Joint Energy and Spectrum Cooperation for Cellular Communication Systems

Powered by renewable energy sources, cellular communication systems usually have different wireless traffic loads and available resources over time. To match their traffics, it is beneficial for two neighboring systems to cooperate in resource sharing when one is excessive in one resource (e.g., spectrum), while the other is sufficient in another (e.g., energy). In this paper, we propose a joint energy and spectrum cooperation scheme between different cellular systems to reduce their operational costs. When the two systems are fully cooperative in nature (e.g., belonging to the same entity), we formulate the cooperation problem as a convex optimization problem to minimize their weighted sum cost and obtain the optimal solution in closed form. We also study another partially cooperative scenario where the two systems have their own interests. We show that the two systems seek for partial cooperation as long as they find inter-system complementarity between the energy and spectrum resources. Under the partial cooperation conditions, we propose a distributed algorithm for the two systems to gradually and simultaneously reduce their costs from the non-cooperative benchmark to the Pareto optimum. This distributed algorithm also has proportional fair cost reduction by reducing each system's cost proportionally over iterations. Finally, we provide numerical results to validate the convergence of the distributed algorithm to the Pareto optimality and compare the centralized and distributed cost reduction approaches for fully and partially cooperative scenarios.Comment: This is the longer version of a paper to appear in IEEE Transactions on Communication

Intelligent Wireless Communications Enabled by Cognitive Radio and Machine Learning

The ability to intelligently utilize resources to meet the need of growing diversity in services and user behavior marks the future of wireless communication systems. Intelligent wireless communications aims at enabling the system to perceive and assess the available resources, to autonomously learn to adapt to the perceived wireless environment, and to reconfigure its operating mode to maximize the utility of the available resources. The perception capability and reconfigurability are the essential features of cognitive radio while modern machine learning techniques project great potential in system adaptation. In this paper, we discuss the development of the cognitive radio technology and machine learning techniques and emphasize their roles in improving spectrum and energy utility of wireless communication systems. We describe the state-of-the-art of relevant techniques, covering spectrum sensing and access approaches and powerful machine learning algorithms that enable spectrum- and energy-efficient communications in dynamic wireless environments. We also present practical applications of these techniques and identify further research challenges in cognitive radio and machine learning as applied to the existing and future wireless communication systems

Non-Cash Auction for Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Contract Theoretical Model with Joint Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

In cognitive radio networks (CRNs), spectrum trading is an efficient way for secondary users (SUs) to achieve dynamic spectrum access and to bring economic benefits for the primary users (PUs). Existing methods requires full payment from SU, which blocked many potential "buyers", and thus limited the PU's expected income. To better improve PUs' revenue from spectrum trading in a CRN, we introduce a financing contract, which is similar to a sealed non-cash auction that allows SU to do a financing. Unlike previous mechanism designs in CRN, the financing contract allows the SU to only pay part of the total amount when the contract is signed, known as the down payment. Then, after the spectrum is released and utilized, the SU pays the rest of payment, known as the installment payment, from the revenue generated by utilizing the spectrum. The way the financing contract carries out and the sealed non-cash auction works similarly. Thus, contract theory is employed here as the mathematical framework to solve the non-cash auction problem and form mutually beneficial relationships between PUs and SUs. As the PU may not have the full acknowledgement of the SU's financial status, nor the SU's capability in making revenue, the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard arise in the two scenarios, respectively. Therefore, a joint adverse selection and moral hazard model is considered here. In particular, we present three situations when either or both adverse selection and moral hazard are present during the trading. Furthermore, both discrete and continuous models are provided in this paper. Through extensive simulations, we show that the adverse selection and moral hazard cases serve as the upper and lower bounds of the general case where both problems are present

Relay Selection for OFDM Wireless Systems under Asymmetric Information: A Contract-Theory Based Approach

