Technological change in markets with network externalities

Technological Change;Externalities

Herd behavior, the "Penguin effect", and the suppression of informational diffusion: An analysis of informational externalities and payoff interdependency

Technology;Information;Econometric Models;Group Behaviour

Co-ordination and Lock-in: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects

Switching costs and network effects bind customers to vendors if products are incompatible, locking customers or even markets in to early choices. Lock-in hinders customers from changing suppliers in response to (predictable or unpredictable) changes in effciency, and gives vendors lucrative ex post market power-over the same buyer in the case of switching costs (or brand loyalty), or over others with network effects. Firms compete ex ante for this ex post power, using penetration pricing, introductory offers, and price wars. Such "competition for the market" or "life-cycle competition" can adequately replace ordinary compatible competition, and can even be fiercer than compatible competition by weakening differentiation. More often, however, incompatible competition not only involves direct effciency losses but also softens competition and magnifies incumbency advantages. With network effects, established firms have little incentive to offer better deals when buyers’ and complementors’ expectations hinge on non-effciency factors (especially history such as past market shares), and although competition between incompatible networks is initially unstable and sensitive to competitive offers and random events, it later "tips" to monopoly, after which entry is hard, often even too hard given incompatibility. And while switching costs can encourage small-scale entry, they discourage sellers from raiding one another’s existing customers, and s also discourage more aggressive entry. Because of these competitive effects, even ineffcient incompatible competition is often more profitable than compatible competition, especially for dominant rms with installed-base or expectational advantages. Thus firms probably seek incompatibility too often. We therefore favor thoughtfully pro-compatibility public policy.

Regulating coexistence of GM and non-GM crops without jeopardizing economic incentives

The ongoing debate about the coexistence of genetically modified (GM) and non-GM crops in the European Union (EU) mainly focuses on preventive measures needed to keep the adventitious presence of GM material in non-GM products below established tolerance thresholds, as well as on issues covering questions of liability and the duty to redress the incurred economic harm once adventitious mixing in non-GM products has occurred. By contrast, the interplay between the economic incentives and costs of coexistence has attracted little attention. The current overemphasis on the technical aspects and cost of coexistence over its economic incentives might lead EU policy-makers to adopt too stringent and rigid regulations on coexistence. Therefore, we argue for flexible coexistence regulations that explicitly take into account the economic incentives for coexistence. Our arguments provide a timely and important framework for EU policy-makers, who are currently struggling to implement coherent coexistence regulations in all member states.status: publishe

Environmental Innovation, War of Attrition and Investment Grants

The paper analyses the timing of spontaneous environmental innovation when second-mover advantages, arising from the expectation of declining investment costs, increase the option value of waiting created by investment irreversibility and uncertainty about private payoffs. We then focus on the design of public subsidies aimed at bridging the gap between the spontaneous time of technological change and the socially desirable one. Under network externalities and incomplete information about firms’ switching costs, auctioning investment grants appears to be a cost-effective way of accelerating pollution abatement, in that it allows targeting grants instead of subsidizing the entire industry indiscriminatelyEnvironmental innovation, Investment irreversibility, Network externalities, Investment grants, Second-price auction.

Consumer Perspectives of Brand Extension Effects : Information Analysis Determining the Consumer Behaviour Patterns

Brands are successful because people prefer them to ordinary products. In addition to the psychological factors already mentioned, brands give consumers the means whereby they can make choices and judgments. The secret to successful branding is to influence the decisions the way in which consumers perceive the company or product, and brands can affect the minds of customers by appealing to the information acquired and analyzed. This paper attempts to emphasize the relationship between empirical and theoretical considerations in the information analysis of brand extensions on consumer behavior. Broadly the study focuses on analysis at the individual or micro-level and tries to draw implications towards buying decisions on the extended brands analyzing the aggregate relationships. The discussion analyzes categorical similarity as a determinant of diagnostic behaviour and explore the premise that high accessibility of extension information in some of the past studies may have left little room to observe the effects of diagnostic behaviour.Brand Extension, Consumer Behaviour, Decision Making

Learning in Networks: a survey

This paper presents a survey of research on learning with a special focus on the structure of interaction between individual entities. The structure is formally modelled as a network: the nodes of the network are individuals while the arcs admit a variety of interpretations (ranging from information channels to social and economic ties). I first examine the nature of learning about optimal actions for a given network architecture. I then discuss learning about optimal links and actions in evolving networks.

The Dutch Banking Chipcard Game

The banks in the Dutch chipcard market initially agreed on one chipcard system. One system is attractive for companies as well as consumers. Companies, banks and retailers, prevent costs of duplication, while consumers enjoy the benefits of a widespread acceptance of one card and do not face uncertainty regarding the chipcard standard. Two standards could harm the development of the chipcard market. However, one bank withdrew from the initial agreement and introduced its own chipcard system in December 1995. This has resulted in a costly battle between the two banking chipcard standards, duplication costs for retailers, the introduction of a gateway technology in order to establish compatibility for users, and low market acceptance of the chipcards. March 2001, after a struggle of more than five years, the banks decided to return to one chipcard. The rationality of the decision to withdraw, despite the prospect that everybody may be worse off, will be analyzed from the perspective of game theory and the theory regarding standards battles.standardization;Banking;chipcard;electronic purse;game theory

Efficiency and Welfare with Complementarities and Asymmetric Information

This paper examines equilibrium and welfare in a tractable class of economies with externalities, strategic complementarity or substitutability, and incomplete information. In equilibrium, complementarity amplifies aggregate volatility by increasing the sensitivity of actions to public information; substitutability raises cross-sectional dispersion by increasing the sensitivity to private information. To address whether these effects are undesirable from a welfare perspective, we characterize the socially optimal degree of coordination and the efficient use of information. We show how efficient allocations depend on the primitives of the environment, how they compare to equilibrium, and how they can be understood in terms of a social trade-off between volatility and dispersion. We next examine the social value of information in equilibrium. When the equilibrium is efficient, welfare necessarily increases with the accuracy of information; and it increases [decreases] with the extent to which information is common if and only if agents' actions are strategic complements [substitutes]. When the equilibrium is inefficient, additional effects emerge as information affects the gap between equilibrium and efficient allocations. We conclude with a few applications, including production externalities, Keynesian frictions, inefficient fluctuations, and efficient market competition.