Programación binivel y equilibrios conjeturados: resultados teóricos y algoritmos numéricos.

This thesis presents the fruit of 3 years of research. During this time 3 works were developed, each one with its own mathematical formulations and results. These works are, of course, related to each other and will be further developed in the near future. The first work of this thesis is presented in chapter 1 and addresses the problem of defining an optimality criterion for a semi-public company in a semi-mixed duopoly model. Here, we have two agents competing, the semi-public company and a private firm, both producing a homogeneous good to satisfy the demand in the market. The private firm, as usual, seeks to maximize its net profit, while the semi-public company has a commitment to watch over the economy of the population, but at the same time, does not neglect its own profit. The compromise between these two objectives for the semipublic company is described by a parameter β ∈ (0, 1], where β → 0 represents that the semi-public company thinks only for its own net profit, and β = 1 represents that the semi-public company cares solely for the economy of the population without seeking its own benefit

Evaluation of cumulative externality: environmental economics, oligopoly and the private provision of public goods

This paper evaluates environmental externality when the structure of the externality is cumulative. The evaluation exercise is based on the assumption that the agents in question form conjectural variations. A number of environments are encompassed within this classification and have received due attention in the literature. Each of these heterogeneous environments, however, possesses considerable analytical homogeneity and permit subscription to a general model treatment. These environments include environmental externality, oligopoly and the analysis of the private provision of public goods. We highlight the general analytical approach by focusing on this latter context, in which debate centers around four issues: the existence of free-riding, the extent to which contributions are matched equally across individuals, the nature of conjectures consistent with equilibrium, and the allocative inefficiency of alternative regimes. This paper resolves each of these issues, with the following conclusions: A consistent-conjectures equilibrium exists in the private provision of public goods. It is the monopolistic-conjectures equilibrium. Agents act identically, contributing positive amounts of the public good in an efficient allocation of resources. There is complete matching of contributions among agents, no free-riding, and the allocation is independent of the number of members within the community. Thus the Olson conjecture—that inefficiency is exacerbated by community size—has no foundation in a consistent-conjectures, cumulative-externality, context (212 words)

Evolutionarily stable conjectures and other regarding preferences in duopoly games

We study the evolutionary selection of conjectures in duopoly games when players have other regarding preferences, i.e. preferences over payoff distributions. In both the Cournot and Bertrand duopoly games, the consistent conjectures are independent of other regarding preferences. Both duopoly games have evolutionarily stable conjectures that depend on other regarding preferences but that do not coincide with the consistent conjectures. For increasingly spiteful preferences, the evolutionarily stable conjectures implicate low quantities in the Cournot game and high prices in the Bertrand game, whereas the inverse relationships hold for the consistent conjectures. We discuss our findings in the context of ultimate and proximate causation

Degree of Instant Competition: Estimation of Market Power in India Instant Coffee Market

The new competition policy of the Government of India seeks to promote competition to protect consumer interests and increase market efficiency. In fact, the degree of price transmission between farmers and final consumers also depends on the degree of competition in the processing sector. Moreover, policy of trade liberalization too is expected to have impact on domestic markets. It becomes imperative, therefore, that one knows the degree of competition in various domestic industries. Instant coffee market in India is a duopoly of Nestl� and Hindustan Lever for decades. They also differentiate their products through branding. At the same time, however, incumbents might have perceived potential competition from another firm, Tata Coffee. In fact, instant coffee can be considered as a part of a larger beverage market with numerous competing products. With trade liberalization, imports have also started trickling in. Thus, circumstantial evidence regarding degree of competition or the market power in the instant coffee market is rather mixed one. By econometrically estimating the perceived first-order supply relation and the demand function, we calculate the market power parameter. Results indicate that the market is not characterized by collusive behaviour. It is quite close to perfectly competitive behaviour although we cannot reject the Cournot-Nash behaviour as well. The econometric study may be complemented by in-depth case study on coffee procurement, processing, and pricing by leading producers. Similar estimations of market power and case studies may be undertaken for other industries as well.