Revisiting the form and function of conflict: Neurobiological, psychological, and cultural mechanisms for attack and defense within and between groups

Conflict can profoundly affect individuals and their groups. Oftentimes, conflict involves a clash between one side seeking change and increased gains through victory and the other side defending the status quo and protecting against loss and defeat. However, theory and empirical research largely neglected these conflicts between attackers and defenders, and the strategic, social, and psychological consequences of attack and defense remain poorly understood. To fill this void, we model (1) the clashing of attack and defense as games of strategy and reveal that (2) attack benefits from mismatching its target's level of defense, whereas defense benefits from matching the attacker's competitiveness. This suggests that (3) attack recruits neuroendocrine pathways underlying behavioral activation and overconfidence, whereas defense invokes neural networks for behavioral inhibition, vigilant scanning, and hostile attributions; and that (4) people invest less in attack than defense, and attack often fails. Finally, we propose that (5) in intergroup conflict, out-group attack needs institutional arrangements that motivate and coordinate collective action, whereas in-group defense benefits from endogenously emerging in-group identification. We discuss how games of attack and defense may have shaped human capacities for prosociality and aggression, and how third parties can regulate such conflicts and reduce their waste. Keywords: behavioral game theory; biobehavioral approach–avoidance; coevolution of prosociality and aggression; conflict; conflict intervention; cultural institutions; intergroup relations; psychological adaptations

Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in multiplayer games

Tese de mestrado em Física (Física Estatística e Não Linear), apresentada à Universidade de Lisboa, através da Faculdade de Ciências, 2011Cooperation is an act where individuals can contribute something, at a cost to themselves, to provide a benefit for others. We can find situations where this kind of act can arise at almost every layer of human societies and also in the animal world. Such a widespread behavior can be studied using Game Theory, a mathematical formulation of multi-optional interactions. The theory takes its predictions from social games between rational individuals that want to maximize their profit. When applied to dilemmas of cooperation, the theory predicts the demise of those who contribute, thus contradicting extensive empirical evidence. Evolutionary Game Theory was created to counteract this shortcoming. It drops the rationality assumption of Game Theory and instead places individuals in a dynamical context where natural selection applies. Thus, in view of this theory, the most successful individuals (who profit the most from games) are more likely to be leave descendants or be imitated by others, depending on the kind of dynamics being considered. Nevertheless, this process by itself does not yet explain the emergence of cooperation and only by adding other mechanisms to the dynamics can we make this property appear. In this thesis we present three such mechanisms all in the context of Public Goods Games. In these games, individuals in a group choose if they want to contribute to a common good that is then transformed into a benefit to be equally shared by all group members. The first mechanism applies to infinite well-mixed population dynamics and consists of a detaching in time the impact of the game on the system. By applying a time delay to the profits, we can modify a specific public goods game in order to give cooperation a chance. The other mechanisms are somewhat similar and apply to finite structured populations where individuals are restricted to interacting with specific opponents. They both consider that this interaction structure is shaped by the game dynamics and can evolve over time. The second and third mechanisms are thus a numerical and analytical implementation, respectively, of this co-evolutionary dynamics.A Cooperação é uma accão em que temos indivíduos que podem contribuir com algo para beneficiar outros, pagando os primeiros um custo. Exemplos de situações onde a cooperação pode surgir encontram-se em quase todos as camadas da sociedade: desde pessoas a terem uma conversa ou a realizar um debate político, a jogar no mercado bolsista, a caçar ou a arranjar mantimentos ou até a construir um edifício ou uma comunidade inteira. No mundo animal também pode surgir cooperação, no contexto de caçadas, protecção contra predadores ou em lideranças de grupo. Um comportamento tão vasto pode ser estudado utilizando Teoria de Jogos, uma formulação matemática de interacções multi-estratégicas. A teoria faz previsões através da realização de jogos sociais entre indivíduos racionais que querem maximizar o seu lucro. Quando aplicada a dilemas de cooperação, a teoria prevê a extinção da cooperação, o que contradiz vastos dados empíricos. A Teoria de Jogos Evolutiva for criada com o intuito de corrigir essa falha. Esta teoria deixa cair o postulado da racionalidade da teoria anterior e considera então que os indivíduos estão num contexto dinâmico sendo estes afectados pela selecção natural. Portanto, de acordo com a teoria, os indivíduos mais fortes (que obtêm mais lucros dos jogos) são os que mais hipóteses têm de deixar descendentes ou de ser imitados, consoante o tipo de dinâmicas consideradas. No entanto, este processo por si só não explica ainda a emergência da cooperação. É preciso adicionar outros mecanismos para fazer aparecer esta propriedade. Nesta tese apresentamos três destes mecanismos, todos no contexto dos Jogos de Bem Público. Nestes jogos, indivíduos juntam-se num grupo e escolhem se querem ou não contribuir para um bem público que depois é transformado e dividido igualmente por todos os membros desse grupo. O primeiro mecanismo aplica-se a dinâmicas de populações infinitas well-mixed onde qualquer indivíduo interage com qualquer outro com a mesma probabilidade, e consiste em separar temporalmente o impacto do jogo no sistema considerado. Aplicando um atraso temporal aos lucros podemos modificar um tipo específico de jogo de bem público de modo a que a cooperação tenha uma hipótese de subsistir. Os outros mecanismos são algo similares e aplicam-se a populações finitas e estruturadas onde os indivíduos estão restringidos a interagir apenas com determinados oponentes. Ambos consideram que esta estrutura de interacção é moldada pelo jogo e pode evoluir ao longo do tempo. O segundo e terceiro mecanismos são portanto uma implementação numérica e analítica, respectivamente, desta dinâmica co-evolutiva

