A principled information valuation for communications during multi-agent coordination

Decentralised coordination in multi-agent systems is typically achieved using communication. However, in many cases, communication is expensive to utilise because there is limited bandwidth, it may be dangerous to communicate, or communication may simply be unavailable at times. In this context, we argue for a rational approach to communication --- if it has a cost, the agents should be able to calculate a value of communicating. By doing this, the agents can balance the need to communicate with the cost of doing so. In this research, we present a novel model of rational communication that uses information theory to value communications, and employ this valuation in a decision theoretic coordination mechanism. A preliminary empirical evaluation of the benefits of this approach is presented in the context of the RoboCupRescue simulator

A Rule-driven Approach for Defining the Behavior of Negotiating Software Agents

One problem with existing agent-mediated negotiation systems is that they rely on ad hoc, static, non-adaptive, and hardcoded schemes to represent the behaviour of agents. This limitation is probably due to the complexity of the negotiation task itself. Indeed, while negotiating, software (human) agents face tough decisions. These decisions are based not only on the information made available by the negotiation server, but on the behaviour of the other participants in the negotiation process as well. The information and the behaviour in question are constantly changing and highly uncertain. In the first part of the paper, we propose a rule-driven approach to represent, manage and explore negotiation strategies and coordination information. For that, we divide the behaviour of negotiating agents into protocols, strategies and coordination. Among the many advantages of the proposed solution, we can cite the high level of abstraction, the closeness to human understanding, the versatility, and the possibility to modify the agents' behaviour during the negotiation process. To validate our solution, we ran many agent tournaments, and used the rule-driven approach to implement bidding strategies that are common in the English and Dutch auctions. We also implemented simple coordination schemes across several auctions. The ongoing validation work is detailed and discussed in the second part of the paper. Un des inconvénients qu'on retrouve fréquemment dans les systèmes de négociation par agents est qu'ils reposent sur des schémas ad-hoc, non adaptatifs et figés dans le code pour représenter le comportement des agents. Cette limitation est probablement due à la complexité de l'activité de négociation elle-même. En effet, au cours de la négociation, les agents logiciels (humains) ont des décisions difficiles à prendre. Ces décisions ne sont pas seulement basées sur l'information disponible sur le serveur de négociation, mais aussi sur le comportement des autres participants durant le processus de négociation. L'information et le comportement en question changent constamment et sont très incertains. Dans la première partie de l'article, nous proposons une approche à base de règles pour représenter, gérer et explorer les stratégies de négociation ainsi que l'information de coordination. Parmi les nombreux avantages de la solution proposée, on peut citer le haut niveau d'abstraction, la proximité avec la compréhension humaine, la souplesse d'utilisation et la possibilité de modifier le comportement des agents durant le processus de négociation. Pour valider notre solution, nous avons effectué plusieurs tournois entre agents et utilisé l'approche à base de règles pour implémenter des stratégies simples applicables à l'enchère anglaise et à l'enchère hollandaise. Nous avons aussi implémenté des schémas simples de coordination impliquant plusieurs enchères. Le travail de validation, en cours, est détaillé et discuté dans la seconde partie de l'article.e-negotiation, online auction, software agent, negotiation strategy, coordination, rule-based system, rule engine, Négociation électronique, enchères en ligne, agents logiciels, stratégie de négociation, coordination, système à base de règles, moteur de règles

Macroeconomic And Monetary Policies From The Eductive Viewpoint

The quality of the coordination of expectations, a key issue for monetary policy, obtains from different, but interrelated, channels: both the credibility of the central bank intervention and the ability of decentralized agents to coordinate on a dynamical equilibrium matter. For both purposes, it is important to understand how agents learn. Indeed, many studies on monetary policy focus on learning processes involving evolutive, real-time learning rules (such as adaptive learning rules). The eductive viewpoint, as illustrated in previous works, partly abstracts from the real-time dimension of learning, with the aim of more directly capturing the systems’ coordination-friendly characteristics. The paper first presents the analytical philosophy of expectational coordination underlying the eductive viewpoint. Following the review, the paper explores the differences between the traditional viewpoint and this competing viewpoint as they relate to standard monetary policy analysis. This exploration is tentative, yet promising.

