control, the need for local differentiation and increased incentives, and a collaboration-oriented culture. Most importantly, practitioners of implementing organizations perceive top-dawn mechanisms as ineffective to achieve coordination and ask for adaptive arrangements, involvement, and deliberative processes when designing coordination arrangements and during the collaboration
Strong Coordination over Noisy Channels: Is Separation Sufficient?
We study the problem of strong coordination of actions of two agents and
that communicate over a noisy communication channel such that the actions
follow a given joint probability distribution. We propose two novel schemes for
this noisy strong coordination problem, and derive inner bounds for the
underlying strong coordination capacity region. The first scheme is a joint
coordination-channel coding scheme that utilizes the randomness provided by the
communication channel to reduce the local randomness required in generating the
action sequence at agent . The second scheme exploits separate coordination
and channel coding where local randomness is extracted from the channel after
decoding. Finally, we present an example in which the joint scheme is able to
outperform the separate scheme in terms of coordination rate.Comment: 9 pages, 4 figures. An extended version of a paper accepted for the
IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), 201
A multi-agent based system to enable strategic and operational design coordination
This paper presents two systems which individually focus on different aspects of design coordination, namely strategic and operational. The systems were developed in parallel and individually contain related models that represent specific frames from a Design Coordination Framework developed by Andreasen et al. [1]. The focus of the strategic design management system is the management of design tasks, decisions, information, goals and rationale within the design process, whereas the focus of the operational design coordination system is the coordination of tasks and activities with respect to the near-optimal utilisation of available resources. A common interface exists which enables the two systems to be integrated and used as a single system with the aim of managing both strategicand operational design coordination. Hence, the objective of this work is to enable the design process to be conducted in a timely and appropriate manner
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