An exploration of the dialectic between theory and method in ethnography

The thesis poses three core questions: 1. What is ethnography? 2. What is the role of theory in ethnography? 3. What (and how) can ethnography contribute to the cumulative development of sociologieal theory? The thesis develops a reflexive awareness of the persuasiveness of the theory-method dialectic in ethnography. It explores the processes through which ethnography generates knowledge through social research and hence the basis upon which ethnography rests its claims about the social world. The thesis conducts a specific case study of one ethnographic 'theory' that was developed through a series of classic ethnographic research monographs. The context of the theory in relation to the historical development of ethnography is evaluated and an area for further theoretical development identified. This area was then tested in new, original fieldwork with the aim to contribute to further theoretical cumulation. The thesis offers two conclusions. The first considers what lessons have been learned through the approach to theorising used by the thesis and if it represents a model for future ethnographic research to follow. The final conclusion of the thesis calls for a greater awareness of the capacity of ethnography to contribute to theory cumulation. It suggests the role of theory has become more implicit than explicit. However, the ethnographic research conducted here has, albeit in one small case study, acknowledged the potential of theory for ethnography. This is vital if ethnography is to offer a sophisticated approach to social research and to contribute to sociological knowledge

Philosophy of mathematics education

PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS EDUCATION\ud This thesis supports the view that mathematics teachers should be aware of differing views of the nature of mathematics and of a range of teaching perspectives. The first part of the thesis discusses differing ways in which the subject 'mathematics' can be identified, by relying on existing philosophy of mathematics. The thesis describes three traditionally recognised philosophies of mathematics: logicism, formalism and intuitionism. A fourth philosophy is constructed, the hypothetical, bringing together the ideas of Peirce and of Lakatos, in particular. The second part of the thesis introduces differing ways of teaching mathematics, and identifies the logical and sometimes contingent connections that exist between the philosophies of mathematics discussed in part 1, and the philosophies of mathematics teaching that arise in part 2. Four teaching perspectives are outlined: the teaching of mathematics as aestheticallyorientated, the teaching of mathematics as a game, the teaching of mathematics as a member of the natural sciences, and the teaching of mathematics as technology-orientated. It is argued that a possible fifth perspective, the teaching of mathematics as a language, is not a distinctive approach. A further approach, the Inter-disciplinary perspective, is recognised as a valid alternative within previously identified philosophical constraints. Thus parts 1 and 2 clarify the range of interpretations found in both the philosophy of mathematics and of mathematics teaching and show that they present realistic choices for the mathematics teacher. The foundations are thereby laid for the arguments generated in part 3, that any mathematics teacher ought to appreciate the full range of teaching 4 perspectives which may be chosen and how these link to views of the nature of mathematics. This would hopefully reverse 'the trend at the moment... towards excessively narrow interpretation of the subject' as reported by Her Majesty's Inspectorate (Aspects of Secondary Education in England, 7.6.20, H. M. S. O., 1979). While the thesis does not contain infallible prescriptions it is concluded that the technology-orientated perspective supported by the hypothetical philosophy of mathematics facilitates the aims of those educators who show concern for the recognition of mathematics in the curriculum, both for its intrinsic and extrinsic value. But the main thrust of the thesis is that the training of future mathematics educators must include opportunities for gaining awareness of the diversity of teaching perspectives and the influence on them of philosophies of mathematics

