Conspiratorial beliefs observed through entropy principles

We propose a novel approach framed in terms of information theory and entropy to tackle the issue of conspiracy theories propagation. We start with the report of an event (such as 9/11 terroristic attack) represented as a series of individual strings of information denoted respectively by two-state variable Ei=+/-1, i=1,..., N. Assigning Ei value to all strings, the initial order parameter and entropy are determined. Conspiracy theorists comment on the report, focusing repeatedly on several strings Ek and changing their meaning (from -1 to +1). The reading of the event is turned fuzzy with an increased entropy value. Beyond some threshold value of entropy, chosen by simplicity to its maximum value, meaning N/2 variables with Ei=1, doubt prevails in the reading of the event and the chance is created that an alternative theory might prevail. Therefore, the evolution of the associated entropy is a way to measure the degree of penetration of a conspiracy theory. Our general framework relies on online content made voluntarily available by crowds of people, in response to some news or blog articles published by official news agencies. We apply different aggregation levels (comment, person, discussion thread) and discuss the associated patterns of entropy change.Comment: 21 page, 14 figure

Conspiracy theory beliefs and worldviews: a mixed-methods approach exploring the psychology of monologicality, dialogicality and belief development

Conspiracy theories (CTs) appear to be an increasingly widespread aspect of everyday thought about social and political events. They call into question common understandings of people and institutions within society, and can have implications for political and policy relevant behaviours (e.g. voting, vaccine uptake). This thesis challenges a central finding in the limited literature covering belief in CTs – the proposition of ‘monologicality’ as proposed by Goertzel (1994), that belief in one CT is accompanied by wholescale endorsement of many others. The thesis takes a mixed-methods approach, triangulating qualitative and quantitative data, to revise our understanding of monologicality. Through qualitative analyses of interview data as presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, the central argument put forward is that not all belief in CTs is monological but there are various other ways of endorsing CTs. In Chapter 2, a thematic analysis reveals five types of conspiracist worldviews, proposing a gradient from non-monological worldviews, characterised by intrigue or limited endorsement, to fully monological worldviews premised upon generalised human agency (e.g. government conspiracy) or supernatural agency (e.g. extra-terrestrial cover up, spiritual entities). Chapter 3 advances the concept of ‘dialogicality,’ revealing that CT ideas are endorsed alongside commonplace ideas of science, religion and politics and society. Five dialogical relations are substantiated, including: integrative thinking, synthetic thinking, target dependent thinking, cognitive dissonance and analogical thinking. Chapter 4 provides a narrative insight into the development of CT belief for all five monological types – focussing on the perceived origins of CT belief and later development. Next, we turn to quantitative data gathered via online surveys. Chapter 5 establishes a new scale known as the Conspiracist Worldviews Scale; the first to measure different types of conspiracist worldviews from non-monological to fully 5 monological. Five subscales representing five types of conspiracist worldviews (Type 2, Type 3, Type 4, Type 5-Alien, Type 5-Spiritual) achieve construct, convergent, concurrent and diagnostic validity. The quantitative findings of Chapter 5 validate earlier qualitative findings of Chapters 2-4 and extend previous understandings of monologicality. The thesis concludes, bringing all these empirical findings together and by recognising the importance of looking beyond monologicality if we are to fully understand the phenomena characterising conspiracist belief

Understanding Trust in Contemporary Australia Using Latent Class Analysis

In 2019, an online survey of 2,015 Australian residents examined the extent of trust of various groups and institutions. A Latent Class Analysis (LCA) of the results generated a typology of trust in Australia. The LCA uncovered four classes based on levels of trust as well as associated demographic profiles and attitudes. The four groups were: those that are very distrusting (15%); those that are largely unsure about how much they can trust various groups and institutions (17%); those that are somewhat trusting (42%); and those that are largely trusting (26%). The largely trusting group was differentiated by their holistic trust in institutions and trust in other Australians (no matter their background). Discomfort with cultural difference was a defining characteristic of the very distrusting class. Examination of these four groups helps understand concerns of Australians and enable the development of strategies to address institutional and interpersonal distrust

Random Sequence Perception Amongst Finance and Accounting Personnel: Can We Measure Illusion Of Control, A Type I Error, or Illusion Of Chaos, A Type II Error?

