17,594 research outputs found
Analyzing Social Network Structures in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal
The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal (IPD/CR) is an
extension of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with evolution that allows players
to choose and to refuse their game partners. From individual behaviors,
behavioral population structures emerge. In this report, we examine one
particular IPD/CR environment and document the social network methods used to
identify population behaviors found within this complex adaptive system. In
contrast to the standard homogeneous population of nice cooperators, we have
also found metastable populations of mixed strategies within this environment.
In particular, the social networks of interesting populations and their
evolution are examined.Comment: 37 pages, uuencoded gzip'd Postscript (1.1Mb when gunzip'd) also
available via WWW at http://www.cs.wisc.edu/~smucker/ipd-cr/ipd-cr.htm
Reputation effects drive the joint evolution of cooperation and social rewarding
People routinely cooperate with each other, even when cooperation is costly. To further encourage such pro-social behaviors, recipients often respond by providing additional incentives, for example by offering rewards. Although such incentives facilitate cooperation, the question remains how these incentivizing behaviors themselves evolve, and whether they would always be used responsibly. Herein, we consider a simple model to systematically study the co-evolution of cooperation and different rewarding policies. In our model, both social and antisocial behaviors can be rewarded, but individuals gain a reputation for how they reward others. By characterizing the game’s equilibria and by simulating evolutionary learning processes, we find that reputation effects systematically favor cooperation and social rewarding. While our baseline model applies to pairwise interactions in well-mixed populations, we obtain similar conclusions under assortment, or when individuals interact in larger groups. According to our model, rewards are most effective when they sway others to cooperate. This view is consistent with empirical observations suggesting that people reward others to ultimately benefit themselves
Why and How Identity Should Influence Utility
This paper provides an argument for the advantage of a preference for identity-consistent behaviour from an evolutionary point of view. Within a stylised model of social interaction, we show that the development of cooperative social norms is greatly facilitated if the agents of the society possess a preference for identity consistent behaviour. As cooperative norms have a positive impact on aggregate outcomes, we conclude that such preferences are evolutionarily advantageous. Furthermore, we discuss how such a preference can be integrated in the modelling of utility in order to account for the distinctive cooperative trait in human behaviour and show how this squares with the evidence
The prisoners dilemma on a stochastic non-growth network evolution model
We investigate the evolution of cooperation on a non - growth network model
with death/birth dynamics. Nodes reproduce under selection for higher payoffs
in a prisoners dilemma game played between network neighbours. The mean field
characteristics of the model are explored and an attempt is made to understand
the size dependent behaviour of the model in terms of fluctuations in the
strategy densities. We also briefly comment on the role of strategy mutation in
regulating the strategy densties.Comment: 8 pages, 8 figure
Evolutionary games on graphs
Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines
from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and
especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network
the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied
in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type
overview of the field for physicists. The first three sections introduce the
necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic
definitions to the most important results. The fourth section surveys the
topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network
structures in general. The last three sections discuss in detail the dynamic
behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner's Dilemma, the
Rock-Scissors-Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the
review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify
and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in
evolutionary games.Comment: Review, final version, 133 pages, 65 figure
- …