Consensus reaching in committees

In this paper, we apply a consensus model to decision-making in committees that have to choose one or more alternatives from a set of alternatives. The model does not use a voting rule nor a set of winning coalitions. Every decision maker evaluates each alternative with respect to given criteria. The criteria may be of unequal importance to a decision maker. Decision makers may be advised by a chairman to adjust their preferences, i.e., to change their evaluation of some alternative(s) or/and the importance of the criteria, in order to obtain a better consensus. The consensus result should satisfy constraints concerning the consensus degree and the ma jority degree. A simple example is presented.constraints satisfaction; consensus; committees

‘Relais actors’ and co-decision first reading agreements in the European Parliament : the case of the advanced therapies regulation

The processing of the advanced therapies regulation is of particular interest to scholars of the European Union's (EU) legislative process and students of the European Parliament (EP) because it provides a case study which throws light upon assumptions commonly made about the role of the EP's ‘relais actors’, the promotion of consensus-building within and between parliamentary committees, and the development of intraorganizational rules in response to early agreements in the co-decision procedure. An examination of the EP's processing of the advanced therapies dossier provides an ‘unusual’ but vivid illustration of how the identification of committee rapporteurs as the most important parliamentary ‘relais actors’ fails to capture the increasingly important roles performed by shadow rapporteurs. Significantly, the ‘unusual’ occurrences associated with the processing of the advanced therapies regulation came at a crucial juncture in the reconsideration of the EP's intraorganizational rules in relation to early agreements and the subsequent adoption of new Rules of Procedure in 2009

Much Ado About Nothing? Comitology as a Feature of EU Policy Implementation and its Effects on the Democratic Arena. IHS Political Science Series: 2001, No. 78

The previously neglected phenomenon of governance by committees has recently received increasing attention in the academic literature. This paper focuses on the consequences of the arrangements prevailing in the committees active in the implementing phase of EU-legislation on the practice of democracy and legitimacy. The so-called "comitology committees" can be seen as a good example of the tension between input- and output-based sources of legitimacy. On the one hand the EP has demanded its increased involvement in this system ever since these committees were established. On the other hand (preliminary) studies have shown that Members of the European Parliament seem to be overwhelmed with the scrutiny or even the filing of draft implementing measures. This gives rise to the question of increasing the legitimacy of committee work and at the same time preserving the "efficiency" of this (presumably) cooperative form of decision making. This phenomenon is illustrated by means of a case study of committees active in the field of health and consumer protection

Water management issues in the Hadejia-Jama’are-Komadugu-Yobe Basin: DFID- JWL and stakeholders experience in information sharing, reaching consensus and physical interventions

River basinsWater resource managementWater governanceSocial participation

Committee Governance after the Enlargement of the EU: the Institutionalisation of Cooperation within the Social Protection Committee

Specialised committees form an important part of the policy-making process in the European Union. After the 2004 enlargement of the EU, the institutional setup of these committees and the practice of Ôcommittee governanceÕ have been considerably challenged. The Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) is a mode of governance in which the work of expert committees is essential. Open and consensus-oriented discussions in committee meetings are regarded as a precondition of the success of the OMC and as a basis of its legitimacy. However, with ten new member states joining OMC committees, the institutional conditions of discussions change. This article provides a discursive conceptual framework for analysing the undergoing changes, and applies it to the case of the Social Protection Committee.committee governance, EU enlargement, Open Method of Co-ordination, discursive institutionalisation

Revitalizing Multilateral Governance at the World Trade Organization Report of the High-Level Board of Experts on the Future of Global Trade Governance. Bertelsmann Policy Brief 2018

If international trade is not governed by rules, mere might dictates what is right. The World Trade Organization (WTO) serves as a place where trade policy issues are addressed, disputes arbitrated, legal frameworks derived and enforced. Through these functions, the WTO ensures that the rules of trade policy are inspired by fairness and reciprocity rather than national interest. It is more important than ever to vitalize the global public good that it rep-resents against various threats that have been undermining it. Therefore, the Global Economic Dynamics project of the Bertelsmann Stiftung has called into life a High-Level Board of Experts on the Future of Global Trade Governance. Composed of eminent experts and seasoned trade diplomats, it elaborated a series of feasible policy recommendations that will increase the effectiveness and sali-ence of the WTO. We hope that this Report provides helpful suggestions in a time marked by increasing trade disputes and protectionism and instead contributes to stronger multilateral institutions and fora.1 The Bertelsmann Stiftung owes a debt of gratitude to Prof Bernard Hoekman, the Chairman of the Expert Board and author of this report. His invaluable expertise and experience, guidance and ability to bridge controversial opinions have been crucial in defining the work of the Board. We would also like to express our sincere thanks to all our Board Members, who generously contributed their expertise, time and networks. Without their dedication, this Report would not have been possible. Finally, we would like to thank Robert Koopman and Aik Hoe Lim of the WTO for their support throughout the whole process and Christian Bluth of Bertelsmann Stiftung for managing this common endeavour

Basics of Business Reorganization in Bankruptcy

In this article, Steven Schwarcz offers an overview of Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In addition to beginning a Chapter 11 case, he also discusses administration of these cases and the plan of reorganization that a debtor must consider