The Challenge of Cooperative Regulatory Relations After Enlargement

This paper conceptualises European governance as a continuous series of collective action games among national regulators. European administration is theorized as a set of mutually beneficial relations among independent regulators, rather than as a hierarchy of supranational institutions, courts, and national administrators. The collective action approach highlights the importance of certain factors in fostering regulatory cooperation and enabling the common market to become an administrative reality: repeated interactions, monitoring and sanctioning by the Commission and the courts, reciprocity norms, and trust. It also suggests that one of the most significant challenges of enlargement will be to establish cooperative regulatory exchanges among old and new regulators. Regulators in the existing member states do not always trust the capacity of Central and Eastern European regulators to administer the acquis communautaire. Cooperation and trust among old and new regulators will also prove difficult because, after enlargement, their relations will gradually shift from ones of power to ones of mutually beneficial exchanges among equals. The solution lies in self-awareness of the structure of the collective action game, a more active role for the Commission and the Court in monitoring compliance, and strict adherence to a strategy of reciprocity in retaliating for non-compliance

Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues

The purpose of the paper is to review the applications of non-cooperative bargaining theory to water related issues – which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. The ultimate aim is that to, on the one hand, identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge, and their characteristics; and, on the other hand, to support policy makers in devising the “rules of the game” that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially of trans-boundary nature, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, this paper first discusses the non-cooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Particular attention will be given to those directly modelling the process of negotiation, although some attempts at finding strategies to maintain the efficient allocation solution will also be illustrated. In addition, this paper will focus on Negotiation Support Systems (NSS), developed to support the process of negotiation. This field of research is still relatively new, however, and NSS have not yet found much use in real life negotiation. The paper will conclude by highlighting the key remaining gaps in the literature.Negotiation theory, Water, Agreeements, Stochasticity, Stakeholders

Paradigm Shift in Game Theory : Sociological Re-Conceptualization of Human Agency, Social Structure, and Agents’ Cognitive-Normative Frameworks and Action Determination Modalities

This article aims to present some of the initial work of developing a social science grounded game theory—as a clear alternative to classical game theory. Two distinct independent initiatives in Sociology are presented: One, a systems approach, social systems game theory (SGT), and the other, Erving Goffman’s interactionist approach (IGT). These approaches are presented and contrasted with classical theory. They focus on the social rules, norms, roles, role relationships, and institutional arrangements, which structure and regulate human behavior. While strategic judgment and instrumental rationality play an important part in the sociological approaches, they are not a universal or dominant modality of social action determination. Rule following is considered, generally speaking, more characteristic and more general. Sociological approaches, such as those outlined in this article provide a language and conceptual tools to more adequately and effectively than the classical theory describe, model, and analyze the diversity and complexity of human interaction conditions and processes: (1) complex cognitive rule based models of the interaction situation with which actors understand and analyze their situations; (2) value complex(es) with which actors operate, often with multiple values and norms applying in interaction situations; (3) action repertoires (rule complexes) with simple and complex action alternatives—plans, programs, established (sometimes highly elaborated) algorithms, and rituals; (4) a rule complex of action determination modalities for actors to generate and/or select actions in game situations; three action modalities are considered here; each modality consists of one or more procedures or algorithms for action determination: (I) following or implementing a rule or rule complex, norm, role, ritual, or social relation; (II) selecting or choosing among given or institutionalized alternatives according to a rule or principle; and (III) constructing or adopting one or more alternatives according to a value, guideline, or set of criteria. Such determinations are often carried out collectively. The paper identifies and illustrates in a concluding table several of the key differences between classical theory and the sociological approaches on a number of dimensions relating to human agency; social structure, norms, institutions, and cultural forms; patterns of game interaction and outcomes, the conditions of cooperation and conflict, game restructuring and transformation, and empirical relevance. Sociologically based game theory, such as the contributions outlined in this article suggest a language and conceptual tools to more adequately and effectively than the classical theory describe, model, and analyze the diversity, complexity, and dynamics of human interaction conditions and processes and, therefore, promises greater empirical relevance and scientific power. An Appendix provides an elaboration of SGT, concluding that one of SGT’s major contributions is the rule based conceptualization of games as socially embedded with agents in social roles and role relationships and subject to cognitive-normative and agential regulation. SGT rules and rule complexes are based on contemporary developments relating to granular computing and Artificial Intelligence in general.Peer reviewe

