1,397 research outputs found
EasyUC: using EasyCrypt to mechanize proofs of universally composable security
We present a methodology for using the EasyCrypt proof assistant (originally designed for mechanizing the generation of proofs of game-based security of cryptographic schemes and protocols) to mechanize proofs of security of cryptographic protocols within the universally composable (UC) security framework. This allows, for the first time, the mechanization and formal verification of the entire sequence of steps needed for proving simulation-based security in a modular way: Specifying a protocol and the desired ideal functionality; Constructing a simulator and demonstrating its validity, via reduction to hard computational problems; Invoking the universal composition operation and demonstrating that it indeed preserves security. We demonstrate our methodology on a simple example: stating and proving the security of secure message communication via a one-time pad, where the key comes from a Diffie-Hellman key-exchange, assuming ideally authenticated communication. We first put together EasyCrypt-verified proofs that: (a) the Diffie-Hellman protocol UC-realizes an ideal key-exchange functionality, assuming hardness of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem, and (b) one-time-pad encryption, with a key obtained using ideal key-exchange, UC-realizes an ideal secure-communication functionality. We then mechanically combine the two proofs into an EasyCrypt-verified proof that the composed protocol realizes the same ideal secure-communication functionality. Although formulating a methodology that is both sound and workable has proven to be a complex task, we are hopeful that it will prove to be the basis for mechanized UC security analyses for significantly more complex protocols and tasks.Accepted manuscrip
Quantum authentication with key recycling
We show that a family of quantum authentication protocols introduced in
[Barnum et al., FOCS 2002] can be used to construct a secure quantum channel
and additionally recycle all of the secret key if the message is successfully
authenticated, and recycle part of the key if tampering is detected. We give a
full security proof that constructs the secure channel given only insecure
noisy channels and a shared secret key. We also prove that the number of
recycled key bits is optimal for this family of protocols, i.e., there exists
an adversarial strategy to obtain all non-recycled bits. Previous works
recycled less key and only gave partial security proofs, since they did not
consider all possible distinguishers (environments) that may be used to
distinguish the real setting from the ideal secure quantum channel and secret
key resource.Comment: 38+17 pages, 13 figures. v2: constructed ideal secure channel and
secret key resource have been slightly redefined; also added a proof in the
appendix for quantum authentication without key recycling that has better
parameters and only requires weak purity testing code
A Machine-Checked Formalization of the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Model
Most approaches to the formal analyses of cryptographic protocols make the perfect cryptography assumption, i.e. the hypothese that there is no way to obtain knowledge about the plaintext pertaining to a ciphertext without knowing the key. Ideally, one would prefer to rely on a weaker hypothesis on the computational cost of gaining information about the plaintext pertaining to a ciphertext without knowing the key. Such a view is permitted by the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Model which provide non-standard computational models in which one may reason about the computational cost of breaking a cryptographic scheme. Using the proof assistant Coq, we provide a machine-checked account of the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Mode
Toward an Algebraic Theory of Systems
We propose the concept of a system algebra with a parallel composition
operation and an interface connection operation, and formalize
composition-order invariance, which postulates that the order of composing and
connecting systems is irrelevant, a generalized form of associativity.
Composition-order invariance explicitly captures a common property that is
implicit in any context where one can draw a figure (hiding the drawing order)
of several connected systems, which appears in many scientific contexts. This
abstract algebra captures settings where one is interested in the behavior of a
composed system in an environment and wants to abstract away anything internal
not relevant for the behavior. This may include physical systems, electronic
circuits, or interacting distributed systems.
One specific such setting, of special interest in computer science, are
functional system algebras, which capture, in the most general sense, any type
of system that takes inputs and produces outputs depending on the inputs, and
where the output of a system can be the input to another system. The behavior
of such a system is uniquely determined by the function mapping inputs to
outputs. We consider several instantiations of this very general concept. In
particular, we show that Kahn networks form a functional system algebra and
prove their composition-order invariance.
Moreover, we define a functional system algebra of causal systems,
characterized by the property that inputs can only influence future outputs,
where an abstract partial order relation captures the notion of "later". This
system algebra is also shown to be composition-order invariant and appropriate
instantiations thereof allow to model and analyze systems that depend on time
Cryptographic security of quantum key distribution
This work is intended as an introduction to cryptographic security and a
motivation for the widely used Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) security
definition. We review the notion of security necessary for a protocol to be
usable in a larger cryptographic context, i.e., for it to remain secure when
composed with other secure protocols. We then derive the corresponding security
criterion for QKD. We provide several examples of QKD composed in sequence and
parallel with different cryptographic schemes to illustrate how the error of a
composed protocol is the sum of the errors of the individual protocols. We also
discuss the operational interpretations of the distance metric used to quantify
these errors.Comment: 31+23 pages. 28 figures. Comments and questions welcom
Depth-Bounded Quantum Cryptography with Applications to One-Time Memory and More
With the power of quantum information, we can achieve exciting and classically impossible cryptographic primitives. However, almost all quantum cryptography faces extreme difficulties with the near-term intermediate-scale quantum technology (NISQ technology); namely, the short lifespan of quantum states and limited sequential computation. At the same time, considering only limited quantum adversaries may still enable us to achieve never-before-possible tasks.
In this work, we consider quantum cryptographic primitives against limited quantum adversaries - depth-bounded adversaries. We introduce a model for (depth-bounded) NISQ computers, which are classical circuits interleaved with shallow quantum circuits. Then, we show one-time memory can be achieved against any depth-bounded quantum adversaries introduced in the work, with their depth being any pre-fixed polynomial. Therefore we obtain applications like one-time programs and one-time proofs. Finally, we show our one-time memory has correctness even against constant-rate errors
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