3,247 research outputs found
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Conservative Claims for the Probability of Perfection of a Software-based System Using Operational Experience of Previous Similar Systems
We begin by briefly discussing the reasons why claims of probability of non-perfection ( pnp ) may sometimes be useful in reasoning about the reliability of software-based systems for safety-critical applications. We identify two ways in which this approach may make the system assessment problem easier. The first concerns the need t o assess the chance of lifetime freedom from failure of a single system . The second concerns the need to assess the reliability of multi-channel software-diverse fault tolerant systems – in this paper, 1-out-of-2 systems. In earlier work (Littlewood and Rushby 2012, Littlewood and Povyakalo 2013) it was proposed that, in certain applications, claims for possible perfection of one of the channels in such a system may be feasible. It was shown that in such a case there is a particularly simple conservative expression for system pfd (probability of failure on demand) , involving the pfd of one channel , and the pnp of the other. In this paper we address the problem of how to assess such a pnp . In previous work (Zhao 2015) we have addressed this problem when the evidence available is only extensive failure - free working of the system in question. Here we consider the case in which there is, in addition , evidence of the previous success of the software development procedures used to build the system: specifically, several previous similar systems built using the same process have exhibited failure -free working during extensive operational exposure
Reasoning about the Reliability of Diverse Two-Channel Systems in which One Channel is "Possibly Perfect"
This paper considers the problem of reasoning about the reliability of fault-tolerant systems with two "channels" (i.e., components) of which one, A, supports only a claim of reliability, while the other, B, by virtue of extreme simplicity and extensive analysis, supports a plausible claim of "perfection." We begin with the case where either channel can bring the system to a safe state. We show that, conditional upon knowing pA (the probability that A fails on a randomly selected demand) and pB (the probability that channel B is imperfect), a conservative bound on the probability that the system fails on a randomly selected demand is simply pA.pB. That is, there is conditional independence between the events "A fails" and "B is imperfect." The second step of the reasoning involves epistemic uncertainty about (pA, pB) and we show that under quite plausible assumptions, a conservative bound on system pfd can be constructed from point estimates for just three parameters. We discuss the feasibility of establishing credible estimates for these parameters. We extend our analysis from faults of omission to those of commission, and then combine these to yield an analysis for monitored architectures of a kind proposed for aircraft
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Software fault-freeness and reliability predictions
Many software development practices aim at ensuring that software is correct, or fault-free. In safety critical applications, requirements are in terms of probabilities of certain behaviours, e.g. as associated to the Safety Integrity Levels of IEC 61508. The two forms of reasoning - about evidence of correctness and about probabilities of certain failures -are rarely brought together explicitly. The desirability of using claims of correctness has been argued by many authors, but not been taken up in practice. We address how to combine evidence concerning probability of failure together with evidence pertaining to likelihood of fault-freeness, in a Bayesian framework. We present novel results to make this approach practical, by guaranteeing reliability predictions that are conservative (err on the side of pessimism), despite the difficulty of stating prior probability distributions for reliability parameters. This approach seems suitable for practical application to assessment of certain classes of safety critical systems
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Conservative reasoning about epistemic uncertainty for the probability of failure on demand of a 1-out-of-2 software-based system in which one channel is “possibly perfect”
In earlier work, (Littlewood and Rushby 2012) (henceforth LR), an analysis was presented of a 1-out-of-2 software-based system in which one channel was “possibly perfect”. It was shown that, at the aleatory level, the system pfd (probability of failure on demand) could be bounded above by the product of the pfd of channel A and the pnp (probability of non-perfection) of channel B. This result was presented as a way of avoiding the well-known difficulty that for two certainly-fallible channels, failures of the two will be dependent, i.e. the system pfd cannot be expressed simply as a product of the channel pfds. A price paid in this new approach for avoiding the issue of failure dependence is that the result is conservative. Furthermore, a complete analysis requires that account be taken of epistemic uncertainty – here concerning the numeric values of the two parameters pfdA and pnpB. Unfortunately this introduces a different difficult problem of dependence: estimating the dependence between an assessor’s beliefs about the parameters. The work reported here avoids this problem by obtaining results that require only an assessor’s marginal beliefs about the individual channels, i.e. they do not require knowledge of the dependence between these beliefs. The price paid is further conservatism in the results
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Assessing the Risk due to Software Faults: Estimates of Failure Rate versus Evidence of Perfection.