User cooperation although improves performance of wireless systems, it requires incentives for the potential cooperating nodes to spend their energy acting as relays. Moreover, these potential relays are better informed than the source about their transmission costs, which depend on the exact channel conditions on their relay-destination links. This results in asymmetry of available information between the source and the relays. In this paper, we use contract theory to tackle the problem of relay selection under asymmetric information in OFDM-based cooperative wireless system that employs decode-and-forward (DF) relaying. We first design incentive compatible offers/contracts, consisting of a menu of payments and desired signal-to-noise-ratios (SNR)s at the destination and then the source broadcasts this menu to nearby mobile nodes. The nearby mobile nodes who are willing to relay notify back the source with the contracts they are willing to accept in each subcarrier. We show that when the source is under a budget constraint, the problem of relay selection in each subcarrier in order to maximize the capacity is a nonlinear non-separable knapsack problem. We propose a heuristic relay selection scheme to solve this problem. We compare the performance of our overall mechanism and the heuristic solution with a simple relay selection scheme and selected numerical results showed that our solution performs better and is close to optimal. The overall mechanism introduced in this paper is simple to implement, requires limited interaction with potential relays and hence requires minimal signalling overhead.Comment: 30 Pages, 8 figures, 3 tables, journa

Analysis of Cognitive Radio Scenes Based on Non-cooperative Game Theoretical Modelling

A noncooperative game theoretical approach for analysing opportunistic spectrum access (OSA) in cognitive radio (CR) environments is proposed. New concepts from game theory are applied to spectrum access analysis in order to extract rules of behaviour for an emerging environment. In order to assess OSA scenarios of CRs, two oligopoly game models are reformulated in terms of resource access: Cournot and Stackelberg games. Five CR scenes are analysed: simultaneous access of unlicensed users (commons regime) with symmetric and asymmetric costs, with and without bandwidth constraints and sequential access (licensed against unlicensed). Several equilibrium concepts are studied as game solutions: Nash, Pareto and the joint NashPareto equilibrium. The latter captures a game situation where players are non-homogeneous users, exhibiting different types of rationality, Nash and Pareto. This enables a more realistic modelling of interactions on a CR scene. An evolutionary game equilibrium detection method is used. The Nash equilibrium indicates the maximum number of channels a CR may access without decreasing its payoff. The Pareto equilibrium describes a larger range of payoffs, capturing unbalanced as well as equitable solutions. The analysis of the Stackelberg modelling shows that payoffs are maximised for all users if the incumbents are Nash oriented and the new entrants are Pareto driven.Comment: 8 double-column pages, 10 figures. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1209.538

Data and Spectrum Trading Policies in a Trusted Cognitive Dynamic Network

Future wireless networks will progressively displace service provisioning towards the edge to accommodate increasing growth in traffic. This paradigm shift calls for smart policies to efficiently share network resources and ensure service delivery. In this paper, we consider a cognitive dynamic network architecture (CDNA) where primary users (PUs) are rewarded for sharing their connectivities and acting as access points for secondary users (SUs). CDNA creates opportunities for capacity increase by network-wide harvesting of unused data plans and spectrum from different operators. Different policies for data and spectrum trading are presented based on centralized, hybrid and distributed schemes involving primary operator (PO), secondary operator (SO) and their respective end users. In these schemes, PO and SO progressively delegate trading to their end users and adopt more flexible cooperation agreements to reduce computational time and track available resources dynamically. A novel matching-with-pricing algorithm is presented to enable self-organized SU-PU associations, channel allocation and pricing for data and spectrum with low computational complexity. Since connectivity is provided by the actual users, the success of the underlying collaborative market relies on the trustworthiness of the connections. A behavioral-based access control mechanism is developed to incentivize/penalize honest/dishonest behavior and create a trusted collaborative network. Numerical results show that the computational time of the hybrid scheme is one order of magnitude faster than the benchmark centralized scheme and that the matching algorithm reconfigures the network up to three orders of magnitude faster than in the centralized scheme.Comment: 15 pages, 12 figures. A version of this paper has been published in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 201

