Clearing price distributions in call auctions

We propose a model for price formation in financial markets based on clearing of a standard call auction with random orders, and verify its validity for prediction of the daily closing price distribution statistically. The model considers random buy and sell orders, placed following demand- and supply-side valuation distributions; an equilibrium equation then leads to a distribution for clearing price and transacted volume. Bid and ask volumes are left as free parameters, permitting possibly heavy-tailed or very skewed order flow conditions. In highly liquid auctions, the clearing price distribution converges to an asymptotically normal central limit, with mean and variance in terms of supply/demand-valuation distributions and order flow imbalance. By means of simulations, we illustrate the influence of variations in order flow and valuation distributions on price/volume, noting a distinction between high- and low-volume auction price variance. To verify the validity of the model statistically, we predict a year's worth of daily closing price distributions for 5 constituents of the Eurostoxx 50 index; Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics and QQ-plots demonstrate with ample statistical significance that the model predicts closing price distributions accurately, and compares favourably with alternative methods of prediction

An investigation of the trading agent competition : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Computer Science at Massey University, Albany, New Zealand

The Internet has swept over the whole world. It is influencing almost every aspect of society. The blooming of electronic commerce on the back of the Internet further increases globalisation and free trade. However, the Internet will never reach its full potential as a new electronic media or marketplace unless agents are developed. The trading Agent Competition (TAC), which simulates online auctions, was designed to create a standard problem in the complex domain of electronic marketplaces and to inspire researchers from all over the world to develop distinctive software agents to a common exercise. In this thesis, a detailed study of intelligent software agents and a comprehensive investigation of the Trading Agent Competition will be presented. The design of the Risker Wise agent and a fuzzy logic system predicting the bid increase of the hotel auction in the TAC game will be discussed in detail

Selection mechanisms affect volatility in evolving markets

Financial asset markets are sociotechnical systems whose constituent agents are subject to evolutionary pressure as unprofitable agents exit the marketplace and more profitable agents continue to trade assets. Using a population of evolving zero-intelligence agents and a frequent batch auction price-discovery mechanism as substrate, we analyze the role played by evolutionary selection mechanisms in determining macro-observable market statistics. In particular, we show that selection mechanisms incorporating a local fitness-proportionate component are associated with high correlation between a micro, risk-aversion parameter and a commonly-used macro-volatility statistic, while a purely quantile-based selection mechanism shows significantly less correlation.Comment: 9 pages, 7 figures, to appear in proceedings of GECCO 2019 as a full pape

Discovering the best: Informational efficiency and liquidity of alternative trading mechanisms in experimental asset markets

This paper reports the results of 18 experimental asset markets with 262 subjects that explore the effects of liquidity and aggregation of information. The main focus lies on the comparison of different trading mechanisms of stock exchanges. Compared to most of financial markets experiments, reality is met by introducing long-living assets and integrating all subjects in a multi-period decision-making process. In accordance with the evidence from the empirical research in real financial markets, our results show that the continuous auction achieves the highest informational efficiency. Dealer markets do the worst; call markets (batch trading) reach an intermediate position. A comparable result is achieved regarding the liquidity of the trading mechanisms. For both success factors of real stock exchanges our results show a strong tendency that continuous trading outperforms the other market structures, at least in the framework of the present measurement and on the chosen abstraction level. This does not exclude for the practice to offer a combination with call markets in certain titles and at certain times, particularly, if the here met assumptions of an open market access and information symmetry between the investors do not apply in full extent. --Market Microstructure,Experimental Asset Markets,Market Efficiency,Informational Efficiency,Liquidity,Call Markets,Continuous Auction

Equity Trading Systems in Europe - A survey of recent changes

This paper provides a survey of recent changes in the market microstructure of the 5 largest European Stock Exchanges. We first provide a brief statistical overview of European equity markets. Then we discuss how the introduction of the Investment Services Directive and the development of institutional trading have prompted European Stock Exchanges to modify their trading systems since 1994. We show that these exchanges have converged to a similar market organization. In this organization, trading takes place in an order-driven market but trading rules can vary according to the type of securities. We also describe the remaining differences between the trading systems, in particular with respect to the consolidation of the order flow and transparency.trading systems; trading rules; market microstructure; European equity markets

A Double-Sided Multiunit Combinatorial Auction for Substitutes: Theory and Algorithms

Combinatorial exchanges have existed for a long time in securities markets. In these auctions buyers and sellers can place orders on combinations, or bundles of different securities. These orders are conjunctive: they are matched only if the full bundle is available. On business-to-business (B2B) exchanges, buyers have the choice to receive the same product with different attributes; for instance the same product can be produced by different sellers. A buyer indicates his preference by submitting a disjunctive order, where he specifies how much of the product he wants, and how much he values each attribute. Only the goods with the best attributes and prices will be matched. This article considers a doubled-sided multi-unit combinatorial auction for substitutes, that is, a uniform price auction where buyers and sellers place both types of orders, conjunctive and disjunctive. We prove the existence of a linear price which is both competitive and surplus-maximizing when goods are perfectly divisible, and nearly so otherwise. We describe an algorithm to clear the market, which is particularly efficient when the number of traders is large.Combinatorial auction, economic equilibrium

Environmental analysis for application layer networks

Die zunehmende Vernetzung von Rechnern über das Internet lies die Vision von Application Layer Netzwerken aufkommen. Sie umfassen Overlay Netzwerke wie beispielsweise Peer-to-Peer Netzwerke und Grid Infrastrukturen unter Verwendung des TCP/IP Protokolls. Ihre gemeinsame Eigenschaft ist die redundante, verteilte Bereitstellung und der Zugang zu Daten-, Rechen- und Anwendungsdiensten, während sie die Heterogenität der Infrastruktur vor dem Nutzer verbergen. In dieser Arbeit werden die Anforderungen, die diese Netzwerke an ökonomische Allokationsmechanismen stellen, untersucht. Die Analyse erfolgt anhand eines Marktanalyseprozesses für einen zentralen Auktionsmechanismus und einen katallaktischen Markt. --Grid Computing