Abstract rationality: the 'logical' structure of attitudes

We present an abstract model of rationality theories that focuses on structural properties of attitudes. We construe rationality as coherence between one's attitudes, e.g., one's beliefs, values, and intentions. We introduce three 'logical' conditions on attitudes: consistency, completeness, and closedness. They generalise the classic logical conditions on beliefs towards multiple attitudes, but contrast with standard rationality conditions such as transitivity for preferences, modus ponens for binary beliefs, additivity for probabilistic beliefs, and non-akrasia for intentions. We establish a formal correspondence between our three logical conditions and standard rationality conditions. Addressing John Broome's enquiry into the achievability of rationality through reasoning, we characterize the extent to which explicit reasoning can help one become more 'logical', i.e., acquire consistent, complete, or closed attitudes, respectively. Our analysis forms a bridge between rationality and logic, and enables logical talk about multi-attitude psychology

GROVE: A computationally grounded model for rational intention revision in BDI agents

A fundamental aspect of Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) agents is intention revision. Agents revise their intentions in order to maintain consistency between their intentions and beliefs, and consistency between intentions. A rational agent must also account for the optimality of their intentions in the case of revision. To that end I present GROVE, a model of rational intention revision for BDI agents. The semantics of a GROVE agent is defined in terms of constraints and preferences on possible future executions of an agent’s plans. I show that GROVE is weakly rational in the sense of Grant et al. and imposes more constraints on executions than the operational semantics for goal lifecycles proposed by Harland et al. As it may not be computationally feasible to consider all possible future executions, I propose a bounded version of GROVE that samples the set of future executions, and state conditions under which bounded GROVE commits to a rational execution

GROVE: A computationally grounded model for rational intention revision in BDI agents

A fundamental aspect of Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) agents is intention revision. Agents revise their intentions in order to maintain consistency between their intentions and beliefs, and consistency between intentions. A rational agent must also account for the optimality of their intentions in the case of revision. To that end I present GROVE, a model of rational intention revision for BDI agents. The semantics of a GROVE agent is defined in terms of constraints and preferences on possible future executions of an agent’s plans. I show that GROVE is weakly rational in the sense of Grant et al. and imposes more constraints on executions than the operational semantics for goal lifecycles proposed by Harland et al. As it may not be computationally feasible to consider all possible future executions, I propose a bounded version of GROVE that samples the set of future executions, and state conditions under which bounded GROVE commits to a rational execution

AGM-Style Revision of Beliefs and Intentions from a Database Perspective (Preliminary Version)

We introduce a logic for temporal beliefs and intentions based on Shoham's database perspective. We separate strong beliefs from weak beliefs. Strong beliefs are independent from intentions, while weak beliefs are obtained by adding intentions to strong beliefs and everything that follows from that. We formalize coherence conditions on strong beliefs and intentions. We provide AGM-style postulates for the revision of strong beliefs and intentions. We show in a representation theorem that a revision operator satisfying our postulates can be represented by a pre-order on interpretations of the beliefs, together with a selection function for the intentions

A Conditional Intent to Perform

The doctrine of promissory fraud holds that a contractual promise implicitly represents an intent to perform. A promisor’s conditional intent to perform poses a problem for that doctrine. It is clear that some undisclosed conditions on the promisor’s intent should result in liability for promissory fraud. Yet no promisor intends to perform come what may, so there is a sense in which all promisors conditionally intend to perform. Building on Michael Bratman’s planning theory of intentions, this article provides a theoretical account of the distinction between “foreground” and “background” conditions on intentions in general and then explains why foreground conditions on a promisor’s intent to perform are likely to result in material promissory misrepresentation, while background conditions are not. The difference between foreground and background conditions lies in whether the agent accepts the satisfaction of the condition for the purposes of her practical reasoning. A promisor’s nonacceptance of a condition on her intent to perform is material because it is likely to affect her preperformance deliberations and investment in the transaction, as well as her willingness to seek agreement with the promisee on how to fill contractual gaps

Social Mental Shaping: Modelling the Impact of Sociality on Autonomous Agents' Mental States

This paper presents a framework that captures how the social nature of agents that are situated in a multi-agent environment impacts upon their individual mental states. Roles and relationships provide an abstraction upon which we develop the notion of social mental shaping. This allows us to extend the standard Belief-Desire-Intention model to account for how common social phenomena (e.g. cooperation, collaborative problem-solving and negotiation) can be integrated into a unified theoretical perspective that reflects a fully explicated model of the autonomous agent's mental state

Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism

We argue that intentions are beliefs—beliefs that are held in light of, and made rational by, practical reasoning. To intend to do something is neither more nor less than to believe, on the basis of one’s practical reasoning, that one will do it. The identification of the mental state of intention with the mental state of belief is what we call strong cognitivism about intentions. It is a strong form of cognitivism because we identify intentions with beliefs, rather than maintaining that beliefs are entailed by intentions or are components of them

The effects of entrepreneurship education

Entrepreneurship education ranks high on policy agendas in Europe and the US, but little research is available to assess its impact. To help close this gap we investigate whether entrepreneurship education a?ects intentions to be entrepreneurial uniformly or whether it leads to greater sorting of students. The latter can reduce the average intention to be entrepreneurial and yet be socially beneficial. This paper provides a model of learning in which entrepreneurship education generates signals to students. Drawing on the signals, students evaluate their aptitude for entrepreneurial tasks. The model is tested using data from a compulsory entrepreneurship course. Using ex ante and ex post survey responses from students, we find that intentions to found decline somewhat although the course has significant positive e?ects on students’ self-assessed entrepreneurial skills. The empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that students receive informative signals and learn about their entrepreneurial aptitude. We outline implications for educators and public policy

The Trans-Contextual Model of Autonomous Motivation in Education: Conceptual and Empirical Issues and Meta-Analysis.

The trans-contextual model outlines the processes by which autonomous motivation toward activities in a physical education context predicts autonomous motivation toward physical activity outside of school, and beliefs about, intentions toward, and actual engagement in, out-of-school physical activity. In the present article, we clarify the fundamental propositions of the model and resolve some outstanding conceptual issues, including its generalizability across multiple educational domains, criteria for its rejection or failed replication, the role of belief-based antecedents of intentions, and the causal ordering of its constructs. We also evaluate the consistency of model relationships in previous tests of the model using path-analytic meta-analysis. The analysis supported model hypotheses but identified substantial heterogeneity in the hypothesized relationships across studies unattributed to sampling and measurement error. Based on our meta-analysis, future research needs to provide further replications of the model in diverse educational settings beyond physical education and test model hypotheses using experimental methods

Why cognitivism?

Intention Cognitivism – the doctrine that intending to V entails, or even consists in, believing that one will V – is an important position with potentially wide-ranging implications, such as a revisionary understanding of practical reason, and a vindicating explanation of 'Practical Knowledge'. In this paper, I critically examine the standard arguments adduced in support of IC, including arguments from the parity of expression of intention and belief; from the ability to plan around one's intention; and from the explanation provided by the thesis for our knowledge of our intentional acts. I conclude that none of these arguments are compelling, and therefore that no good reason has been given to accept IC