The Return to Schooling in Structural Dynamic Models: A Survey

This papers contains a survey of the recent literature devoted to the returns to schooling within a dynamic structural framework. I present a historical perspective on the evolution of the literature, from early static models set in a selectivity framework (Willis and Rosen, 1979) to the recent literature, stimulated by Keane and Wolpin (1997), and which uses stochastic dynamic programming techniques. After reviewing the literature thoroughly, I compare the structural approach with the IV (experimental) approach. I present their commonalities and I also discuss their fundamental differences. To get an order of magnitude, most structural estimates reported for the US range between 4% and 7% per year. On the other hand, IV estimates between 10% and 15% per year are often reported. The discrepancy prevails even when comparable (if not identical) data sets are used. The discussion is focussed on understanding this divergence. The distinction between static and dynamic model specifications is a recurrent theme in the analysis. I argue that the distinction between the IV approach and the structural approach may be coined in terms of a trade off between behavioral and statistical assumptions. For this reason, and unless one has very specific knowledge of the true data generating process, it is neither possible, nor sensible, to claim which approach to estimation is more flexible. More precisely, I show that structural and IV approaches differ mainly at the level of i) the compatibility of the underlying models with truly dynamic behavior, ii) the role of heterogeneity in ability and tastes, iii) the consideration of post-schooling opportunities, and (iv) the specification (and interpretation) of the Mincer wage equation.Returns to Schooling ; Human Capital ; Ability Bias ; Dynamic Programming ; Dynamic Self-Selection ; Natural experiments ; IV estimation

What Drives the Skill Premium: Technological Change or Demographic Variation?

This paper quantitatively examines the effects of two exogenous driving forces, investment-specific technological change (ISTC) and the demographic change known as “the baby boom and the baby bust,” on the evolution of the skill premium in the postwar U.S. economy. I develop an overlapping generations general equilibrium model with endogenous discrete schooling choice. The production technology features capital-skill complementarity as in Krusell et al. (2000). ISTC, through capital-skill complementarity, raises the relative demand for skilled labor, while demographic variation affects the skill premium through changing the age structure and hence relative supply of skilled labor. I find that demographic change is more important in shaping the skill premium before 1980. Since then, ISTC takes over to drive the dramatic increase in the skill premium.Skill Premium; Schooling Choice; Demographic and Technological Change; Capital-Skill Complementarity; Overlapping Generations

Enrolment into Higher Education and Changes in Repayment Obligations of Student Aid – Microeconometric Evidence for Germany.

We evaluate the effect of the federal students’ financial assistance scheme (BAfoeG) on enrolment rates into higher education by exploiting the exogenous variation introduced through a discrete shift in the repayment regulations. Supported students had to repay the full loan until 1990. Thereafter, 50 percent of the student aid has been offered as a non-repayable grant. Our results from simple difference-in- difference estimates suggest that student aid is ineffective in raising enrolment rates. Our findings may have important implications for the current debate on the reform of financing higher education in Germany and elsewhere.educational decision, educational finance, higher education, difference-in-difference, discrete-choice

A Model Of College Tuition Maximization

This paper develops a series of models for optimal tuition pricing for private colleges and universities.  The university is assumed to be a profit maximizing, price discriminating monopolist.  The enrollment decision of student’s is stochastic in nature.  The university offers an effective tuition rate, comprised of stipulated tuition less financial aid, to each student based on the demographic characteristics of the student.  Initially, the applicant poll is assumed to be homogeneous.  Subsequently, the quality of the applicant pool is allowed to vary and the university’s tuition maximization problem is subject to quality and capacity constraints.  Lastly, we perform a simulation that allows an exploration of the risks associated with the university’s tuition, quality and capacity decisions

Accounting for the Changing Role of Family Income in Determining College Entry

Assessing the importance of borrowing constraints for college entry is key for education policy analysis in the U.S. economy. I present a computable dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations and incomplete markets that allows me to measure the fraction of households constrained in their college entry decision. College education is financed by family transfers and public subsidies, where transfers are generated through altruism on part of the parents. Parents face a trade-off between making transfers to their children and own savings. Ceteris paribus, parents who expect lower future earnings transfer less and save more. Data from the 1986 Survey of Consumer Finances give support to this mechanism. I show that this trade-off leads to substantially higher estimates of the fraction of constrained households compared to the results in the empirical literature (18 instead of 8 percent). The model also predicts that an increment in parents' earnings uncertainty decreases their willingness to provide transfers. In combination with rising returns to education, which makes college going more attractive, this boosts the number of constrained youths and explains why family income has become more important for college access over the last decades in the U.S. economy.College Enrolment, Borrowing Constraints,Parental Transfers, Household Savings, Dynamic General Equilibrium Models

Constrained After College: Student Loans and Early Career Occupational Choices

In the early 2000s, a highly selective university introduced a "no-loans" policy under which the loan component of financial aid awards was replaced with grants. We use this natural experiment to identify the causal effect of student debt on employment outcomes. In the standard life-cycle model, young people make optimal educational investment decisions if they are able to finance these investments by borrowing against future earnings; the presence of debt has only income effects on future decisions. We find that debt causes graduates to choose substantially higher-salary jobs and reduces the probability that students choose low-paid "public interest" jobs. We also find some evidence that debt affects students' academic decisions during college. Our estimates suggest that recent college graduates are not life-cycle agents. Two potential explanations are that young workers are credit constrained or that they are averse to holding debt. We find suggestive evidence that debt reduces students' donations to the institution in the years after they graduate and increases the likelihood that a graduate will default on a pledge made during her senior year; we argue this result is more likely consistent with credit constraints than with debt aversion.

Estimation of dynamic discrete choice models by maximum likelihood and the simulated method of moments

We compare the performance of maximum likelihood (ML) and simulated method of moments (SMM) estimation for dynamic discrete choice models. We construct and estimate a simplified dynamic structural model of education that captures some basic features of educational choices in the United States in the 1980s and early 1990s. We use estimates from our model to simulate a synthetic dataset and assess the ability of ML and SMM to recover the model parameters on this sample. We investigate the performance of alternative tuning parameters for SMM

An Empirical Model of the Medical Match

This paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in a many-to-one matching market using only observed matches. I use pairwise stability and a vertical preference restriction on one side to identify preferences on both sides of the market. Counterfactual simulations are used to analyze the antitrust allegation that the centralized medical residency match is responsible for salary depression. Due to residents' willingness to pay for desirable programs and capacity constraints, salaries in any competitive equilibrium would remain, on average, at least $23,000 below the marginal product of labor. Therefore, the match is not the likely cause of low salaries.National Bureau of Economic Research (Nonprofit Fellowship)Gardner and Florence Call Cowles Foundatio

Bribe-Taking by Bureaucrats: Personal and Circumstantial Determinants

We argue that personal (e.g., age, gender and education) and circumstantial (e.g., bureaucratic rank and sector of employment) factors affect the cost and the benefit of bribe-taking by the bureaucrats. The bureaucrat’s bribe-taking decision is modeled. A unique data set is used to test the predictions of the model. The empirical findings include that education reduces, but power (measured by rank and sector of work) increases, the magnitude of bribe-taking. Age affects bribe-taking in a more subtle way. Gender does not affect it in a statistically significant way. Our study of corruption at the individual level complements the literature studying corruption at country and industry levels.corruption, bureaucrats, determinants, bribe-taking