6,969 research outputs found
The Least-core and Nucleolus of Path Cooperative Games
Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit
distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic
issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some
commodity flows through a network. In these games, a coalition of edges or
vertices is successful if it enables a path from the source to the sink in the
network, and lose otherwise. Based on dual theory of linear programming and the
relationship with flow games, we provide the characterizations on the CS-core,
least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. Furthermore, we show that
the least-core and nucleolus are polynomially solvable for path cooperative
games defined on both directed and undirected network
Industrial Symbiotic Networks as Coordinated Games
We present an approach for implementing a specific form of collaborative
industrial practices-called Industrial Symbiotic Networks (ISNs)-as MC-Net
cooperative games and address the so called ISN implementation problem. This
is, the characteristics of ISNs may lead to inapplicability of fair and stable
benefit allocation methods even if the collaboration is a collectively desired
one. Inspired by realistic ISN scenarios and the literature on normative
multi-agent systems, we consider regulations and normative socioeconomic
policies as two elements that in combination with ISN games resolve the
situation and result in the concept of coordinated ISNs.Comment: 3 pages, Proc. of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2018
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