17,550 research outputs found

    On the convergence of iterative voting: how restrictive should restricted dynamics be?

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    We study convergence properties of iterative voting procedures. Such procedures are defined by a voting rule and a (restricted) iterative process, where at each step one agent can modify his vote towards a better outcome for himself. It is already known that if the iteration dynamics (the manner in which voters are allowed to modify their votes) are unrestricted, then the voting process may not converge. For most common voting rules this may be observed even under the best response dynamics limitation. It is therefore important to investigate whether and which natural restrictions on the dynamics of iterative voting procedures can guarantee convergence. To this end, we provide two general conditions on the dynamics based on iterative myopic improvements, each of which is sufficient for convergence. We then identify several classes of voting rules (including Positional Scoring Rules, Maximin, Copeland and Bucklin), along with their corresponding iterative processes, for which at least one of these conditions hold

    Acyclic Games and Iterative Voting

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    We consider iterative voting models and position them within the general framework of acyclic games and game forms. More specifically, we classify convergence results based on the underlying assumptions on the agent scheduler (the order of players) and the action scheduler (which better-reply is played). Our main technical result is providing a complete picture of conditions for acyclicity in several variations of Plurality voting. In particular, we show that (a) under the traditional lexicographic tie-breaking, the game converges for any order of players under a weak restriction on voters' actions; and (b) Plurality with randomized tie-breaking is not guaranteed to converge under arbitrary agent schedulers, but from any initial state there is \emph{some} path of better-replies to a Nash equilibrium. We thus show a first separation between restricted-acyclicity and weak-acyclicity of game forms, thereby settling an open question from [Kukushkin, IJGT 2011]. In addition, we refute another conjecture regarding strongly-acyclic voting rules.Comment: some of the results appeared in preliminary versions of this paper: Convergence to Equilibrium of Plurality Voting, Meir et al., AAAI 2010; Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting, Meir, COMSOC 201

    Heuristic Voting as Ordinal Dominance Strategies

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    Decision making under uncertainty is a key component of many AI settings, and in particular of voting scenarios where strategic agents are trying to reach a joint decision. The common approach to handle uncertainty is by maximizing expected utility, which requires a cardinal utility function as well as detailed probabilistic information. However, often such probabilities are not easy to estimate or apply. To this end, we present a framework that allows "shades of gray" of likelihood without probabilities. Specifically, we create a hierarchy of sets of world states based on a prospective poll, with inner sets contain more likely outcomes. This hierarchy of likelihoods allows us to define what we term ordinally-dominated strategies. We use this approach to justify various known voting heuristics as bounded-rational strategies.Comment: This is the full version of paper #6080 accepted to AAAI'1

    A Factor Graph Approach to Automated Design of Bayesian Signal Processing Algorithms

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    The benefits of automating design cycles for Bayesian inference-based algorithms are becoming increasingly recognized by the machine learning community. As a result, interest in probabilistic programming frameworks has much increased over the past few years. This paper explores a specific probabilistic programming paradigm, namely message passing in Forney-style factor graphs (FFGs), in the context of automated design of efficient Bayesian signal processing algorithms. To this end, we developed "ForneyLab" (https://github.com/biaslab/ForneyLab.jl) as a Julia toolbox for message passing-based inference in FFGs. We show by example how ForneyLab enables automatic derivation of Bayesian signal processing algorithms, including algorithms for parameter estimation and model comparison. Crucially, due to the modular makeup of the FFG framework, both the model specification and inference methods are readily extensible in ForneyLab. In order to test this framework, we compared variational message passing as implemented by ForneyLab with automatic differentiation variational inference (ADVI) and Monte Carlo methods as implemented by state-of-the-art tools "Edward" and "Stan". In terms of performance, extensibility and stability issues, ForneyLab appears to enjoy an edge relative to its competitors for automated inference in state-space models.Comment: Accepted for publication in the International Journal of Approximate Reasonin
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