The purpose of this dissertation was to determine if finance and accounting personnel could distinguish between random and non-random time-series strings and to determine what types of errors they would make. These individuals averaging 13 years of experience were unable to distinguish non-random patterns from random strings in an assessment composed of statistical process control (SPC) charts. Respondents scored no better than guessing which was also assessed with a series of true-false questions. Neither over-alternation (oscillation) nor under-alternation (trend) strategies were able to predict type I or type II error rates, i.e. illusion of control or illusion of chaos. Latent class analysis methods within partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) were successful in uncovering segments or groups of respondents with large explained variance and significant path models. Relationships between desirability of control, personal fear of invalidity, and error rates were more varied than expected. Yet, some segments tended to illusion of control while others to illusion of chaos. Similar effects were also observed when substituting a true-false guessing assessment for the SPC assessment with some loss of explained variance and weaker path coefficients. Respondents also provided their perceptions and thoughts of randomness for both SPC and true-false assessments

A Deliberative Account of Causation: How the Evidence of Deliberating Agents Accounts for Causation and its Temporal Direction

In my dissertation I develop and defend a deliberative account of causation: causal relations correspond to the evidential relations we use when we decide on one thing in order to achieve another. Tamsin’s taking her umbrella is a cause of her staying dry, for example, if and only if her deciding to take her umbrella for the sake of staying dry is adequate grounds for believing she’ll stay dry. I defend the account in the form of a biconditional that relates causal relations to evidential relations. This biconditional makes claims about causal relations, not just our causal concepts, and constrains metaphysical accounts of causation, including reductive ones. Surely we need science to investigate causal structure. But we can’t justify any particular account of causation independently of its relevance for us. This deliberative account explains why we should care about causation, why we deliberate on the future and not the past, and even why causes come prior in time to their effects. In chapter 1 I introduce the motivations for the project: to reconcile causation and our freedom as agents with the picture of the world presented by physics. Fundamental physics makes no mention of causes. And the lawlike character of the world seems to rule out freedom to decide. My dissertation offers a combined solution—I explain our freedom in epistemic terms and use this freedom to make sense of causation. In chapter 2 I draw on philosophy of action and decision theory to develop an epistemic model of deliberation, one based in requirements on belief. If we’re to deliberate, our beliefs can’t epistemically settle how we’ll decide, yet our decisions must epistemically settle what we’ll do. This combination of belief and suspension of belief explains why we rationally take ourselves to be free to decide on different options in deliberation. In chapter 3 I defend this model from near rivals that also explain freedom in terms of belief. Accounts of ‘epistemic freedom’ from David Velleman, James Joyce and Jenann Ismael appeal to our justification to form beliefs ‘unconstrained’ by evidence. Yet, I will argue, these accounts are susceptible to counterexamples and turn out to rely on a primitive ability to believe at will—one that makes the appeal to justification redundant. J. G. Fichte’s Idealist account of freedom, based in a primitive activity of the ‘I’, nicely illustrates the kind of freedom these accounts rely on. In chapter 4 I develop the epistemic model of deliberation into a deliberative account of causation. I argue that A is a type-level cause of B if and only if an agent deciding on a state of affairs of type A in ‘proper deliberation’, for the sake of a state of affairs of type B would be good evidence of a state of affairs of type B obtaining. This biconditional explains why we should care about causal relations—they direct us to good decisions. But existing accounts of causation don’t adequately explain why causation matters. James Woodward’s interventionist account explicates ‘control’ and ‘causation’ in the very same terms—and so can’t appeal to a relation between them to explain why we should care about causal relations. David Lewis’ reductive account relies on standards for evaluating counterfactuals, but doesn’t motivate them or explain why a causal relation analysed in these terms should matter. Delivering the right verdicts is not enough. The deliberative account explains why causation matters, by relating causal relations to the evidential relations needed for deliberation. In chapter 5 I use the deliberative account to explain causal asymmetry—why, contingently, causes come before their effects. Following an approach from Huw Price, because deliberation comes prior to decision, deliberation undermines evidential relations towards the past. So an agent’s deciding for the sake of the past in proper deliberation won’t be appropriate evidence of the past, and backwards causation is not implied. To explain why deliberation comes prior to decision, I appeal to an epistemic asymmetry, one that is explained by statistical-mechanical accounts of causation in non-causal terms. But statistical-mechanical accounts still need the deliberative account to justify why the relations they pick out as causal should matter to us. The deliberative account of causation relates causal relations to the evidential relations of use to deliberating agents. It constrains metaphysical accounts, while revealing their underlying explanatory structure. And it does not rule out explanations of causal asymmetry based in physics, but complements them. Overall this project makes sense of causation by foregrounding its relevance for us

“Down the rabbit hole” Exploring the role of Psychopathological and Socio-Cognitive Factors in Conspiracy Theory Beliefs and Stratergies for Intervention.

