10,121 research outputs found

    Models of Consensus for Multiple Agent Systems

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    Models of consensus are used to manage multiple agent systems in order to choose between different recommendations provided by the system. It is assumed that there is a central agent that solicits recommendations or plans from other agents. That agent the n determines the consensus of the other agents, and chooses the resultant consensus recommendation or plan. Voting schemes such as this have been used in a variety of domains, including air traffic control. This paper uses an analytic model to study the use of consensus in multiple agent systems. The binomial model is used to study the probability that the consensus judgment is correct or incorrect. That basic model is extended to account for both different levels of agent competence and unequal prior odds. The analysis of that model is critical in the investigation of multiple agent systems, since the model leads us to conclude that in some cases consensus judgment is not appropriate. In addition, the results allow us to determine how many agents should be used to develop consensus decisions, which agents should be used to develop consensus decisions and under which conditions the consensus model should be used.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Tenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI1994

    Voting to leave: economic insecurity and the Brexit vote

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    This chapter focuses on the political economy of the Brexit vote. It contributes to the debate on British Euroscepticism by examining the impact of economic insecurity. More specifically we explore the determinants of individual support for Brexit by focusing on several factors relating to economic insecurity that have all received significant attention in broader political economy debates including income, occupation, unemployment, poverty and the level and type of education. Our analysis pays particular attention to the labour market position of individuals and the labour market risks they face as we want to examine whether- and if so how- the risk of being unemployed, the risk of being in poverty and housing risk have influenced support for Brexit. We also investigate the impact of income level and source, of being in low skill occupations in areas where immigration has been particularly salient, and of having studied a higher education degree that is ‘protective’ (medicine or law)

    Aggregation of Coarse Preferences

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    We consider weak preference orderings over a set An of n alternatives. An individual preference is of refinement lindividual preferences; voting rules; aggregation

    Spain’s referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty: a quantitative analysis within the conceptual framework of first and second order elections

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    In contrast to the attention devoted to the rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty at French and Dutch referenda; the Spanish referendum, where this Treaty was ratified, remained under-researched by political scientists. This paper analyses the voting behaviour at the Spanish referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty with the use of quantitative methods and the concept of first and second-order elections. This paper finds that the Spanish referendum was a second-order referendum, because the effects of domestic political issues in Spain had a greater impact on the electoral behaviour of Spanish voters than had genuinely European issues. This finding raises doubts over the suitability of using direct democracy in the EU in order to raise the legitimacy and democratic accountability of the European project

    Explaining Disparities between Actual and Hypothetical Stated Values: Further Investigation Using Meta-Analysis

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    Spurred by the need to account for non-market values in various policy applications, a lively and extended debate has surrounded the presence and magnitude of hypothetical bias in stated value studies (e.g., applications of the survey-based contingent valuation method). Using the rapidly accumulating set of comparison studies, List and Gallet (2001) conducted an initial meta-analysis of the experimental protocol that may be influencing the disparity between real and hypothetical values in stated value studies. We expand the original meta-analysis by using a significantly larger (29%) data set, including variables to account for referendum formats, certainty corrections, and cheap talk scripts.

    Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules Using Voting Records

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    In certain judgmental situations where a “correct” decision is presumed to exist, optimal decision making requires evaluation of the decision-maker's capabilities and the selection of the appropriate aggregation rule. The major and so far unresolved difficulty is the former necessity. This paper presents the optimal aggregation rule that simultaneously satisfies these two interdependent necessary requirements. In our setting, some record of the voters' past decisions is available, but the correct decisions are not known. We observe that any arbitrary evaluation of the decision-maker's capabilities as probabilities yields some optimal aggregation rule that, in turn, yields a maximum-likelihood estimation of decisional skills. Thus, a skill-evaluation equilibrium can be defined as an evaluation of decisional skills that yields itself as a maximum-likelihood estimation of decisional skills. We show that such equilibrium exists and offer a procedure for finding one. The obtained equilibrium is locally optimal and is shown empirically to generally be globally optimal in terms of the correctness of the resulting collective decisions. Interestingly, under minimally competent (almost symmetric) skill distributions that allow unskilled decision makers, the optimal rule considerably outperforms the common simple majority rule (SMR). Furthermore, a sufficient record of past decisions ensures that the collective probability of making a correct decision converges to 1, as opposed to accuracy of about 0.7 under SMR. Our proposed optimal voting procedure relaxes the fundamental (and sometimes unrealistic) assumptions in Condorcet celebrated theorem and its extensions, such as sufficiently high decision-making quality, skill homogeneity or existence of a sufficiently large group of decision makers.

    When who and how matter: explaining the success of referendums in Europe

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    This article aims to identify the institutional factors that make a referendum successful. This comparative analysis seeks to explain the success of top-down referendums organized in Europe between 2001 and 2013. It argues and tests for the main effect of three institutional factors (popularity of the initiator, size of parliamentary majority, and political cues during referendum campaigns) and controls for the type of referendum and voter turnout. The analysis uses data collected from referendums and electoral databases, public opinion surveys, and newspaper articles. Results show that referendums proposed by a large parliamentary majority or with clear messages from political parties during campaign are likely to be successful

    Political Economists are Neither Selfish Nor Indoctrinated

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    Most professional economists believe that economists in general are more selfish than other persons and that this greater selfishness is due to economics education. This paper offers empirical evidence against this widely held belief. Using a unique data set about giving behavior in connection with two social funds at the University of Zurich, it is shown that economics education does not make people act more selfishly. Rather, this natural experiment suggests that the particular behavior of economists can be explained by a selection effect.economists, public good, giving behavior, education, selection

    When who and how matter: explaining the success of referendums in Europe

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    This article aims to identify the institutional factors that make a referendum successful. This comparative analysis seeks to explain the success of top-down referendums organized in Europe between 2001 and 2013. It argues and tests for the main effect of three institutional factors (popularity of the initiator, size of parliamentary majority, and political cues during referendum campaigns) and controls for the type of referendum and voter turnout. The analysis uses data collected from referendums and electoral databases, public opinion surveys, and newspaper articles. Results show that referendums proposed by a large parliamentary majority or with clear messages from political parties during campaign are likely to be successful
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