Individual Tariffs for Mobile Communication Services

This paper introduces a conceptual framework and a computational model for individual tariffs for mobile communication services. The purpose is to provide guidance for implementation by communication service suppliers or user groups alike. The paper first examines the sociological and economic incentives for personalized services and individual tariffs. Then it introduces a framework for individual tariffs which is centered on user and supplier behaviours. The user, instead of being fully rational, has "bounded rationality" and his behaviours are subject to economic constraints and influenced by social needs. The supplier can belong to different types of entities such as firms and communities; each has his own goals which lead to different behaviors. Individual tariffs are decided through interactions between the user and the supplier and can be analyzed in a structured way using game theory. A numerical case in mobile music training is developed to illustrate the concepts.risks;mobile communication services;Individual tariffs;computational games

Promoting SME cooperative aggregations: main criteria and contractual models

Collaboration is considered an effective solution to improve business strategies. However, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) often lack common principles and common forms of contractual coordination. Several policies implemented by the EU have addressed the set-up of a comprehensive SME policy framework, but European institutions seem to have focused more on organisational devices to conduct business activities rather than on contractual forms of coordination. In April 2009, Italy adopted a law in network contract to promote the development of inter-firm cooperation strategies to foster enterprises' innovation and growth. Even if this law represents a novelty in Europe and may offer new challenges and hints, it still presents some lacks in its formulation. The current research aims at presenting the Italian law for network contract and a comparison with other models of SME aggregations adopted in EU countries. A formal model to support the design of an SME network was proposed, by providing both an ontology-based model to help the definition of the contract in a structured way, and a basic workflow to identify the important phases of the network design, i.e. the feasibility study and the negotiatio

What If? A Look at Integrity Pacts

This note examines the Integrity Pact (IP) methodology proposed by Transparency International to confront the problem of corruption in public procurement. The examination draws from a decision model for participants developed elsewhere, in which the critical elements are shown to be the vulnerability of the conditions under which the tender is conducted and the risk of bribing. The IP methodology intends to interfere with the central elements in individual tender instantiations by a process of discussion leading to mutual trust; participants and public officials sign a pledge of honesty. Disputes are to be resolved by private arbitration and allegedly enforcement is attained by force of a private contract between participants. Preferably, a civil society organization stimulates and monitors the process and acts as fiducial guarantor. Publicising proceedings stimulates discus-sion and enhances transparency. All this is held to favourably affect the process, leading to better results. This, in turn, is held to affect the overall environment over time. In order to accommodate for the ethical dimension introduced by IPs, the present analysis incorporates an “ethical” factor operating over the conditions under which tenders are conducted. Ascertaining the operation of this hypothetical factor is an empirical question. The examination of IP premises, together with evidence collected from instantiations of the meth-odology, plus the absence of comparative empirical data on bribery, leads to the conclusion that IPs do not heighten the risk of bribing for participants. Contrary to the methodology’s claim, en-forcement, be it from arbitration or otherwise, is shown to be dependent on each particular envi-ronment. Conditions under which particular tenders are conducted might be bettered, but not un-conditionally, as the institutional framework perforce dominates private agreements. The influence of the “ethical” factor cannot be assessed for lack of empirical evidence, and the honesty pledge IPs rely on is argued to be devoid of significance. Although for lack of data the economic effi-ciency of the methodology cannot be ascertained, there is no reason to suppose that IPs do not bet-ter the outcomes piecewise. The methodology fails to address the problem of cartelisation that af-fects public markets, and – perhaps due to the low frequency of its application – does not discuss measures to counterbalance the action of cartels. Interpreting the premises behind the IP idea, it is argued that they stem from a perspective on cor-ruption rooted on morality rather than on the mechanisms that propitiate bribery. Thus, tackling individual instantiations is favoured over confronting systemic factors. IP guidelines stipulate that the absence of allegations of bribery in a tender authorises the sponsor-ing NGO to announce that the tender was “clean”. It is argued that such manifestations of overcon-fidence are hazardous for the reputation of NGOs that adopt the methodology. It is also argued that the continuous involvement of NGOs with IPs raises questions about their entitlement to it, more-over because NGOs are not bound by oversight and accountability constraints that formally charac- terise State organisms. It is contended that for both governments and NGOs, promoting and par-ticipating in IPs is a strategic decision that should be balanced with their effectiveness towards the aim of changing the institutional environment.Control, corruption, integrity pact, public procurement, regulation, Transparency International

Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?

