4,342 research outputs found
Coordinating a Supply Chain With a Manufacturer-Owned Online Channel: A Dual Channel Model Under Price Competition
We consider a dual channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells a single product to end-users through both a traditional retail channel and a manufacturer-owned direct online channel. We adopt a commonly used linear demand substitution model in which the mean demand in each channel is a function of the prices in each channel.We model each channel as a news vendor problem, with price and order quantity as decision variables. In addition, the manufacturer must choose the wholesale price to charge to the independent retailer. We analyze the optimal decisions for each channel and prove the existence of a unique equilibrium for the system. We compare this equilibrium solution to the solution for an integrated system, in which the manufacturer owns both the online store and the retailer. To enable supply chain coordination, we propose two contract schemes: a modified revenue-sharing contract and gain/loss sharing contract. We show that, in cases where the retail channel has a larger market than the online channel, such contracts enable the manufacturer to maintain price discrimination, selling the products in different channels at different prices. Finally, we perform a comprehensive numerical study to consider the impact of the model parameters on the equilibrium and to demonstrate the performance of the proposed coordination contracts. We conclude that coordination is most critical for products which are highly price sensitive and for systems in which the online and traditional retail channels are not viewed as close substitutes
Optimization of a Dual-Channel Retailing System with Customer Returns
A plethora of retailers have begun to embrace a dual-channel retailing strategy wherein items are provided to consumers through both an online store and a physical store. As a result of standards and competitive measures, many retailers provide buyers who are unhappy with their purchases with the ability to achieve a full refund. In a dualchannel retailing system, full reimbursements can be done through what is called a crosschannel return, when a buyer purchases a product from an online store and returns it to a physical store. They can also be done through what is called a same-channel return, when a buyer purchases a product from a physical store and returns it back to the physical store, or purchases a product from an online store and returns it back to the online store. No existing research has examined all common types of customer returns in the context of a dual-channel retailing system. Be notified that the practice of cross-returning an item purchased from the physical store back to the online store is not common. Thus, it is not considered in this dissertation.
We first study the optimal pricing policies for a centralized and decentralized dual-channel retailer (DCR) with same- and cross-channel returns. We consider two factors: the dual-channel retailerâs performance under centralization with unified and differential pricing schemes, and the dual-channel retailerâs performance under decentralization with the Stackelberg and Nash games. How dual-channel pricing behaviour is impacted by customer preference and rates of customer returns is discussed. In this study, a channelâs sales requests is a linear function of a channelâs own pricing strategy and a cross-channelâs pricing strategy.
The second problem is an extension of the first problem. The optimal pricing policies and online channelâs responsiveness level for a centralized and decentralized dual-channel retailer with same- and cross-channel returns are studied. Indeed, the online store is normally the distribution centre of the enterprise and is not limited to the customers in its neighbourhood. Also, the online store experiences a much higher return rate compared to the physical store. Thus, it has the capability and the need to optimize its responsiveness to customer returns along with its pricing strategy. A channelâs sales requests, in the second problem, is a linear function of a channelâs own price, a crosschannelâs price, and the online storeâs responsiveness level.
The third problem studies the dilemma of whether or not to allow unsatisfactory online purchases to be cross-returned to the physical store. If not properly considered, those returns may create havoc to the system and a retailer might overestimate or underestimate a channelâs order quantity. Therefore, we study and compare between four vi different strategies, and propose models to determine optimal order quantities for each strategy when a dual-channel retailer offers both same and cross-channel returns. Several decision making insights on choosing between the different cross-channel return strategies and some properties of the optimal solutions are presented.
From the retailerâs perspective of outsourcing the e-channelâs management to a third party logistics and service provider, we finally study three different inventory strategies, namely transaction-based fee, flat-based fee, and gain sharing. For each strategy, we find both channelsâ optimal inventory policies and expected profits. The performances of the different strategies are compared and the managerial insights are given using analytical and numerical analysis.
Methodologies, insights, comparative analysis, and computational results are delivered in this dissertation for the above aforementioned problems
Buyback and return policies for a book publishing firm = Egy könyvkiadó vållalat visszavåsårlåsi stratégiåja
A dolgozat cĂ©lja egy vĂĄllalati gyakorlatbĂłl szĂĄrmazĂł eset elemzĂ©se. Egy könyvkiadĂłt tekintĂŒnk. A kiadĂł kapcsolatban van kis- Ă©s nagykereskedĆkkel, valamint a fogyasztĂłk egy csoportjĂĄval is vannak kapcsolatai. A könyvkiadĂłk projekt rendszerben mƱködnek. A kiadĂł azzal a problĂ©mĂĄval szembesĂŒl, hogy hogyan ossza el egy frissen kiadott Ă©s nyomtatott könyv pĂ©ldĂĄnyszĂĄmait a kis- Ă©s nagykereskedĆk között, valamint mekkora pĂ©ldĂĄnyszĂĄmot tĂĄroljon maga a fogyasztĂłk közvetlen kielĂ©gĂtĂ©sĂ©re. A kiadĂłrĂłl feltĂ©telezzĂŒk, hogy visszavĂĄsĂĄrlĂĄsi szerzĆdĂ©se van a kereskedĆkkel. A könyv irĂĄnti kereslet nem ismert, de becsĂŒlhetĆ. A kis- Ă©s nagykereskedĆk maximalizĂĄljĂĄk a nyeresĂ©gĂŒket. = The aim of the paper is to analyze a practical real world problem. A publishing house is given. The publishing firm has contacts to a number of wholesaler / retailer enterprises and direct contact to customers to satisfy the market demand. The book publishers work in a project industry. The publisher faces with the problem how to allocate the stocks of a given, newly published book to the wholesaler and retailer, and to hold some copies to satisfy the customers direct from the publisher. The publisher has a buyback option. The distribution of the demand is unknown, but it can be estimated. The wholesaler / retailer maximize the profits.
The problem can be modeled as a one-warehouse and N-retailer supply chain with not identical demand distribution. The model can be transformed in a game theory problem. It is assumed that the demand distribution follows a Poisson distribution
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