224 research outputs found

    Cooperative assignment games with the inverse Monge property

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    We study inverse-Monge assignment games, namely cooperative assignment games in which the assignment matrix satisfies the inverse-Monge property. For square inverse-Monge assignment games, we describe their cores and we obtain a closed formula for the buyers-optimal and the sellers-optimal core allocations. We also apply the above results to solve the non-square case

    A Discrete Choquet Integral for Ordered Systems

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    A model for a Choquet integral for arbitrary finite set systems is presented. The model includes in particular the classical model on the system of all subsets of a finite set. The general model associates canonical non-negative and positively homogeneous superadditive functionals with generalized belief functions relative to an ordered system, which are then extended to arbitrary valuations on the set system. It is shown that the general Choquet integral can be computed by a simple Monge-type algorithm for so-called intersection systems, which include as a special case weakly union-closed families. Generalizing Lov\'asz' classical characterization, we give a characterization of the superadditivity of the Choquet integral relative to a capacity on a union-closed system in terms of an appropriate model of supermodularity of such capacities

    An algebraic framework for the greedy algorithm with applications to the core and Weber set of cooperative games

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    An algebraic model generalizing submodular polytopes is presented, where modular functions on partially ordered sets take over the role of vectors in Rn{\mathbb R}^n. This model unifies various generalizations of combinatorial models in which the greedy algorithm and the Monge algorithm are successful and generalizations of the notions of core and Weber set in cooperative game theory. As a further application, we show that an earlier model of ours as well as the algorithmic model of Queyranne, Spieksma and Tardella for the Monge algorithm can be treated within the framework of usual matroid theory (on unordered ground-sets), which permits also the efficient algorithmic solution of the intersection problem within this model. \u

    A Discrete Choquet Integral for Ordered Systems

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    A model for a Choquet integral for arbitrary finite set systems is presented. The model includes in particular the classical model on the system of all subsets of a finite set. The general model associates canonical non-negative and positively homogeneous superadditive functionals with generalized belief functions relative to an ordered system, which are then extended to arbitrary valuations on the set system. It is shown that the general Choquet integral can be computed by a simple Monge-type algorithm for so-called intersection systems, which include as a special case weakly union-closed families. Generalizing LovĂĄsz' classical characterization, we give a characterization of the superadditivity of the Choquet integral relative to a capacity on a union-closed system in terms of an appropriate model of supermodularity of such capacities.Choquet integral, belief function, measurability, set systems, Monge algorithm, supermodularity

    Assortative multisided assignment games. The extreme core points [WP]

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    We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and MartĂ­nez-de-AlbĂ©niz et al. (2019). In them players’ abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core points is obtained

    Mathematical Game Theory

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    These lecture notes attempt a mathematical treatment of game theory akin to mathematical physics. A game instance is defined as a sequence of states of an underlying system. This viewpoint unifies classical mathematical models for 2-person and, in particular, combinatorial and zero-sum games as well as models for investing and betting. n-person games are studied with emphasis on notions of utilities, potentials and equilibria, which allows to subsume cooperative games as special cases. The represenation of a game theoretic system in a Hilbert space furthermore establishes a link to the mathematical model of quantum mechancis and general interaction systems

    Solving Becker's assortative assignments and extensions

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    We analyze assortative assignment games, introduced in Becker (1973) and Eriksson et al. (2000). We study the extreme core points and show an easy way to compute them. We find a natural solution for these games. It coincides with several well-known point solutions, the median stable utility solution (Schwarz and Yenmez, 2011) and the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969).We also analyze the behavior of the Shapley value. We finish with some extensions, where some hypotheses are relaxed

    A survey on assignment markets

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    The assignment game is a two-sided market, say buyers and sellers, where demand and supply are unitary and utility is transferable by means of prices. This survey is structured in three parts: a first part, from the introduction of the assignment game by Shapley and Shubik (1972) until the publication of the book of Roth and Sotomayor (1990), focused on the notion of core; the subsequent investigations that broaden the scope to other notions of solution for these markets; and its extensions to assignment markets with multiple sides or multiple partnership. These extended two-sided assignment markets, that allow for multiple partnership, better represent the situation in a labour market or an auction
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