This paper surveys the contributions of laboratory experiments to labor economics. We begin with a discussion of methodological issues: why (and when) is a lab experiment the best approach; how do laboratory experiments compare to field experiments; and what are the main design issues? We then summarize the substantive contributions of laboratory experiments to our understanding of principal-agent interactions, social preferences, union-firm bargaining, arbitration, gender differentials, discrimination, job search, and labor markets more generally.personnel economics, principal-agent theory, laboratory experiments, labor economics

Managing the Employment Relationship

This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by SAGE Publishing in Strategic Human Resource Management: An International Perspective, 2nd Edition on 2017, available at: https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/eur/strategic-human-resource-management/book249141.The chapter discusses and explores the employment relationship within a UK and international context. It looks at Government ideological perspectives, employee engagement and employee voice.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

Pre-Game Strategy for Long-Term Win: Using Trademark Registration and Right of Publicity to Protect Esports Gamers

The soaring popularity of esports across the globe has turned ultra-talented gamers into a blend of athlete and entertainer. The youthful esports ecosystem is exploding in growth, and the world is taking notice. But are the gamers who are eyeing professional play taking basic legal steps to develop and shield their brands, as well as bolster their collective negotiating leverage with teams, leagues, and miscellaneous entities? This note explores what features of an up-and-coming esports gamer might be worth protecting through a trademark and/or personality-rights schema, which in turn, could assist competitive gamers who are interested in developing their careers for both the long and short term

Fuzzy decision making system and the dynamics of business games

Effective and efficient strategic decision making is the backbone for the success of a business organisation among its competitors in a particular industry. The results of these decision making processes determine whether the business will continue to survive or not. In this thesis, fuzzy logic (FL) concepts and game theory are being used to model strategic decision making processes in business organisations. We generally modelled competition by business organisations in industries as games where each business organization is a player. A player formulates his own decisions by making strategic moves based on uncertain information he has gained about the opponents. This information relates to prevailing market demand, cost of production, marketing, consolidation efforts and other business variables. This uncertain information is being modelled using the concept of fuzzy logic. In this thesis, simulation experiments were run and results obtained in six different settings. The first experiment addresses the payoff of the fuzzy player in a typical duopoly system. The second analyses payoff in an n-player game which was used to model a perfect market competition with many players. It is an extension of the two-player game of a duopoly market which we considered in the first experiment. The third experiment used and analysed real data of companies in a case study. Here, we chose the competition between Coca-cola and PepsiCo companies who are major players in the beverage industry. Data were extracted from their published financial statements to validate our experiment. In the fourth experiment, we modelled competition in business networks with uncertain information and varying level of connectivity. We varied the level of interconnections (connectivity) among business units in the business networks and investigated how missing links affect the payoffs of players on the networks. We used the fifth experiment to model business competition as games on boards with possible constraints or restrictions and varying level of connectivity on the boards. We also investigated this for games with uncertain information. We varied the level of interconnections (connectivity) among the nodes on the boards and investigated how these a ect the payoffs of players that played on the boards. We principally used these experiments to investigate how the level of availability of vital infrastructures (such as road networks) in a particular location or region affects profitability of businesses in that particular region. The sixth experiment contains simulations in which we introduced the fuzzy game approach to wage negotiation in managing employers and employees (unions) relationships. The scheme proposes how employers and employees (unions) can successfully manage the deadlocks that usually accompany wage negotiations. In all cases, fuzzy rules are constructed that symbolise various rules and strategic variables that firms take into consideration before taken decisions. The models also include learning procedures that enable the agents to optimize these fuzzy rules and their decision processes. This is the main contribution of the thesis: a set of fuzzy models that include learning, and can be used to improve decision making in business

Individual Tariffs for Mobile Communication Services

This paper introduces a conceptual framework and a computational model for individual tariffs for mobile communication services. The purpose is to provide guidance for implementation by communication service suppliers or user groups alike. The paper first examines the sociological and economic incentives for personalized services and individual tariffs. Then it introduces a framework for individual tariffs which is centered on user and supplier behaviours. The user, instead of being fully rational, has "bounded rationality" and his behaviours are subject to economic constraints and influenced by social needs. The supplier can belong to different types of entities such as firms and communities; each has his own goals which lead to different behaviors. Individual tariffs are decided through interactions between the user and the supplier and can be analyzed in a structured way using game theory. A numerical case in mobile music training is developed to illustrate the concepts