Run-Time Selection of Coordination Mechanisms in Multi-Agent Systems

This paper presents a framework that enables autonomous agents to dynamically select the mechanism they employ in order to coordinate their inter-related activities. Adopting this framework means coordination mechanisms move from the realm of being imposed upon the system at design time, to something that the agents select at run-time in order to fit their prevailing circumstances and their current coordination needs. Empirical analysis is used to evaluate the effect of various design alternatives for the agent's decision making mechanisms and for the coordination mechanisms themselves

Scalable Multiagent Coordination with Distributed Online Open Loop Planning

We propose distributed online open loop planning (DOOLP), a general framework for online multiagent coordination and decision making under uncertainty. DOOLP is based on online heuristic search in the space defined by a generative model of the domain dynamics, which is exploited by agents to simulate and evaluate the consequences of their potential choices. We also propose distributed online Thompson sampling (DOTS) as an effective instantiation of the DOOLP framework. DOTS models sequences of agent choices by concatenating a number of multiarmed bandits for each agent and uses Thompson sampling for dealing with action value uncertainty. The Bayesian approach underlying Thompson sampling allows to effectively model and estimate uncertainty about (a) own action values and (b) other agents' behavior. This approach yields a principled and statistically sound solution to the exploration-exploitation dilemma when exploring large search spaces with limited resources. We implemented DOTS in a smart factory case study with positive empirical results. We observed effective, robust and scalable planning and coordination capabilities even when only searching a fraction of the potential search space

The Role of NGOs in Human Security

Human security is fundamentally concerned with helping people to deal with unforeseeable threats and sudden downturns, whether international financial crises, environmental disasters or incapacitating illnesses. In this paper I argue that NGOs, as one of the most visible sets of actors in the related fields of human development and human rights, can play a significant role in helping to achieve human security. NGOs are especially well suited to action for human security because of their size and reach, closeness to local populations, willingness to confront the status quo, and ability to address transnational threats through coalition-building. While NGOs face many obstacles in reorienting their activities explicitly towards human security, including the cyclical nature of the aid monies on which many of them depend and the high costs of networking, I argue that the human security framework will nonetheless attract many NGOs to its approach.This publication is Hauser Center Working Paper No. 12. The Hauser Center Working Paper Series was launched during the summer of 2000. The Series enables the Hauser Center to share with a broad audience important works-in-progress written by Hauser Center scholars and researchers

Mechanisms for Automated Negotiation in State Oriented Domains

This paper lays part of the groundwork for a domain theory of negotiation, that is, a way of classifying interactions so that it is clear, given a domain, which negotiation mechanisms and strategies are appropriate. We define State Oriented Domains, a general category of interaction. Necessary and sufficient conditions for cooperation are outlined. We use the notion of worth in an altered definition of utility, thus enabling agreements in a wider class of joint-goal reachable situations. An approach is offered for conflict resolution, and it is shown that even in a conflict situation, partial cooperative steps can be taken by interacting agents (that is, agents in fundamental conflict might still agree to cooperate up to a certain point). A Unified Negotiation Protocol (UNP) is developed that can be used in all types of encounters. It is shown that in certain borderline cooperative situations, a partial cooperative agreement (i.e., one that does not achieve all agents' goals) might be preferred by all agents, even though there exists a rational agreement that would achieve all their goals. Finally, we analyze cases where agents have incomplete information on the goals and worth of other agents. First we consider the case where agents' goals are private information, and we analyze what goal declaration strategies the agents might adopt to increase their utility. Then, we consider the situation where the agents' goals (and therefore stand-alone costs) are common knowledge, but the worth they attach to their goals is private information. We introduce two mechanisms, one 'strict', the other 'tolerant', and analyze their affects on the stability and efficiency of negotiation outcomes.Comment: See http://www.jair.org/ for any accompanying file

COORDINATION, COOPERATION, AND THE EXTENDED COASEAN APPROACH TO ECONOMIC POLICY

The Coasean way to deal with the cooperation failure that is implicit in Pareto inefficiency is to remove or lessen the obstacles to cooperation through the attribution of property rights and the elimination or reduction of transaction costs. The relevance of this approach is however undermined by some intrinsic difficulties to its application in a real world context, such as those arising from the number and indeterminacy of the interested parties, as well as from the free rider problem. A way to extend the Coasean approach taking into account those real life limitations is to consider the local authorities as representatives of the interest of their local constituencies and, through the provision of an adequate institutional framework, to enhance the opportunities for cooperation through voluntary agreements involving private and public parties. Thus the extent of cooperation could be widened, as opposite to traditional remedial actions relying on non- contractual, or direct entrepreneurial action by the state. With the reduction in the appeal of direct and coercive action by the state a number of institutions emphasising the contractual cooperation between public and private parties have effectively grown of importance, as wide apart as the township and village enterprises in China, or the “programmazione negoziata” in Italy. In the final part of the paper the lattercoase theorem, economic policy, transition, property rights, cooperation, coordination

Coordination approaches and systems - part I : a strategic perspective

This is the first part of a two-part paper presenting a fundamental review and summary of research of design coordination and cooperation technologies. The theme of this review is aimed at the research conducted within the decision management aspect of design coordination. The focus is therefore on the strategies involved in making decisions and how these strategies are used to satisfy design requirements. The paper reviews research within collaborative and coordinated design, project and workflow management, and, task and organization models. The research reviewed has attempted to identify fundamental coordination mechanisms from different domains, however it is concluded that domain independent mechanisms need to be augmented with domain specific mechanisms to facilitate coordination. Part II is a review of design coordination from an operational perspective