Truth and Existence

Halbach has argued that Tarski biconditionals are not ontologically conservative over classical logic, but his argument is undermined by the fact that he cannot include a theory of arithmetic, which functions as a theory of syntax. This article is an improvement on Halbach's argument. By adding the Tarski biconditionals to inclusive negative free logic and the universal closure of minimal arithmetic, which is by itself an ontologically neutral combination, one can prove that at least one thing exists. The result can then be strengthened to the conclusion that infinitely many things exist. Those things are not just all Gödel codes of sentences but rather all natural numbers. Against this background inclusive negative free logic collapses into noninclusive free logic, which collapses into classical logic. The consequences for ontological deflationism with respect to truth are discussed

Reflection using the derivability conditions

Reflection principles are a way to build non-conservative true extensions of a theory. However the application of a reflection principle needs a proof predicate, and the effort needed to provide this is so great as to be not really practical. We look at a possible way to avoid this effort by using, instead of a proof predicate, a predicate defined using only necessary `modal' properties. Surprisingly, we can produce powerful non-conservative extensions this way. But a reflection principle based on such a predicate is essentially weaker, and we also consider its limitations

On the alleged simplicity of impure proof

Roughly, a proof of a theorem, is “pure” if it draws only on what is “close” or “intrinsic” to that theorem. Mathematicians employ a variety of terms to identify pure proofs, saying that a pure proof is one that avoids what is “extrinsic,” “extraneous,” “distant,” “remote,” “alien,” or “foreign” to the problem or theorem under investigation. In the background of these attributions is the view that there is a distance measure (or a variety of such measures) between mathematical statements and proofs. Mathematicians have paid little attention to specifying such distance measures precisely because in practice certain methods of proof have seemed self- evidently impure by design: think for instance of analytic geometry and analytic number theory. By contrast, mathematicians have paid considerable attention to whether such impurities are a good thing or to be avoided, and some have claimed that they are valuable because generally impure proofs are simpler than pure proofs. This article is an investigation of this claim, formulated more precisely by proof- theoretic means. After assembling evidence from proof theory that may be thought to support this claim, we will argue that on the contrary this evidence does not support the claim

On axiom schemes for T-provably Δ1 formulas

This paper investigates the status of the fragments of Peano Arithmetic obtained by restricting induction, collection and least number axiom schemes to formulas which are Δ1 provably in an arithmetic theory T. In particular, we determine the provably total computable functions of this kind of theories. As an application, we obtain a reduction of the problem whether IΔ0+¬exp implies BΣ1 to a purely recursion-theoretic question.Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación MTM2008–0643

Computational reverse mathematics and foundational analysis

Reverse mathematics studies which subsystems of second order arithmetic are equivalent to key theorems of ordinary, non-set-theoretic mathematics. The main philosophical application of reverse mathematics proposed thus far is foundational analysis, which explores the limits of different foundations for mathematics in a formally precise manner. This paper gives a detailed account of the motivations and methodology of foundational analysis, which have heretofore been largely left implicit in the practice. It then shows how this account can be fruitfully applied in the evaluation of major foundational approaches by a careful examination of two case studies: a partial realization of Hilbert's program due to Simpson [1988], and predicativism in the extended form due to Feferman and Sch\"{u}tte. Shore [2010, 2013] proposes that equivalences in reverse mathematics be proved in the same way as inequivalences, namely by considering only $\omega$-models of the systems in question. Shore refers to this approach as computational reverse mathematics. This paper shows that despite some attractive features, computational reverse mathematics is inappropriate for foundational analysis, for two major reasons. Firstly, the computable entailment relation employed in computational reverse mathematics does not preserve justification for the foundational programs above. Secondly, computable entailment is a $\Pi^1_1$ complete relation, and hence employing it commits one to theoretical resources which outstrip those available within any foundational approach that is proof-theoretically weaker than $\Pi^1_1\text{-}\mathsf{CA}_0$.Comment: Submitted. 41 page