In the debate over the assessment of software reliability (or safety), as applied to critical software, two extreme positions can be discerned: the ‘statistical’ position, which requires that the claims of reliability be supported by statistical inference from realistic testing or operation, and the ‘perfectionist’ position, which requires convincing indications that the software is free from defects. These two positions naturally lead to requiring different kinds of supporting evidence, and actually to stating the dependability requirements in different ways, not allowing any direct comparison. There is often confusion about the relationship between statements about software failure rates and about software correctness, and about which evidence can support either kind of statement. This note clarifies the meaning of the two kinds of statement and how they relate to the probability of failure-free operation, and discusses their practical merits, especially for high required reliability or safety
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Conservative reasoning about epistemic uncertainty for the probability of failure on demand of a 1-out-of-2 software-based system in which one channel is "possibly perfect"
In earlier work, (Littlewood and Rushby 2011) (henceforth LR), an analysis was presented of a 1-out-of-2 system in which one channel was “possibly perfect”. It was shown that, at the aleatory level, the system pfd could be bounded above by the product of the pfd of channel A and the pnp (probability of non-perfection)of channel B. This was presented as a way of avoiding the well-known difficulty that for two certainly-fallible channels, system pfd cannot be expressed simply as a function of the channel pfds, and in particular not as a product of these. One price paid in this new approach is that the result is conservative – perhaps greatly so. Furthermore, a complete analysis requires that account be taken of epistemic uncertainty – here concerning the numeric values of the two parameters pfdA and pnpB. This introduces some difficulties, particularly concerning the estimation of dependence between an assessor’s beliefs about the parameters. The work reported here avoids these difficulties by obtaining results that require only an assessor’s marginal beliefs about the individual channels, i.e. they do not require knowledge of the dependence between these belief
The problems of assessing software reliability ...When you really need to depend on it
This paper looks at the ways in which the reliability of software can be assessed and predicted. It shows that the levels of reliability that can be claimed with scientific justification are relatively modest
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Modeling the probability of failure on demand (pfd) of a 1-out-of-2 system in which one channel is “quasi-perfect”
Our earlier work proposed ways of overcoming some of the difficulties of lack of independence in reliability modeling of 1-out-of-2 software-based systems. Firstly, it is well known that aleatory independence between the failures of two channels A and B cannot be assumed, so system pfd is not a simple product of channel pfds. However, it has been shown that the probability of system failure can be bounded conservatively by a simple product of pfdA and pnpB (probability not perfect) in those special cases where channel B is sufficiently simple to be possibly perfect. Whilst this “solves” the problem of aleatory dependence, the issue of epistemic dependence remains: An assessor’s beliefs about unknown pfdA and pnpB will not have them independent. Recent work has partially overcome this problem by requiring only marginal beliefs – at the price of further conservatism. Here we generalize these results. Instead of “perfection” we introduce the notion of “quasi-perfection”: a small pfd practically equivalent to perfection (e.g. yielding very small chance of failure in the entire life of a fleet of systems). We present a conservative argument supporting claims about system pfd. We propose further work, e.g. to conduct “what if?” calculations to understand exactly how conservative our approach might be in practice, and suggest further simplifications
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Toward a Formalism for Conservative Claims about the Dependability of Software-Based Systems
In recent work, we have argued for a formal treatment of confidence about the claims made in dependability cases for software-based systems. The key idea underlying this work is "the inevitability of uncertainty": It is rarely possible to assert that a claim about safety or reliability is true with certainty. Much of this uncertainty is epistemic in nature, so it seems inevitable that expert judgment will continue to play an important role in dependability cases. Here, we consider a simple case where an expert makes a claim about the probability of failure on demand (pfd) of a subsystem of a wider system and is able to express his confidence about that claim probabilistically. An important, but difficult, problem then is how such subsystem (claim, confidence) pairs can be propagated through a dependability case for a wider system, of which the subsystems are components. An informal way forward is to justify, at high confidence, a strong claim, and then, conservatively, only claim something much weaker: "I'm 99 percent confident that the pfd is less than 10-5, so it's reasonable to be 100 percent confident that it is less than 10-3." These conservative pfds of subsystems can then be propagated simply through the dependability case of the wider system. In this paper, we provide formal support for such reasoning
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Conservative Claims about the Probability of Perfection of Software-based Systems
In recent years we have become interested in the problem of assessing the probability of perfection of softwarebased systems which are sufficiently simple that they are “possibly perfect”. By “perfection” we mean that the software of interest will never fail in a specific operating environment. We can never be certain that it is perfect, so our interest lies in claims for its probability of perfection. Our approach is Bayesian: our aim is to model the changes to this probability of perfection as we see evidence of failure-free working. Much of the paper considers the difficult problem of expressing prior beliefs about the probability of failure on demand (pfd), and representing these mathematically. This requires the assessor to state his prior belief in perfection as a probability, and also to state what he believes are likely values of the pfd in the event that the system is not perfect. We take the view that it will be impractical for an assessor to express these beliefs as a complete distribution for pfd. Our approach to the problem has three threads. Firstly we assume that, although he cannot provide a full probabilistic description of his uncertainty in a single distribution, the assessor can express some precise but partial beliefs about the unknowns. Secondly, we assume that in the inevitable presence of such incompleteness, the Bayesian analysis needs to provide results that are guaranteed to be conservative (because the analyses we have in mind relate to critical systems). Finally, we seek to prune the set of prior distributions that the assessor finds acceptable in order that the conservatism of the results is no greater than it has to be, i.e. we propose, and eliminate, sets of priors that would appear generally unreasonable. We give some illustrative numerical examples of this approach, and note that the numerical values obtained for the posterior probability of perfection in this way seem potentially useful (although we make no claims for the practical realism of the numbers we use). We also note that the general approach here to the problem of expressing and using limited prior belief in a Bayesian analysis may have wider applicability than to the problem we have addressed
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