Relational Contracts and the Economic Well-Being of Nations

Informal long-term relationships and mutual confidence play a crucial role in modern economies in at least two dimensions. First, the performance of firms is strongly affected by their capacity to solve organizational questions effectively and this capacity is apparently strongly related to their ability to maintain informal long-term relationships. Second, countries that are better at maintaining unwritten agreements and where interactions are more strongly guided by a sense of trust fare better in terms of economic welfare than others. This paper provides a simple general equilibrium model which reconciles these two findings: we offer a micro-founded explanation of how the trust that prevails in an economy gets transmitted into higher economic well-being and we thereby highlight the role of managers with low time preference. Our analysis builds on the model of Antràs and Helpman (2004) and a formalization of the notion of relational contracting developed in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002).relational contracting, theory of the firm, aggregate welfare, firm heterogeneity

Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist

In The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, Adam Smith famously argued that economic behavior was motivated by self-interest. But 17 years earlier in 1759, Smith had proposed a theory of human behavior that looks anything but self-interested. In his first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith argued that behavior was determined by the struggle between what Smith termed the “passions” and the “impartial spectator.” The passions included drives such as hunger and sex, emotions such as fear and anger, and motivational feeling states such as pain. Smith viewed behavior as under the direct control of the passions, but believed that people could override passion-driven behavior by viewing their own behavior from the perspective of an outsider—the impartial spectator—a “moral hector who, looking over the shoulder of the economic man, scrutinizes every move he makes” (Grampp, 1948, p. 317)

Measures for savings and saving rates in the German SAVE data set

Saving is frequently measured using a one-shot question for total annual saving during the preceding year. This type of one-shot recall question might cause severe measurement errors since saving is a complicated concept which consists of various components, many of which respondents might not be fully aware of. This paper uses the SAVE data to analyze potential errors generated by this kind of questioning and provides remedies in order to construct the most of reliable saving measure given the information at hand.

Efficiency in Family Bargaining: Living Arrangements and Caregiving Decisions of Adult Children and Disabled Elderly Parents

In this paper, we use a two-stage bargaining model to analyze the living arrangement of a disabled elderly parent and the assistance provided to the parent by her adult children. The first stage determines the living arrangement: the parent can live in a nursing home, live alone in the community, or live with any child who has invited coresidence. The second stage determines the assistance provided by each child in the family. Working by backward induction, we first calculate the level of assistance that each child would provide to the parent in each possible living arrangement. Using these calculations, we then analyze the living arrangement that would emerge from the first stage game. A key assumption of our model is that family members cannot or will not make binding agreements at the first stage regarding transfers at the second stage. Because coresidence is likely to reduce the bargaining power of the coresident child relative to her siblings, coresidence may fail to emerge as the equilibrium living arrangement even when it is Pareto efficient. That is, the outcome of the two-stage game need not be Pareto efficient.

Measures for savings and saving rates in the German SAVE data set

Saving is frequently measured using a one-shot question for total annual saving during the preceding year. This type of one-shot recall question might cause severe measurement errors since saving is a complicated concept which consists of various components, many of which respondents might not be fully aware of. This paper uses the SAVE data to analyze potential errors generated by this kind of questioning and provides remedies in order to construct the most of reliable saving measure given the information at hand.

Raising revenue with transaction taxes in Latin america - or is it better to tax with the devil you know?

In recent years, various Latin American governments have resorted to taxes on bank debits and financial transactions as alternative ways of raising revenue. Considerable interest has developed in understanding the consequences of such reforms. The author constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model to assess the size of distortions and other quantitative implications associated with a transaction tax. The distinctive feature of the model is the non-neutrality property of the tax in the sense that it distorts the structure of relative prices of intermediate transactions, giving rise to tax"pyramidation."The effective tax rate ultimately borne by the economy is shown to depend on the complexity of the transaction structure. Calibrated for Latin America, the model finds that, contrary to existing evidence and conventional wisdom, a transaction tax is not a particularly burdensome levy in terms of economic growth and efficiency costs. The model also shows that if a government can credibly commit itself to an announced two-step reform in which it first uses a transaction tax temporarily and then replaces it with any other conventional tax, this policy will improve economic welfare relative to a tax reform where a consumption tax (or a labor income tax or a capital earnings tax) is exclusively used from the start to raise the required additional revenue.Public Sector Economics&Finance,Economic Theory&Research,Labor Policies,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Growth

Global and regional public goods: a prognosis for collective action

This paper applies modern concepts from the theory of public goods to indicate why progress has been made with respect to some global and regional public goods (for example, cutting sulphur emissions) but not with respect to others (for example, cutting greenhouse gases). Factors promoting collective action at the transnational level include the removal of uncertainty, a high share of nation-specific benefits, a limited number of essential participants and the presence of an influential leader nation. The impact of public good aggregation technologies on the future provision of transnational public goods is related to the trend in world-wide income inequality. Principles are presented for designing supranational structures for addressing transnational public good problems.

Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future

Behavioral economics increases the explanatory power of economics by providing it with more realistic psychological foundations. This book consists of representative recent articles in behavioral economics. This chapter is intended to provide an introduction to the approach and methods of behavioral economics, and to some of its major findings, applications, and promising new directions. It also seeks to fill some unavoidable gaps in the chapters’ coverage of topics

A Model of Anticipated Regret and Endogenous Beliefs

This paper clarifies and extends the model of anticipated regret and endogenous beliefs based on the Savage (1951) Minmax Regret Criterion developped in Suryanarayanan (2006a). A decision maker chooses an action with state contingent consequences but cannot precisely assess the true probability distribution of the state. She distrusts her prior about the true distribution and surrounds it with a set of alternative but plausible probability distributions. The decision maker minimizes the worst expected regret over all plausible probability distributions and alternative actions, where regret is the loss experienced when the decision maker compares an action to a counterfactual feasible alternative for a given realization of the state. Preliminary theoretical results provide a systematic algorithm to find the solution to the decision problem and show how models of Minmax Regret differs from models of ambiguity aversion and expected utility. In particular, the solution to the decision problem can always be represented as a saddle point solution to an equivalent zerosum game problem. This new problem jointly produces the solution to the Anticipated Regret problem and the endogenous belief. We then use the endogenous belief to define the implicit certainty equivalent and to build an infinite horizon and time consistent problem for a decision maker minimizing her lifetime worst expected regrets.