A Category Theoretic View of Contextual Types: from Simple Types to Dependent Types

We describe the categorical semantics for a simply typed variant and a simplified dependently typed variant of Cocon, a contextual modal type theory where the box modality mediates between the weak function space that is used to represent higher-order abstract syntax (HOAS) trees and the strong function space that describes (recursive) computations about them. What makes Cocon different from standard type theories is the presence of first-class contexts and contextual objects to describe syntax trees that are closed with respect to a given context of assumptions. Following M. Hofmann's work, we use a presheaf model to characterise HOAS trees. Surprisingly, this model already provides the necessary structure to also model Cocon. In particular, we can capture the contextual objects of Cocon using a comonad $\flat$ that restricts presheaves to their closed elements. This gives a simple semantic characterisation of the invariants of contextual types (e.g. substitution invariance) and identifies Cocon as a type-theoretic syntax of presheaf models. We further extend this characterisation to dependent types using categories with families and show that we can model a fragment of Cocon without recursor in the Fitch-style dependent modal type theory presented by Birkedal et. al.

A constructive modal semantics for contextual verification

This paper introduces a non-standard semantics for a modal version of constructive KT for contextual (assumptions-based) verification. The modal fragment expresses verifiability under extensions of contexts, enjoying adapted validity and (weak) monotonicity properties depending on satisfaction of the contextual data

Multi-level Contextual Type Theory

Contextual type theory distinguishes between bound variables and meta-variables to write potentially incomplete terms in the presence of binders. It has found good use as a framework for concise explanations of higher-order unification, characterize holes in proofs, and in developing a foundation for programming with higher-order abstract syntax, as embodied by the programming and reasoning environment Beluga. However, to reason about these applications, we need to introduce meta^2-variables to characterize the dependency on meta-variables and bound variables. In other words, we must go beyond a two-level system granting only bound variables and meta-variables. In this paper we generalize contextual type theory to n levels for arbitrary n, so as to obtain a formal system offering bound variables, meta-variables and so on all the way to meta^n-variables. We obtain a uniform account by collapsing all these different kinds of variables into a single notion of variabe indexed by some level k. We give a decidable bi-directional type system which characterizes beta-eta-normal forms together with a generalized substitution operation.Comment: In Proceedings LFMTP 2011, arXiv:1110.668

Modalities in homotopy type theory

Univalent homotopy type theory (HoTT) may be seen as a language for the category of $\infty$-groupoids. It is being developed as a new foundation for mathematics and as an internal language for (elementary) higher toposes. We develop the theory of factorization systems, reflective subuniverses, and modalities in homotopy type theory, including their construction using a "localization" higher inductive type. This produces in particular the ($n$-connected, $n$-truncated) factorization system as well as internal presentations of subtoposes, through lex modalities. We also develop the semantics of these constructions

Hilbert Space Quantum Mechanics is Contextual (Reply to R. B. Griffiths)

In a recent paper Griffiths [38] has argued, based on the consistent histories interpretation, that Hilbert space quantum mechanics (QM) is noncontextual. According to Griffiths the problem of contextuality disappears if the apparatus is "designed and operated by a competent experimentalist" and we accept the Single Framework Rule (SFR). We will argue from a representational realist stance that the conclusion is incorrect due to the misleading understanding provided by Griffiths to the meaning of quantum contextuality and its relation to physical reality and measurements. We will discuss how the quite general incomprehension of contextuality has its origin in the "objective-subjective omelette" created by Heisenberg and Bohr. We will argue that in order to unscramble the omelette we need to disentangle, firstly, representational realism from naive realism, secondly, ontology from epistemology, and thirdly, the different interpretational problems of QM. In this respect, we will analyze what should be considered as Meaningful Physical Statements (MPS) within a theory and will argue that Counterfactual Reasoning (CR) -considered by Griffiths as "tricky"- must be accepted as a necessary condition for any representational realist interpretation of QM. Finally we discuss what should be considered as a problem (and what not) in QM from a representational realist perspective.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1502.0531