Complementarities and Macroeconomics: Poisson Games

In many situations in macroeconomics strategic complementarities arise, and agents face a coordination problem. An important issue, from both a theoretical and a policy perspective, is equilibrium uniqueness. We contribute to this literature by focusing on the macroeconomic aspect of the problem: the number of potential innovators, speculators e.t.c. is large. In particular, we follow Myerson (1998, 2000) that in large games “a more realistic model should admit some uncertainty about the number of players in the game”. In more detail, we model the coordination problem as a Poisson game, and investigate the conditions under which unique equilibrium selection is obtained.Strategic Complementarities, Coordination Games, Poisson Games, Currency Crises, Innovation.

Multiagent Bidirectionally-Coordinated Nets: Emergence of Human-level Coordination in Learning to Play StarCraft Combat Games

Many artificial intelligence (AI) applications often require multiple intelligent agents to work in a collaborative effort. Efficient learning for intra-agent communication and coordination is an indispensable step towards general AI. In this paper, we take StarCraft combat game as a case study, where the task is to coordinate multiple agents as a team to defeat their enemies. To maintain a scalable yet effective communication protocol, we introduce a Multiagent Bidirectionally-Coordinated Network (BiCNet ['bIknet]) with a vectorised extension of actor-critic formulation. We show that BiCNet can handle different types of combats with arbitrary numbers of AI agents for both sides. Our analysis demonstrates that without any supervisions such as human demonstrations or labelled data, BiCNet could learn various types of advanced coordination strategies that have been commonly used by experienced game players. In our experiments, we evaluate our approach against multiple baselines under different scenarios; it shows state-of-the-art performance, and possesses potential values for large-scale real-world applications.Comment: 10 pages, 10 figures. Previously as title: "Multiagent Bidirectionally-Coordinated Nets for Learning to Play StarCraft Combat Games", Mar 201

Approximate Equilibrium and Incentivizing Social Coordination

We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic preferences but they stand to gain if others choose the same strategy as them. For non-trivial versions of our game, stable solutions like Nash Equilibrium may not exist, or may be socially inefficient even when they do exist. This motivates us to focus on designing efficient algorithms to compute (almost) stable solutions like Approximate Equilibrium that can be realized if agents are provided some additional incentives. Our results apply in many settings like adoption of new products, project selection, and group formation, where a central authority can direct agents towards a strategy but agents may defect if they have better alternatives. We show that for any given instance, we can either compute a high quality approximate equilibrium or a near-optimal solution that can be stabilized by providing small payments to some players. We then generalize our model to encompass situations where player relationships may exhibit complementarities and present an algorithm to compute an Approximate Equilibrium whose stability factor is linear in the degree of complementarity. Our results imply that a little influence is necessary in order to ensure that selfish players coordinate and form socially efficient solutions.Comment: A preliminary version of this work will appear in AAAI-14: Twenty-Eighth Conference on Artificial Intelligenc

Decentralised Coordination of Low-Power Embedded Devices Using the Max-Sum Algorithm

This paper considers the problem of performing decentralised coordination of low-power embedded devices (as is required within many environmental sensing and surveillance applications). Specifically, we address the generic problem of maximising social welfare within a group of interacting agents. We propose a novel representation of the problem, as a cyclic bipartite factor graph, composed of variable and function nodes (representing the agents’ states and utilities respectively). We show that such representation allows us to use an extension of the max-sum algorithm to generate approximate solutions to this global optimisation problem through local decentralised message passing. We empirically evaluate this approach on a canonical coordination problem (graph colouring), and benchmark it against state of the art approximate and complete algorithms (DSA and DPOP). We show that our approach is robust to lossy communication, that it generates solutions closer to those of DPOP than DSA is able to, and that it does so with a communication cost (in terms of total messages size) that scales very well with the number of agents in the system (compared to the exponential increase of DPOP). Finally, we describe a hardware implementation of our algorithm operating on low-power Chipcon CC2431 System-on-Chip sensor nodes

The Desirable Organizational Structure for Evolutionary Firms in Static Landscapes

In addition to the common analysis of the Kauffman NK model where the value of K and the structure of interaction is given, the aim of this paper is to study what would be the values of these two parameters if they were endogenized. Thus, a model is proposed where firms and business schools coordinate to search for high peaks in their respective landscapes using evolutionary algorithms. The main result coming out from the analysis of the model is that agents, using evolutionary algorithms, attempt to simplify the problems of coordination and this, over time, produces the existence in the economy of agents using many different strategies. (JEL-code: C61, C63, D21, D23