Constrained Signaling in Auction Design

We consider the problem of an auctioneer who faces the task of selling a good (drawn from a known distribution) to a set of buyers, when the auctioneer does not have the capacity to describe to the buyers the exact identity of the good that he is selling. Instead, he must come up with a constrained signalling scheme: a (non injective) mapping from goods to signals, that satisfies the constraints of his setting. For example, the auctioneer may be able to communicate only a bounded length message for each good, or he might be legally constrained in how he can advertise the item being sold. Each candidate signaling scheme induces an incomplete-information game among the buyers, and the goal of the auctioneer is to choose the signaling scheme and accompanying auction format that optimizes welfare. In this paper, we use techniques from submodular function maximization and no-regret learning to give algorithms for computing constrained signaling schemes for a variety of constrained signaling problems

An Information Theoretic approach to Post Randomization Methods under Differential Privacy

Post Randomization Methods (PRAM) are among the most popular disclosure limitation techniques for both categorical and continuous data. In the categorical case, given a stochastic matrix M and a specified variable, an individual belonging to category i is changed to category j with probability Mi,j . Every approach to choose the randomization matrix M has to balance between two desiderata: 1) preserving as much statistical information from the raw data as possible; 2) guaranteeing the privacy of individuals in the dataset. This trade-off has generally been shown to be very challenging to solve. In this work, we use recent tools from the computer science literature and propose to choose M as the solution of a constrained maximization problems. Specifically, M is chosen as the solution of a constrained maximization problem, where we maximize the Mutual Information between raw and transformed data, given the constraint that the transformation satisfies the notion of Differential Privacy. For the general Categorical model, it is shown how this maximization problem reduces to a convex linear programming and can be therefore solved with known optimization algorithms

Equilibrium Corporate Finance

We study a general equilibrium model with production where financial markets are incomplete. At a competitive equilibrium firms take their production and financial decisions so as to maximize their value. We show that shareholders unanimously support value maximization. Furthermore, competitive equilibria are constrained Pareto efficient. Finally the Modigliani-Miller theorem typically does not hold and the firms’ corporate financing structure is determined at equilibrium. Such results extend to the case where informational asymmetries are present and contribute to determine the firms’ capital structure.capital structure, competitive equilibria, incomplete markets, asymmetric information