Aerospace medicine and biology: A continuing bibliography with indexes (supplement 349)

This bibliography lists 149 reports, articles and other documents introduced into the NASA Scientific and Technical Information System during April, 1991. Subject coverage includes: aerospace medicine and psychology, life support systems and controlled environments, safety equipment, exobiology and extraterrestrial life, and flight crew behavior and performance

Risk of Performance and Behavioral Health Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, Communication, and Psychosocial Adaptation within a Team

A team is defined as: "two or more individuals who interact socially and adaptively, have shared or common goals, and hold meaningful task interdependences; it is hierarchically structured and has a limited life span; in it expertise and roles are distributed; and it is embedded within an organization/environmental context that influences and is influenced by ongoing processes and performance outcomes" (Salas, Stagl, Burke, & Goodwin, 2007, p. 189). From the NASA perspective, a team is commonly understood to be a collection of individuals that is assigned to support and achieve a particular mission. Thus, depending on context, this definition can encompass both the spaceflight crew and the individuals and teams in the larger multi-team system who are assigned to support that crew during a mission. The Team Risk outcomes of interest are predominantly performance related, with a secondary emphasis on long-term health; this is somewhat unique in the NASA HRP in that most Risk areas are medically related and primarily focused on long-term health consequences. In many operational environments (e.g., aviation), performance is assessed as the avoidance of errors. However, the research on performance errors is ambiguous. It implies that actions may be dichotomized into "correct" or "incorrect" responses, where incorrect responses or errors are always undesirable. Researchers have argued that this dichotomy is a harmful oversimplification, and it would be more productive to focus on the variability of human performance and how organizations can manage that variability (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006) (Category III1). Two problems occur when focusing on performance errors: 1) the errors are infrequent and, therefore, difficult to observe and record; and 2) the errors do not directly correspond to failure. Research reveals that humans are fairly adept at correcting or compensating for performance errors before such errors result in recognizable or recordable failures. Astronauts are notably adept high performers. Most failures are recorded only when multiple, small errors occur and humans are unable to recognize and correct or compensate for these errors in time to prevent a failure (Dismukes, Berman, Loukopoulos, 2007) (Category III). More commonly, observers record variability in levels of performance. Some teams commit no observable errors but fail to achieve performance objectives or perform only adequately, while other teams commit some errors but perform spectacularly. Successful performance, therefore, cannot be viewed as simply the absence of errors or the avoidance of failure Johnson Space Center (JSC) Joint Leadership Team, 2008). While failure is commonly attributed to making a major error, focusing solely on the elimination of error(s) does not significantly reduce the risk of failure. Failure may also occur when performance is simply insufficient or an effort is incapable of adjusting sufficiently to a contextual change (e.g., changing levels of autonomy)

Aerospace medicine and biology: A continuing bibliography with indexes (supplement 288)

This bibliography lists 190 reports, articles and other documents introduced into the NASA scientific and technical information system in August 1986

International Space Station Systems Engineering Case Study

This case study on the International Space Station considers what many believe to have been the ultimate international engineering project in history. The initial plans involved the direct participation of 16 nations, 88 launches and over 160 spacewalks-more space activities than NASA had accomplished prior to the 1993 International Space Station decision. Probably more important was the significant leap in System Engineering (SE) execution that would be required to build and operate a multi-national space station. In a short period of time, NASA and its partners had to work out how to integrate culturally different SE approaches, designs, languages and operational perspectives on risk and safety

Paper Session I-B - The International Space Station Partners: Background and Current Status

The International Space Station, as the largest international civil program in history, features unprecedented technical, managerial, and international complexity. Seven international partners and participants encompassing fifteen countries are involved in the ISS. Each partner is designing, developing and will be operating separate pieces of hardware, to be integrated on-orbit into a single orbital station. Mission control centers, launch vehicles, astronauts/ cosmonauts, and support services will be provided by multiple partners, but functioning in a coordinated, integrated fashion. A number of major milestones have been accomplished to date, including the construction of major elements of flight hardware, the development of operations and sustaining engineering centers, astronaut training, and seven Space Shuttle/Mir docking missions. International partner contributions and levels of participation have been baselined. Astronauts and cosmonauts are in training. In short, the International Space Station is well on its way to its first launch and being a fully-operation program