The spread of conspiracy theories and misinformation has become increasingly common in recent years, particularly becoming a rather topical area on social media platforms since the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic. Such theories have been linked to several negative social and health consequences, leading to them becoming a topic of interest for researchers. Research in psychology has focused on factors that contribute to the adoption of conspiracy theories from various levels of approach. This thesis explores the individual differences that may contribute to how conspiracy information is evaluated, and, in turn, may explain why conspiracy beliefs are endorsed as well as the implications for challenging these belief systems. To this end, I conducted five studies which examined various individual differences, some yet to be explored in the conspiracy theory literature. A particular focus was to extend the range of clinical measures considered in this area, and, to develop a greater understanding of cognitive factors related to conspiracy beliefs through a more integrated approach (e.g., the inclusion of multiple explanatory lines from research). Following the introductory chapter reviewing the relevant existing literature, Chapter 3 presents Study One which focussed on the potential role of autistic traits as a confounding factor between the relationship between schizotypy and conspiracy beliefs. Chapter 4 reports differences in cognitive style, information seeking behaviour and conspiracy theory beliefs for those who scored above the clinical ASD cut-off compared to the rest of the sample. Chapter 5 presents a refined approach towards thinking styles and examined how people engage in the scientific appraisal of conspiracy information. Chapter 6 assessed the within-individual variation of schizotypy, autistic traits, socio-cognitive tendencies associated with conspiracy beliefs and scientific reasoning ability through a Latent Profile Analysis (LPA). Chapter 7 presents the fifth and final study, to which an intervention approach examined whether encouraging a stronger orientation toward critical scientific appraisal of conspiracy theories could reduce their acceptance. This thesis closes with a general discussion of how it has made a novel contribution to the area of conspiracy research and other related fields. Specifically, I discuss the theoretical and methodological contributions advanced by this thesis through the inclusion of novel psychopathological and socio-cognitive features, how such advancement improved our understanding of the different pathways which lead to conspiracy beliefs, then, how this research into conspiracy beliefs may represent a novel contribution to clinical research. One of the main contrutions being the significance of scientific reasoning skills as amenable to an intervention approach for conspiracy theory beliefs. I conclude with the implications of this work for future research and the conclusions that could be drawn from this thesis.Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Psychology, 202

Lorenz, G\"{o}del and Penrose: New perspectives on determinism and causality in fundamental physics

Despite being known for his pioneering work on chaotic unpredictability, the key discovery at the core of meteorologist Ed Lorenz's work is the link between space-time calculus and state-space fractal geometry. Indeed, properties of Lorenz's fractal invariant set relate space-time calculus to deep areas of mathematics such as G\"{o}del's Incompleteness Theorem. These properties, combined with some recent developments in theoretical and observational cosmology, motivate what is referred to as the `cosmological invariant set postulate': that the universe $U$ can be considered a deterministic dynamical system evolving on a causal measure-zero fractal invariant set $I_U$ in its state space. Symbolic representations of $I_U$ are constructed explicitly based on permutation representations of quaternions. The resulting `invariant set theory' provides some new perspectives on determinism and causality in fundamental physics. For example, whilst the cosmological invariant set appears to have a rich enough structure to allow a description of quantum probability, its measure-zero character ensures it is sparse enough to prevent invariant set theory being constrained by the Bell inequality (consistent with a partial violation of the so-called measurement independence postulate). The primacy of geometry as embodied in the proposed theory extends the principles underpinning general relativity. As a result, the physical basis for contemporary programmes which apply standard field quantisation to some putative gravitational lagrangian is questioned. Consistent with Penrose's suggestion of a deterministic but non-computable theory of fundamental physics, a `gravitational theory of the quantum' is proposed based on the geometry of $I_U$, with potential observational consequences for the dark universe.Comment: This manuscript has been accepted for publication in Contemporary Physics and is based on the author's 9th Dennis Sciama Lecture, given in Oxford and Triest

Understanding conspiracy theories

Scholarly efforts to understand conspiracy theories have grown significantly in recent years, and there is now a broad and interdisciplinary literature that we review in this article. We ask three specific questions. First, what are the factors that are associated with conspiracy theorizing? Our review of the literature shows that conspiracy beliefs result from a range of psychological, political and social factors. Next, how are conspiracy theories communicated? Here, we explain how conspiracy theories are shared among individuals and spread through traditional and social media platforms. Next, what are the risks and rewards associated with conspiracy theories? By focusing on politics and science, we argue that conspiracy theories do more harm than good. Finally, because this is a growing literature and many open questions remain, we conclude by suggesting several promising avenues for future research

"Truth" and Fiction: Conspiracy Theories in Eastern European Culture and Literature

Several of the most prolific and influential conspiracy theories have originated in Eastern Europe. The far reaching influence of conspiracy narratives can be observed in recent developments in Poland or with regard to the wars waged in Eastern Ukraine and in former Yugoslavia. This volume analyses the history behind this widespread phenomenon as well the role it has played in Eastern European cultures and literature both past and present