Myopic behavior and overall utility maximization - A study of linked hawks and doves

At present, in the domain of simultaneous action selection and network formation games, game-theoretic behavior and experimental observations are not consistent. While theory typically predicts inefficient outcomes for (anti- )co-ordination games, experiments show that subjects tend to play efficient (non-Nash) strategy profiles. One reason for this discrepancy is the tendency to model corresponding games as one-shot and derive predictions. In this paper, we calculate the equilibria for a finitely repeated version of the Hawk-Dove game with endogenous network formation and show that the repetition leads to additional sub-game perfect equilibria; namely, the efficient strategy profiles played by human subjects. However, efficiency crucially depends on the design of the game. This paper theoretically demonstrates that, although technically feasible, the efficient profiles are not sub-game perfect equilibria if actions are fixed after an initial period. We confirm this result using an experimental study that demonstrates how payoffs are higher if actions are never fixed

Social Interaction Patterns of the Disabled People in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas

The social participation of the disabled people is unsatisfactory and low, one of the reasons often overlooked but of great importance may lie in the disparate patterns of social interaction between the disabled people and the abled people. The current study respectively recruited 41 and 80 disabled people in two experiments and adopted give-some games and public good dilemma to explore social interaction patterns between the disabled abled people. The results were as follows: (1) the disabled people preferred to interact with the disabled people and the abled people preferred to interact with the abled people. (2) The disabled abled people had higher cooperation, satisfaction and sense of justice when interacting with the disabled people than interacting with the abled people. (3) Advantage in the number of the disabled people could reverse their disadvantage in the identity. These results are of important practical value, which provides related theoretical support for the disabled people’s federation and communities when carrying out activities for the disabled people

Econometric Models of Asymmetric Price Transmission

In this paper we review the existing empirical literature on price asymmetries in commodities, providing a way to classify and compare different studies which are highly heterogeneous in terms of econometric models, type of asymmetries and empirical findings. Relative to the previous literature, this paper is novel in several respects. First, it presents a detailed and updated survey of the existing empirical contributions on the existence of price asymmetries in the transmission mechanism linking input prices to output prices. Second, this paper presents an extension of the traditional distinction between long-run and short-run asymmetries to new categories of asymmetries, such as: contemporaneous impact, distributed lag effect, cumulated impact, reaction time, equilibrium and momentum equilibrium adjustment path, regime effect, regime equilibrium adjustment path. Third, each empirical study is critically discussed in the light of this new classification of asymmetries. Fourth, this paper evaluates the relative merits of the most popular econometric models for price asymmetries, namely autoregressive distributed lags, partial adjustments, error correction models, regime switching and vector autoregressive models.Price asymmetries, Cointegration, Partial adjustment, Threshold regime switching

The social contagion of antisocial behavior

Previous research has shown that reciprocity can be contagious when there is no option to repay the benefactor and the recipient instead channels repayment toward strangers. In this study, we test whether retaliation can also be contagious. Extending previous work on “paying it forward,” we tested two mechanisms for the social contagion of antisocial behavior: generalized reciprocity (a victim of antisocial behavior is more likely to pay it forward) and third-party influence (an observer of antisocial behavior is more likely to emulate it). We used an online experiment with randomized trials to test the two hypothesized mechanisms and their interaction by manipulating the extent to which participants experienced and observed antisocial behavior. We found that people are more likely to harm others if they have been harmed and they are less likely to do so if they observe that others do not harm