Fair and optimistic quantum contract signing

We present a fair and optimistic quantum contract signing protocol between two clients that requires no communication with the third trusted party during the exchange phase. We discuss its fairness and show that it is possible to design such a protocol for which the probability of a dishonest client to cheat becomes negligible, and scales as N^{-1/2}, where N is the number of messages exchanged between the clients. Our protocol is not based on the exchange of signed messages: its fairness is based on the laws of quantum mechanics. Thus, it is abuse-free, and the clients do not have to generate new keys for each message during the Exchange phase. We discuss a real-life scenario when the measurement errors and qubit state corruption due to noisy channels occur and argue that for real, good enough measurement apparatus and transmission channels, our protocol would still be fair. Our protocol could be implemented by today's technology, as it requires in essence the same type of apparatus as the one needed for BB84 cryptographic protocol. Finally, we briefly discuss two alternative versions of the protocol, one that uses only two states (based on B92 protocol) and the other that uses entangled pairs, and show that it is possible to generalize our protocol to an arbitrary number of clients.Comment: 11 pages, 2 figure

Endogenous Information Structures in Conservation Contracting

Landowners are commonly not only better informed about their private cost of conservation than conservation agencies, but also frequently in a position to spend resources on improving their knowledge about contract-relevant parameters before signing a contract on offer. We extend and generalize the literature on conservation contracting by endogenizing the information structure in a setting where the conservation agency is both asymmetrically informed about the efficiency of the landowner and unable to observe whether the landowner collects information after being offered the contract and before signing it. In this setting, we study the optimal contract the conservation agency should offer to the landowner conditional on the cost of information collection. This contract needs to balance moral hazard and adverse selection problems since by encouraging a landowner to collect information, the conservation agency simultaneously increases the landowner's incentive to misreport his 'type'. We term this the 'information rent effect'. Due to its presence, the terms of conservation contracts have to be significantly altered relative to a contract offered based on exogenous information structure or a contract based purely on information collection.

The Determinants of the Salary in NBA and the Overpayment in the Year of Signing a New Contract

Based on lots of previous research, the salary in National Basketball Association is determined by both personal characteristics and on-court performance. However, which kind of performance seems more important? Furthermore, does signing a new contract have any incentive or effect on the player\u27s performance which makes the player be overpaid or underpaid in the year of signing the contract? And which kind of contracts and what kind of players tend to be overpaid? In my paper I introduce the on-court performance, personal characteristics and salary. Then I build a connection between them and run 2 regressions to analyze the determinants of salary and overpayment in the year of signing a new contract. In my first regression, I found that the player\u27s salary is not just determined by the performance in the contract year, but the performance in the contract year and one year before that. I also found some interesting results like height is more important than weight, All star player salary premium exits in NBA. In the contract year, hitting a 3 point shot could always bring more expected future income than hitting a 2 point shot or hitting a free throw and some other funny results. In my second regression, I found that offering a big contract always lead to overpayment in the year of signing the contract. I also found that providing a contract to an all star player could brings benefit to the team in the year of signing a new contract, and providing a contract to an old player might not be a wise choice. The first regression tells us what factors are the determinants of expected salary, and which kind of performance is more important. It could help players to make the optimal choice of seeking a new contract. The second regression tells us what type of contract and what kind of players tend to be overpaid or underpaid. It may help team managers to make the choice when they provide a new contract

NAVIGATING PRODUCTION CONTRACT ARRANGEMENTS

This paper is targeted for producers who are interested in learning the basics about pork production contracts. It discusses such things as what a production contract is, how they work and presents a set of questions to evaluate before signing a contract.Farm Management,

The effects of win-win conditions on revenue-sharing contracts

This paper studies revenue-sharing contracts in distribution chains in the presence of win-win conditions. Revenue-sharing contracts are a mechanism to coordinate the firms in a distribution chain. Under these contracts the retailer shares its revenue with the supplier in exchange for a lower wholesale price. The win-win conditions are natural conditions requiring that the profit of any firm may not decrease after implementing the revenue-sharing contract. If these conditions are not met, that is, if at least one firm is confronted with decreased profits, the firms will not agree upon signing the contract and the revenue-sharing contract will not be implemented. We show that the win-win conditions result in a smaller range of contracts being offered by the supplier. More important, in case of multiple competing retailers there may be no revenue-sharing contract satisfying these conditions. Hence, in the presence of win-win conditions revenue-sharing contracts are not suitable for distribution chains with a supplier and multiple competing retailers. For these chains we present a simple alternative coordination mechanism that coordinates the chain and satisfies all win-win conditions. \u

Exclusive contracts in health insurance

Competition between insurance companies for employees of a firm often increases the prices and reduces the availability of high-quality health plans offered to employees. An insurance company can reduce competition by signing an exclusive contract, which guarantees that the company is the only insurance provider. The study assesses whether exclusive contracts can alleviate the negative consequences of competition. Using the nation-wide survey of employers, I find that exclusive insurers charged 39-42 less for a unit of insurance quality than non-exclusive insurers. Furthermore, I find that the pattern of insurance quality dispersion is consistent with the exclusive insurers offering more high quality plans.health insurance; exclusive contract; subsidy; vertical restraint; signaling

High Temperature Heat Exchanger Project: Quarterly Progress Report January 1, 2004 through March 31, 2004

Mutually satisfactory language has been developed to permit signing of a subcontract between the General Atomics Corporation and the UNLV Research Foundation. The contract is signed