Paradoxes in Legal Thought

Traditional legal thought has generated few anomalies, antinomies, and paradoxes. These factual and logical tensions arise only when theorists press for a complete and comprehensive body of thought. Discrete, unconnected solutions to problems and particularized precedents spare us the logical tensions that have troubled scientific inquiry. Anomalies arise from data that do not fit the prevailing scientific theory. Paradoxes and antinomies, on the other hand, reflect problems of logical rather than factual consistency. To follow Quine\u27s definitions, paradoxes are contradictions that result from overlooking an accepted canon of consistent thought. They are resolved by pointing to the fallacy that generates them. When we confront the special form of paradox called an antinomy, however, we have no such easy way out. The resolution of these more troubling contradictions requires reexamination of our fundamental premises. The solution typically represents a conceptual innovation, a new way of looking at the field of life that generates the contradiction. For these factual and logical puzzles to become significant in a body of thought, theorists must be committed both to the completeness and to the consistency of their theoretical accounts. The impulse toward completeness renders anomalies disturbing. Confronted by data not explainable by the prevailing theory, theorists must either confess the incompleteness and inadequacy of their system or revise their tools of analysis to accommodate the anomaly. For example, those committed to the economic analysis of law initially regarded comparative negligence as anomalous under their system. The criteria of crime, criminal responsibility, and punishment have yet to receive an adequate account in the literature of law and economics. If anomalies like these accumulate, they can, as Kuhn has taught us, overthrow the theory that causes them to stand out. Until that overthrow occurs, the recognition of anomalies bears witness to the importance of the theoretical enterprise. That anomalies are troubling reflects a shared commitment to the development of a complete theory, not merely the accumulation of discrete formulae for unrelated factual data. The commitment to the consistency of logical structures – as contrasted with the completeness of their theories – drives theorists to grapple with paradoxes and antinomies. This drive has been evident, as we shall see, in the philosophical tradition. Oddly, the commitment to consistency has generated little progress in legal theory. The Holmesian belief that the life of the law has been experience rather than logic provides a good excuse for ignoring seeming contradictions in the structures of legal argument. This aversion to logical thought is buttressed by the ubiquitous misreading of Emerson\u27s branding consistency as the hobgoblin of little minds. What Emerson deplored is the foolish consistency \u27 of those unwilling to change their views over time. Yet criticizing inflexibility provides no excuse for accepting contradictory positions. In some circles of supposedly critical thought, it is even fashionable to tolerate contradictions as an inescapable feature of legal thought. These antitheoretical and antirational strains in legal thought discourage dialogue and preclude advances in our understanding of legal phenomena. This Article commits itself to logical consistency as the indispensable foundation for effective dialogue and coherent criticism. Only if we accept consistency as an overriding legal value will we be troubled by the paradoxes and antinomies that lie latent in our undeveloped systems of legal thought. Grappling with uncovered paradoxes and antinomies will impel us toward consistent theoretical structures. None of this, I submit, requires us to suppress our sensitivities to policies, principles, or other questions of value

Meta-level argumentation framework for representing and reasoning about disagreement

The contribution of this thesis is to the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI), specifically to the sub-field called knowledge engineering. Knowledge engineering involves the computer representation and use of the knowledge and opinions of human experts.In real world controversies, disagreements can be treated as opportunities for exploring the beliefs and reasoning of experts via a process called argumentation. The central claim of this thesis is that a formal computer-based framework for argumentation is a useful solution to the problem of representing and reasoning with multiple conflicting viewpoints.The problem which this thesis addresses is how to represent arguments in domains in which there is controversy and disagreement between many relevant points of view. The reason that this is a problem is that most knowledge based systems are founded in logics, such as first order predicate logic, in which inconsistencies must be eliminated from a theory in order for meaningful inference to be possible from it.I argue that it is possible to devise an argumentation framework by describing one (FORA : Framework for Opposition and Reasoning about Arguments). FORA contains a language for representing the views of multiple experts who disagree or have differing opinions. FORA also contains a suite of software tools which can facilitate debate, exploration of multiple viewpoints, and construction and revision of knowledge bases which are challenged by opposing opinions or evidence.A fundamental part of this thesis is the claim that arguments are meta-level structures which describe the relationships between statements contained in knowledge bases. It is important to make a clear distinction between representations in knowledge bases (the object-level) and representations of the arguments implicit in knowledge bases (the meta-level). FORA has been developed to make this distinction clear and its main benefit is that the argument representations are independent of the object-level representation language. This is useful because it facilitates integration of arguments from multiple sources using different representation languages, and because it enables knowledge engineering decisions to be made about how to structure arguments and chains of reasoning, independently of object-level representation decisions.I argue that abstract argument representations are useful because they can facilitate a variety of knowledge engineering tasks. These include knowledge acquisition; automatic abstraction from existing formal knowledge bases; and construction, rerepresentation, evaluation and criticism of object-level knowledge bases. Examples of software tools contained within FORA are used to illustrate these uses of argumentation structures. The utility of a meta-level framework for argumentation, and FORA in particular, is demonstrated in terms of an important real world controversy concerning the health risks of a group of toxic compounds called aflatoxins