Conformance Verification of Normative Specifications using C-O Diagrams

C-O Diagrams have been introduced as a means to have a visual representation of normative texts and electronic contracts, where it is possible to represent the obligations, permissions and prohibitions of the different signatories, as well as what are the penalties in case of not fulfillment of their obligations and prohibitions. In such diagrams we are also able to represent absolute and relative timing constrains. In this paper we consider a formal semantics for C-O Diagrams based on a network of timed automata and we present several relations to check the consistency of a contract in terms of realizability, to analyze whether an implementation satisfies the requirements defined on its contract, and to compare several implementations using the executed permissions as criteria.Comment: In Proceedings FLACOS 2012, arXiv:1209.169

Multilevel Contracts for Trusted Components

This article contributes to the design and the verification of trusted components and services. The contracts are declined at several levels to cover then different facets, such as component consistency, compatibility or correctness. The article introduces multilevel contracts and a design+verification process for handling and analysing these contracts in component models. The approach is implemented with the COSTO platform that supports the Kmelia component model. A case study illustrates the overall approach.Comment: In Proceedings WCSI 2010, arXiv:1010.233

Lending Petri nets and contracts

Choreography-based approaches to service composition typically assume that, after a set of services has been found which correctly play the roles prescribed by the choreography, each service respects his role. Honest services are not protected against adversaries. We propose a model for contracts based on a extension of Petri nets, which allows services to protect themselves while still realizing the choreography. We relate this model with Propositional Contract Logic, by showing a translation of formulae into our Petri nets which preserves the logical notion of agreement, and allows for compositional verification

FLACOS’08 Workshop proceedings

The 2nd Workshop on Formal Languages and Analysis of Contract-Oriented Software (FLACOS’08) is held in Malta. The aim of the workshop is to bring together researchers and practitioners working on language-based solutions to contract-oriented software development. The workshop is partially funded by the Nordunet3 project “COSoDIS” (Contract-Oriented Software Development for Internet Services) and it attracted 25 participants. The program consists of 4 regular papers and 10 invited participant presentations

Soft and Hard Strategies: The Role of Business in the Crafting of International Commercial Law

Part I returns to the classic definition of hard international law initially put forward by Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal and related IR scholars and analyzes existing commercial law treaties in light of this definition. It concludes that virtually none of these commercial law treaties constitute “hard” international law because nearly all commercial law treaties rely on national courts for enforcement. But Abbott and Snidal’s focus on the extent to which international law is legalized—and especially the extent to which it is enforced by international actors—may matter less with commercial than other more public international lawmaking. This is because the mostly private law governing commercial transactions conceives of obligation and enforcement in ways distinct from its public law counterparts. Part II explains the distinction between private and public laws that govern purely domestic commerce. Many commercial transactions are not governed by regulatory legislation imposing “top down” obligations enforced by the state but rather contractual obligations that are self-regulating and mostly self-enforcing. In the absence of mandatory commercial regulation, businesses assert their interests domestically through privately organized contracts and litigation brought to enforce these contracts as well as through political pressure for reform of judicial administration. Where regulation does exist or has been proposed, businesses may also look to influence this regulation by lobbying legislators and executives. Part III considers the implications of commercial lawmaking for international settings and, in particular, state and non-state (that is, business) interests in the production of international versions of such laws. State sovereignty interests vary depending on the type of international commercial law reform proposed, whether regulatory or otherwise; business’ autonomy interests also vary along this axis. These interests may diverge, although the interests of states and businesses are also interconnected and subject to change based on assertions of influence. Soft law may aid in bridging these differences in various ways—through its gap-filling, advocacy, and socializing functions. Businesses are uniquely capable of fulfilling these functions through soft international law, capabilities that Part III explores both with reference to the detail of various international commercial laws and with regard to broader theoretical concerns