Applications of Game Theory in Vehicular Networks: A Survey

In the Internet of Things (IoT) era, vehicles and other intelligent components in an intelligent transportation system (ITS) are connected, forming Vehicular Networks (VNs) that provide efficient and secure traffic and ubiquitous access to various applications. However, as the number of nodes in ITS increases, it is challenging to satisfy a varied and large number of service requests with different Quality of Service and security requirements in highly dynamic VNs. Intelligent nodes in VNs can compete or cooperate for limited network resources to achieve either an individual or a group's objectives. Game Theory (GT), a theoretical framework designed for strategic interactions among rational decision-makers sharing scarce resources, can be used to model and analyze individual or group behaviors of communicating entities in VNs. This paper primarily surveys the recent developments of GT in solving various challenges of VNs. This survey starts with an introduction to the background of VNs. A review of GT models studied in the VNs is then introduced, including its basic concepts, classifications, and applicable vehicular issues. After discussing the requirements of VNs and the motivation of using GT, a comprehensive literature review on GT applications in dealing with the challenges of current VNs is provided. Furthermore, recent contributions of GT to VNs integrating with diverse emerging 5G technologies are surveyed. Finally, the lessons learned are given, and several key research challenges and possible solutions for applying GT in VNs are outlined.Comment: It has been submitted to "IEEE communication surveys and tutorials".This is the revised versio

Game Theoretic Approaches in Vehicular Networks: A Survey

In the era of the Internet of Things (IoT), vehicles and other intelligent components in Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) are connected, forming the Vehicular Networks (VNs) that provide efficient and secure traffic, ubiquitous access to information, and various applications. However, as the number of connected nodes keeps increasing, it is challenging to satisfy various and large amounts of service requests with different Quality of Service (QoS ) and security requirements in the highly dynamic VNs. Intelligent nodes in VNs can compete or cooperate for limited network resources so that either an individual or group objectives can be achieved. Game theory, a theoretical framework designed for strategic interactions among rational decision-makers who faced with scarce resources, can be used to model and analyze individual or group behaviors of communication entities in VNs. This paper primarily surveys the recent advantages of GT used in solving various challenges in VNs. As VNs and GT have been extensively investigate34d, this survey starts with a brief introduction of the basic concept and classification of GT used in VNs. Then, a comprehensive review of applications of GT in VNs is presented, which primarily covers the aspects of QoS and security. Moreover, with the development of fifth-generation (5G) wireless communication, recent contributions of GT to diverse emerging technologies of 5G integrated into VNs are surveyed in this paper. Finally, several key research challenges and possible solutions for applying GT in VNs are outlined

DR9.3 Final report of the JRRM and ASM activities

Deliverable del projecte europeu NEWCOM++This deliverable provides the final report with the summary of the activities carried out in NEWCOM++ WPR9, with a particular focus on those obtained during the last year. They address on the one hand RRM and JRRM strategies in heterogeneous scenarios and, on the other hand, spectrum management and opportunistic spectrum access to achieve an efficient spectrum usage. Main outcomes of the workpackage as well as integration indicators are also summarised.Postprint (published version

Spectrum utilization using game theory

This thesis was submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophy and awarded by Brunel University.Spectrum utilization is the most recent communications issue which takes great deal of attention from communication researchers where most of the efforts have been dedicated for spectral efficient utilization. Spectrum sharing is one of the solutions considered in the problem of lack of available frequency for new communication services which are unlicensed. In this work we propose an optimal method for spectrum utilization to increase spectral efficiency. It considers the problem of spectrum holes found in Primary User's (PU) band and detected using one of the spectral sensing methods. The solution is formulated with the help of Game theory approach in such a way that the primary user who has unoccupied frequency can share it with a group of secondary users (SU) in a competitive way. One of the SUs will be a secondary primary user (SPU), share available frequency from PU then offer his sharing to serve other SUs in different rate of sharing. Each user in the group of secondary users has a chance to be secondary primary user depending on reputation of each SU. Enhancing reputation is the only way for any SU to assure a share in the spectrum where it considered the factor of increasing or decreasing rate of sharing as well as factor of being SPU or an ordinary SU. A theoretical non-cooperative game model is introduced in a comparison with a proposed non-dynamic technique which depends on number of subscribers who occupy frequency in each time period. Multi-users compete on sharing the frequency from one of the users who offers sharing at a time when he has low number of subscribers that occupy his band. It is found that non-dynamic sharing results in inefficient spectrum utilization which is one of the reasons of spectrum scarcity where this resource is allocated in fixed way. Spectrum sharing using game theory solves this problem by its ability to make users compete to gain highest rate of spectrum allocation according to the real requirement of each user at each time interval. The problem of urgent case is also discussed when the primary user comes back to using his band which is the specific band of sharing with the secondary users group. SPU makes it easy to unload the required band from multi-users because PU does not need to request his band from each SU in the group